

JPRS 75378

26 March 1980

West Europe Report

No. 1557



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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REPORT ON TESTS OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINE 'LE TONNANT'

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Feb 80 pp 162-163

[Article by Jean Labayle: "Testing of SNLE 'Le Tonnant'"]

[Text] Our fifth SNLE [Missile-Launching Nuclear Submarine] "Le Tonnant," left the Cherbourg navy yard on the night of 18-19 December for the L'Ile Longue naval base near Brest. It will continue its tests at this nuclear submarine base before beginning the extended sea trials that always precede the commissioning of new ships for active service. It will then be ready to begin its first operational cruise. "Le Tonnant" is of the "Le Redoutable" class and has all of the improvements made in that class of SNLE since the first one became operational in December 1971. Its main characteristics are as follows: hull of a grade of steel with a high elastic stress limit allowing a maximum operating depth of much more than 200 meters; submerged displacement: 7,900 tons; dimensions: 128X10.6X10 meters; power plant: one pressurized water reactor fueled with highly enriched uranium, two turbogenerators, one electric motor driving a large-sized propeller, plus an auxiliary propulsion unit with a power generator to supplement the main power plant if necessary; submarine's range with auxiliary power unit: approximately 5,000 nautical miles; speed: 20 knots; strategic weapons: 16 M-20 missiles; tactical weapons: four 550-mm tubes (18 torpedoes); crew: two, each consisting of 15 officers and 120 men, the "blue" crew rotating patrol missions with the "red" crew.

The M-20 missile with which our five SNLE's are or will be equipped is a two-stage ballistic missile with a range of more than 3,000 kilometers. It is armed with a 1-megaton thermonuclear warhead and equipped with improved penetration aids giving it a large penetration capability. Last July, when submerged in waters off the Landes Test Center, "Le Tonnant" conducted a highly successful test firing of the M-20 missile. This firing raised to more than 10 the number of successive successful firings of this type of missile. Most of these firings were from submerged submarines.

We will now have to wait until 1985 for our sixth SNLE, "L'Inflexible," to become operational. As far as its main characteristics are concerned, this newest SNLE will be quite similar to its predecessors, but unlike the latter, it will benefit from many of the more recent technical and technological advances, notably in its navigation and diving system, its communications and underwater detection capabilities. "L'Inflexible" will be equipped with the new M-4 missile. This three-stage missile system will have a range of more than 4,000 kilometers and be armed with a multiple reentry vehicle (MRV), in other words each one of its multiple warheads will have an individualized trajectory. These warheads--6 or 7 in number--will have a 150-kiloton yield, a very high degree of accuracy, and a greater penetration capability than the M-20 missile, thanks to much more effective hardening and improved countermeasures. The missile-launching system will be different. It will have a greater rate of fire and be a much more secure system. The M-4 missile will be launchable from a much greater operating depth. It will subsequently replace the M-20 missile on the earlier SNLE's, except perhaps "Le Redoutable," because of the latter's age when this modernization eventually takes place. The launch tubes on these earlier SNLE's will have to be enlarged to accommodate the M-4 missile.

Last July, an M-20 missile equipped with an M-4 type reentry vehicle was fired for the purpose of studying reentry into the atmosphere of the M-4's multiple warheads. Good results were obtained from this firing which had been preceded by two other test launches in December 1978 and April 1979 to study the separation and reentry of M-4 warheads. This July test firing marked an important stage in the development of the M-4 multiple warheads and their guidance system.

8041

CSO: 3100

EC'S BRUNNER CALLS FOR ACTION ON ENERGY PROGRAM

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 15 Feb 80 p 28

[Article by Guido Brunner: "European Energy Pact Now"]

[Text] Let us be honest: Afghanistan has alarmed us also because there is impending danger to secure supplies of oil from the Near East. Oil is becoming the high stakes of large-scale politics in increasingly shorter intervals. Our position still does not acknowledge the importance of these stakes.

Oil grew scarce and expensive during the oil crisis of 1973/74. There followed an unparalleled economic crisis, but the situation returned to normal. Was it then merely an operational breakdown for the world economy? Let us look at oil consumption. It has of course flattened out, but the FRG today is using not 5 percent less each year, but 3 percent more. Anyone who points this out is reminded of economic growth -- greater than 4 percent in real terms last year. This is unattainable without oil.

This argument indicates one thing above all. We continue to think in the old progressions: more jobs, greater growth, greater oil consumption. Broad sections of our energy policy are beset with taboos. Our imagination floats around within the four walls of the traditional economic policy calculation for the next year. Economy measures and new sources, of course, but merely as residual items in the overall economic accounting. This is the wrong approach.

Let us assume for a moment that we had done everything quite differently after 1973/74, that in 1973 we had practiced crisis management for energy and not for the market. Assume that we had without delay instituted massive economy measures and gradually found substitutes for oil for heating, motor vehicle fuels and electricity. The European Community would not be dependent upon imports for 51 percent of its energy requirements, as it is today; the figure would probably be only 40 or 30 percent. There would be more oil in the world at lower prices. The European Community's oil bill would not amount to \$ 100 billion in 1980, but perhaps to only half that figure. The other half would not be disrupting the

world's foreign exchange markets and the dollar; it would be solid capital, invested in a secure energy structure oriented toward the future. Such is not the case. Are we going to sleep through a turning point in world history a second time?

We must finally recognize that energy is an exceptional sector which demands exceptional politics in the future. Energy is not only an economic variable but a factor of peace. We shall maintain the peace if we reduce our dependence. We can do this rapidly or at a more leisurely pace. In light of the world situation, only a record pace will save us from future jolts. Swift action faces resistance from private enterprise. The extraction of oil and gasoline from coal is technically possible; it is not yet economically possible. A radical conversion of the supply base to economical energy is not a problem technically, but it probably is in terms of industrial management.

The difficulty could be surmounted. It requires only an unusual financial effort. Energy investments must be made possible, periods of return flow of capital shortened and profitability problems surmounted. We have proposed that this be achieved on the basis of national programs within the framework of a European solidarity action.

It could take this form: Our governments would agree on priority programs. They would make possible specific tax breaks in order to allow more leeway for write-offs and profits. For its part, the European Community would provide for fair competition and additional funds. We could develop a new source of financing by levying a small tax on oil imports. It would be earmarked specifically for energy investments in Europe.

It is argued in opposition to this plan that the oil-producing countries might regard the import tax as an unfriendly act and decide to raise prices. Of course prices will continue to rise, but not because we are finally executing a resolute energy policy but because we have hitherto neglected to do so. Effects on the inflationary trend are also being predicted. My response to this is that such effects will occur if the market and our policy permit it. First of all, however, the large oil companies must step forward. I cannot imagine that they fail to recognize the demands of the hour. Given their current income statements, they will not want to suggest new price increases to us right away. But even if prices fluctuate, energy will become more expensive no matter what. There is but one difference. If the oil-producing countries order price increases for us, capital will flow out to foreign countries and be gone. If we anticipate the oil-price increases, then we can use these funds to assure our own energy future.

To be sure, without coordination in the European Community the stability pact for energy will not succeed. We cannot afford distortions brought on by competition. The Common Market would not survive a subsidy race in the hour of its energy emergency.

7458

CSO: 3103

COUNTRY SECTION

WEST GERMANY TO REVIVE TURKISH INTEREST IN NATO

Cologne RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in Germany 15 Feb 80 p 10

[Article by Wolfgang Hoepker: "From Partnership to Sponsorship: German Relief Action for Ankara"]

[Text] In today's much discussed division of labor of the Western Alliance, the FRG has been allocated a key task in supporting Turkey. Bonn is facing a mountain of problems.

Among all the NATO partners, the FRG is considered to be the country having the best relationship with Turkey. U.S.-Turkish relations have cooled considerably during the last few years and are even now, after a renewed warming trend, beset by resentment and problems. Relations with Great Britain are normal and on an even keel, ("uneventful"), but they are not marked by any special sympathies either. France is considered an irritant in Ankara these days, since the Turks feel justified in accusing Giscard of open partisanship in favor of Athens in the Turkish-Greek Cyprus conflict and in the question of sovereignty in the Aegean.

In matters concerning the Western Alliance, the European Community and bilateral contacts and liaisons, the Turkish leadership continues to assure its citizens that Germany is their most reliable ally. The key role attributed by Ankara to Germany in the context of relations with the West is suddenly and strongly highlighted by the worldwide crisis of this particular period. In implementing the comprehensive relief efforts designed to support and economically stabilize Turkey, the FRG has drawn the responsibility for overall control. What this means is that partnership is being expanded into sponsorship.

Bonn has not been anxious to assume that role. It is the result of a special relationship based on confidence. Furthermore, the FRG is faced with the task (based on the motto "Atlantic Division of Labor") of relieving the burden of its American ally who more than ever has worldwide preoccupations, with heavy concentration on the Middle East. Inasmuch as the FRG, in accordance with a sort of "Bonn Doctrine," does not enter into any kind of military obligation outside the NATO area, weapons and armament support for Turkey appears to be an appropriate field of endeavor.

The huge Anatolian landmass, almost a subcontinent in itself, which forms a hinge between Europe and Asia, occupies a sensitive corner in world politics these days. In view of Soviet imperialism's expansionist pressures toward the South, imminent dangers emanate from this area. Turkey appears like a bridgehead toward the Near East, and, in its capacity as a neighbor of Iran, also toward the Middle East. Due to its position along the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, Turkey, as the "Guardian of the straits," controls the waterways leading from the USSR into the Mediterranean. As a cornerstone between the Middle East, Southern Europe, the Mediterranean and the USSR, Turkey today more than ever occupies a key position in all aspects of Western security.

But this cornerstone has begun to crumble and is in urgent need of reinforcement. The major reason for this is the Turkish-Greek conflict which has been smoldering since 1974, the catastrophic year of the Cyprus crisis, which has made NATO's southern flank vulnerable. It has close connections also with the brittle U.S. weapons embargo, brought about by the Greek lobby in the United States as a sort of punitive action for Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. For several years, it denied Turkey the delivery of modern weapons and of spare parts for its obsolescent weaponry.

Especially in view of this self-inflicted impairment of Western defense capability, there is a great deal that must be done to bring military aid up to date. Heading the Turkish shopping list, apart from Starfighters, is the delivery of 70 Leopard 1 tanks.

In view of massive Greek protests, Bonn is of course delaying its decisions. There is to be no basic change in the intention of "equalizing" military aid to Turkey and Greece. But Athens, which is still insisting on a departure from NATO military integration, hardly has grounds for complaint if the Western Alliance gives assistance to Turkey, which it regards as the more reliable and more important ally from a geostrategic viewpoint.

Germany enjoys the Turkish army's confidence far in excess of that accorded any other nation. This has its roots in a historic basis which found its most significant expression in their "comrades-in-arms" relationship of World War I. In Germany, this episode has long faded into oblivion. But in Turkey there persists a sentimental memory of the encounter of Ottoman and German soldiers, and of names like Liman von Sanders and von der Goltz. It even goes back to Moltke's assignment as Prussian military advisor to the Ottoman court during the 1830's. His "Letters from Turkey," a literary masterwork, constitute a blueprint for German-Turkish relationships.

German-Turkish friendship has outlasted the fall of both monarchies. Stimulated by Turkish orientation toward the West under Kemal Ataturk, it continued into the era of the Weimar Republic. Ataturk, who died in 1938, had managed to resist Hitler's efforts to lure him into a treaty through flexible delaying tactics. In World War II, Turkey remained neutral until almost the end of the fighting. After the founding of the FRG, Turkey was among the first to enter into diplomatic relations with Bonn.

Turkey's Western orientation was to find its full expression in its joining the European Community in 1963, designed to supplement its economic integration into NATO. But the process of adapting this primarily agricultural developing country to highly industrialized Western Europe began increasingly to stagnate. This was one reason for Turkey to place special expectations upon support from the FRG, its most important trade partner. The Bosphorus Bridge, opened in 1973, which links Europe and Asia into a "double continent," is seen by the Turks as a symbol of German achievement.

As a preliminary to lightening Anatolia's economic and social burdens, we must note the stream of Turkish guest laborers into the FRG. This provided Turkey, whose population had swollen to 44 million people, with a safety valve for disposing of its army of unemployed and underemployed. Including women and children, 1.2 million Turks are presently living in our midst.

The expression "the sick man on the Bosphorus" was once coined to describe the decaying Ottoman Empire. Despite its errant ways, disturbances, reverses and tensions resulting in terrorism, today's Turkey has more vitality than is apparent to the outside observer. As a "transitional country," Turkey is making the painful transition from an agrarian to an industrialized country, which other countries would bring about through dictatorial measures. Turkey has so far managed to resist that temptation.

The Turkish army is a power factor in the background to an extent hardly possible in any other country. In the final analysis, the government can go only so far as the army will permit. But this cannot and must not mean that the military, alarmed by terrorism and economic misery, will itself take power, as was the case during the 1960 coup d'etat. Its entry into the political arena ended in failure at the time, and it profits from that experience. An army which engages in running a country is in danger of losing its fighting capability. Its best people turn into administrators and it becomes bogged down in tasks for which it is neither prepared nor trained. Of necessity, it loses its defensive capability—a luxury which today's Turkey can afford less than ever before.

Democracy was not imposed upon Turkey against its will. Despite the growing wave of Muslim consciousness, parliamentary procedure in this country has a tradition and roots of its own. Turkey is much more able than its Arab neighbors to assimilate the new Islamic vitality into its democratic order.

We must adopt the thinking of a German diplomat who is familiar with Turkish realities. Ekkehard Eickhoff (presently German ambassador to South Africa) wrote the following in a Festschrift for Golo Mann: "Despite the great burdens and dangers confronting her, Turkey has a great opportunity to reconcile Islam with parliamentary democracy, and modern industrial technology and economics with obsolete Asiatic ways of thinking. Should this synthesis be crowned with success, Turkey could render invaluable services to the people inhabiting the Middle East and the Near East, and thereby to the cause of peace in this part of the world."

GREEK PRIME MINISTER BRIEFS WEST GERMAN MINISTER

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 23 Feb 80 p 7

[Text]

West German Finance Minister, Hans Matthoefer, assured Greece last Sunday that any future economic aid to Turkey would not upset the balance of power in the region. "You can be assured that we will keep the sensitivities of the region in mind, as we have always done in the past," he said.

In an interview with the Athens News Agency, Herr Matthoefer said. "It is in our common interest to make a new multi-lateral effort to overcome the difficulties in the Turkish economy. Stability in Turkey is important for the stability in the region and of Western Europe as a whole."

Herr Matthoefer was making a one-day stop over in Athens on his way to Ankara Sunday to acquaint himself with what he called "actual difficulties of the Turkish economy". He said. "I want to know what has to be done, and that is why I am visiting Turkey".

Herr Matthoefer had a one-hour talk with Premier Karamanlis and then met with Foreign Minister George Rallis, Coordination Minister Mitsotakis, Finance Minister Kanellopoulos and EC Minister Kontogeorgis. He said that West Germany has been and will remain a friend of Greece and Turkey, so "it is normal that I visit both countries".

Departure statement

In an airport statement before his departure for Ankara, the German Minister said Prime Minister Karamanlis had briefed him on the situation in the region and "I briefed him on our efforts to set up an economic assistance programme for Turkey, which faces a very difficult economic situation." This programme, he said, would include major western organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation (OECD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EEC.

He reported that Greek government leaders had told him that Greece too was interested in the restoration of stable economic conditions in Turkey.

Herr Matthoefer further said that during his talks he had stressed his government's interest in Greece's return to NATO's military wing from which the country had withdrawn following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. He said that such a move would strengthen the Alliance and that the Greek government was showing a similar interest.

Unfortunately, he said, there were still problems between Greece and Turkey that had to be solved by those two countries. "We hope that both

countries will find a way out of these difficulties within the Alliance, and that our demonstration of solidarity which we have shown in the past to both of them and are showing right now will encourage them to do so. You can be assured — and my visit to Athens shows this clearly — that we will keep the sensitivities of the region in mind," he said.

Economy in good shape

Herr Matthofer said there was no question of forthcoming economic aid to Greece which will soon enter the EEC and requires no special economic assistance, since the Greek economy was in "very good condition and its unemployment level much healthier than that of other countries."

He also said that certain difficulties that would arise from Greece's entry into the EEC would gradually diminish as a result of the country's share in the Community's regional funds.

PROSPECTS FOR HIGHER TRADE BETWEEN ITALY-GREECE

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 16 Feb 80 pp 2, 3, 4

[Interview with Dr Luigi Deserti, president of the Italian Institute for Foreign Trade--date, place not given]

[Text] In a recent talk with BUSINESS AND FINANCE, Dr Luigi Deserti, president of the Italian Institute for Foreign Trade, comments on the prospects of the formation of a Common Mediterranean Policy and the possibility of greater Greek-Italian trade exchanges following Greek accession to the EC. Mr Deserti in particular stressed the importance of promoting two-way trade by both sides and not merely pursuing a greater promotion of exports.

B&F: *First of all I would like to ask you a question relating to what we might call a Common Mediterranean policy; something between Greece, Italy, Spain and other EEC or future EEC members.*

Deserti: Well, my own opinion is that if we work to organise a regional policy, we should be the ones to promote it. After all, we are a completely Mediterranean country; more so for instance than France or Spain; this would however be in the general interest of all. Nobody would suffer from an attempt to harmonise our economies, but, as I said, I believe we should be its guide. Of course I cannot say that all sections of the population will necessarily agree with this, for instance farmers and agriculturalists.

I think that in the same way there is a certain exaggerated response on their

part to what they feel may be dangers to their interests by the accession of Greece to the Community. I believe that as far as Greece is concerned we have to consider it in the same way in which we consider the problems of different regions in Italy. Italian regional producers who produce the same crops do not confront each other. I believe we should see Greece in the same way, as another regional producer; just as we see two regions here producing, for instance peaches, but working together.

Incidentally, I have just had a meeting with the President of the Greek Association of Fruit Importers at which we discussed the future, our immediate futures, and I agreed to organise in Rome, at my Institute, a meeting as soon as possible, between the Associations of both Greek and Italian fruit producers,

to see what they can do to cooperate together, and I believe there is a real possibility of exchanging views, information in general, and market information thus facing the markets of Northern Europe together. I believe we can discuss future developments and possibly organise joint ventures. This, I feel is a good idea in our mutual interest.

B&F: *Do you believe that a Common Mediterranean Policy, if we might call it that, would be resented by other Community members such as Germany or England, for instance.*

Deserti: I do not think they will be unduly disturbed because anything they do in the general field of development tends to increase business in the developed countries anyway.

In any case I doubt that in the medium term we will find much room for economic countries; and thus firstly in the Mediterranean. Therefore our own efforts will be of better benefit to us.

B&F: *Yes, but on the other hand Mr. President, the North African countries do have a big potential for development as far as production goes.*

Deserti: Yes but do not forget there are two points to keep in mind here. First of all they cannot concentrate on export production, i.e. cash production, and second they tend to develop production to meet the food needs of the local populations. It is therefore up to us to some extent to cooperate with them in assisting them to attack the production problem aggressively, particularly in the field of products that we no longer produce; or at least may soon give up producing.

I think we also have to bear in mind that we in Italy still tend to think that

agriculture is very important for us also, but perhaps not so important as people say it is. We could do better of course, but if you go down to the South of Italy now you will find people are much more interested in industrial development, and this is why we have problems to face. We have to make adjustments; for what we lose on one side we will gain on the other.

B&F: *Mr. President - a lot of Italian products are exported to Greece. Do you foresee a greater future development in this field with expanding exports to Greece?*

Deserti: Well, I think our interest is to have a more balanced interchange. We are very much interested, and indeed happy, to note that, apart from the situation at present, Greece, in the last two to three years has increased its exports to Italy and these are higher at present than Italian exports to Greece.

I believe the trend is good and that we have to continue to assist Greece to export more to Italy as we know from experience that when trade is unbalanced against one side at a certain moment the exchange stops; this is dangerous and against our interests. We would very much like to buy more from Greece and I think we have to look out for opportunities for the exchange also of technology and "know how"; thus possibly engaging in joint ventures to assist towards increases in trade on both sides.

B&F: *Are you at present expecting an increase in exports from Greece to Italy of specific products?*

Deserti: I do not really know in what fields you wish to operate to

increase exports to Italy. I do not know in fact what products you want to promote. I would really like to find out your thinking. You have to study our market just as you do your own.

In this connection remember that our Foreign Trade Institute is not only an office operating in the field of exports, but also interests itself in imports and likes to assist the importer because there are frequently many products which you may be able to deliver at better prices. This is also the philosophy of our Institute - imports and exports.

B&F: *I hope the Greek Government will take advantage of this.*

Deserti: I also hope so. We are at your disposal. I may say that we would entirely agree that you publish on our behalf that our organisation is not based only on assisting Italian exporters or the Greek importer but is available to give advice on all forms of Greek products and future products.

"I think we also have to bear in mind that we in Italy still tend to think that agriculture is very important for us also, but perhaps not so important as people say it is."

B&F: *Are there any specific steps that Greeks should take in order to take advantage of all this to increase their exports to Italy?*

Deserti: I think the best thing to do is what we do with other countries; that is you send a delegation or committee of individuals from either government and/or business and industry to meet with our people to discuss possibilities. Sometimes, I do not know exactly how often, but it has happened that we

ourselves suggest to other countries things they might produce which we ourselves have not produced or have not enough production to meet our needs.

B&F: *Do you believe this might be the case with Greece?*

Deserti: Of course.

B&F: *I wonder, Mr. President, if you are aware that recently the Greek Government took some restrictive measures as far as imports are concerned and I wonder whether you think these measures may have a restrictive effect on Italian imports to Greece.*

Deserti: Well at the moment I can say that we have had the same situation, and the same restrictive measures, twice. In a difficult situation the Italian Government did the same; I think the effect was positive. I cannot say quite honestly whether it really was or not, or whether we could have had the same results in the end without the measures; it's difficult to demonstrate the contrary.

Of course six months is not a long period - and of course I do not know the figures which brought about your government's decision. I suppose they had good reasons. When this happened in Italy I was not President of the Institute of Foreign Trade, just an importer, and I complained, but we survived, and you know there is an important point here - that when the regulations are eased people buy more and more; this is actually what happens.

B&F: *Does this mean that when the regulations are lifted the results will become negative?*

Deserti: Yes — but it is difficult to explain there is the psychological effect, and if people understand the reasons why things are being done the effect might be good with a quietening effect for some period. I am not one hundred percent against the measures; and I am speaking how as an importer and businessman not as President of the Foreign Trade Institute.

If there is a shortage of money some people will be put out of business and of course all drastic decisions are not going to be easy to accept and make people happy.

Now: I am an Italian and I do not know exactly your situation. Speaking from personal experience, we passed two difficult periods, and not only did we survive, but we developed more and more

"We have opened the office (in Athens) because we believe in the interchange and development of relations between Greece and Italy on both sides"

afterwards. I hope you will have the same experience — a moment of difficulty and

then more important developments.

In general, we have the same problems as yours and understand your views. What is important is that you are coming into the European Community and, as you know, our government is very much in favour of this, and I can also tell you the business community is also in favour.

Our government wishes to assist Greece in this. From my point of view, speaking as the President of Institute of Foreign Trade, we will use our Organisation, "know how" and experience to help you.

B&F: *That is very interesting and important. Is there anything else you would care to add, Mr. President?*

Deserti: Just to stress what I said before that our intentions have been demonstrated by opening an office in Athens with efficient and competent staff. That best expresses our intentions. We have opened the office because we believe in the interchange and development of relations between Greece and Italy on both sides.

SEVERAL SWISS SPIES WATCHED AUSTRIAN ARMY MANEUVERS

Geneva JOURNAL DE GENEVE in French 22 Jan 80 p 4

[Article by J.-P. Gat: "The Schilling Affair - 'Spy' Sent to Austria Said to be One of a Dozen!"]

[Text] Berne--There is a minor drama developing in what is conveniently called, for greater ease, the Schilling Affair, concerning this Swiss citizen and former army first lieutenant who was sentenced by an Austrian court at the end of last year to five months' imprisonment, suspended. Kurt Schilling was not the only one who observed the maneuvers of the Austrian army last fall. He was only one of the agents--a particularly mediocre one since he let himself be arrested--among a dozen or more others who had been commissioned by the Federal Department of Defense.

This information was produced by the Zurich daily newspaper TAGES ANZEIGER in an article by its Vienna correspondent. It will be remembered that Kurt Schilling was commissioned by Colonel Albert Bachmann, who was relieved of his duties last November and is currently under administrative investigation. On the basis of the Zurich newspaper's "revelations," the following situation unfolds in this affair:

Kurt Schilling was not the only one covering the Austrian army's maneuvers in the Vienna area; rather, there were eleven other agents with him (or possibly more) who had been commissioned by the Defense Department or by Albert Bachmann, whose actions in this case are said to have been taken on his own initiative.

Rudolf Gnaegi, who was the minister of defense at that time, gave his backing to this operation. Reportedly, this was disclosed to the Vienna correspondent of the Zurich daily by "independent Austrian and Swiss sources."

Other operations of a similar nature are said to have been carried out in the FRG and in Italy, always with the objective of covering military maneuvers.

Shaking of Heads at the Defense Department

At the Federal Department of Defense they are shaking their heads in denial: No, no one was aware of Colonel Bachmann's machinations. Besides, the investigation concerning this matter is still underway. It should be concluded "very soon." With regard to the so-called "expeditions" to Italy and the FRG, their purpose was to train Bachmann to spot an unknown partner; in addition, Bachmann was to collect information which was not secret and had no particular significance.

The Defense Department further comments that Bachmann will probably not be reinstated in the department. It will simply be a matter of deciding the conditions of his separation. But it is true that the investigation concerning his own case has not been concluded, nor the military investigation concerning Kurt Schilling.

Rudolf Gnaegi, in turn, denies any knowledge of Colonel Bachmann's doings. He had previously made a statement to this effect in parliament.

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CSO: 3100

KREISKY FAVORS TOUGHER STANCE TOWARD SOVIET UNION

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 22 Feb 80 pp 40-41

[Interview with Bruno Kreisky, federal chancellor of Austria, by WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE editor Wolfgang Stockklauser; Vienna, date not given]

[Text] [Question] Chancellor, since the entry of Soviet forces in Afghanistan world interest has focused on Asia. You have lately returned from travels in the Middle and Far East. What were your impressions, and what did you learn?

[Answer] In Afghanistan the Soviet Union has used military force to intervene in an internal dispute. That is an occurrence which must clearly be condemned. On the other hand we must not forget that Afghanistan has always been within the power sphere of the Soviet Union, and that the latter has always affected the composition of the Afghan Government.

[Question] Do you think that the invasion was prepared a long time ago?

[Answer] The invasion has dramatically exemplified the Soviet Union's claim to power in Afghanistan. The Afghan people are defending themselves against the Soviets, and the more they struggle the more they will obviously be oppressed.

[Question] The United States are aiding the Afghan rebel movement against the Soviet Union. Do you see this as representing the danger of a confrontation?

[Answer] It is a perfectly normal event for any people to fight for their rights and homeland. I do not know how far U.S. aid to the patriots actually extends. Certainly the issue does not thereby become easier, even though the moral aspects are not in doubt. Concerning Pakistan, the military enhancement of that state is not without danger because, according to Indian views, Pakistan is not stable internationally.

[Question] You were in India also and talked with the Prime Minister. How does she view these developments?

[Answer] Indira Gandhi is very concerned about Pakistan rearmament. These weapons, she feels, could well be directed against India one of these days. The unstable situation in Pakistan on the one hand and Indian mistrust of China on the other are the reasons why the New Delhi Government has drawn closer to the Soviet Union.

[Question] Does Mrs Gandhi consider the Soviet Union the lesser evil?

[Answer] India feels threatened by her neighbors, not by the Soviet Union.

[Question] Despite Afghanistan?

[Answer] That has made no difference to the Indian attitude. Mrs Gandhi does not approve the entry of the Soviet Army. She rejects any intervention. Still, India does not feel threatened by the Soviet Union.

[Question] How should the West react to the disruption of the balance by the Soviet Union? Do you think economic sanctions would be meaningful?

[Answer] It is not up to me to give advice to the West. I must say, though, that I do not think much of economic sanctions. To make it effective all Eastern Bloc countries would have to be included in the boycott and all borders closed. I consider this most impractical. At best certain things could be delayed. It makes no sense to assume that the Soviet Union cannot exist without Western supplies and would atrophy. It reminds me of the general surprise when the Soviets fired their sputnik into space: "How could this be possible in a country with an allegedly backward technology!" We consoled ourselves by claiming that some deported German scientists had been involved. I do not know what really happened. It is certain in any case that the Soviet Union has at least as efficient an arms industry as the United States.

[Question] That may be true in the matter of arms. But what is the situation in other fields?

[Answer] A country of the size of the Soviet Union is always able to cope with difficulties arising from economic sanctions. It is impossible really to hurt such a great people. That is my firm conviction. After all, such sanctions were imposed already at the time of the Cold War, and they did not function very well then.

[Question] You just spoke the key word. Is the Cold War being revived?

[Answer] Well, there is certainly the danger that we may be confronting a new cold war. Some people are getting on top again.

[Question] Whom exactly do you mean?

[Answer] I do not want to name names. In America and elsewhere there are enough cold warriors who are coming to the fore again. But we must not simply discard detente.

[Question] How can detente continue after Afghanistan?

[Answer] Nobody should make any gifts to the Soviet Union. We should let the Soviet Union know what we think of its policies. That is possibly the only way to achieve a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Admittedly I have my doubts whether these armed forces will withdraw very quickly.

[Question] Does that mean we have to resign ourselves to Soviet interference? Yesterday Afghanistan was swallowed, tomorrow it may be another country.

[Answer] I do not advocate acceptance. We must show reserve in all future negotiations with the Soviet Union. We must enlighten the world so that nobody may have any illusions and believe the peace propaganda spouted from that side.

[Question] Do you have any travel plans in an Eastern direction, possibly Moscow?

[Answer] Not for the time being.

[Question] Let us assume that you had received an invitation to visit Moscow, and that this invitation had been extended before Afghanistan. Would you go to Moscow?

[Answer] I would.

[Question] And what would you tell the Kremlin rulers?

[Answer] I would say to them the same I am saying to the Russian diplomats here in Vienna: In Afghanistan the Soviet Union is discrediting detente and has thereby robbed it of credibility. The most sensible approach would be a rapid Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

[Question] What, in your opinion, was the reason for the invasion? Was it self-defense? Does the Soviet Union need a buffer zone at its borders?

[Answer] Exactly. Of course developments in Iran also influenced Soviet policy. As long as the Shah ruled in that country, the Russians could not complain about Iran. Now they are taking precautions. I do not share the assumption that Afghanistan represents the start of a Russian assault on the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union is perfectly well aware that a push in that region would result in direct confrontation with the United States. The Russians certainly do not want that.

[Question] You also visited Saudi Arabia. How do the Saudis view the advance of the Soviets?

[Answer] Disquiet is great in Saudi Arabia. There and in other Gulf states the belief prevails that the Soviets do aim to push toward the Gulf. At least they want to make you think so. Actually they are quite right. The Arabs intend to warn the world.

[Question] What, in Saudi opinion, can be done to counteract Soviet pressure?

[Answer] At the conference of Islamic foreign ministers Saudi Arabia provided the inspiration for resistance. By its Afghan adventure the Soviet Union has been damaged in the world of Islam and also in the Third World. It spent a tremendous amount of money to gain the confidence of these countries. The Soviets certainly did not expect this reaction.

[Question] In Saudi Arabia you also met with PLO chief Yasir Arafat. Does he think the same way as the Saudis?

[Answer] Arafat is aided by the Soviet Union and consequently cannot denounce it. His own cause is closer to him than Afghanistan's. He will therefore not attack the Soviet Union. There is another strong argument to which many people are wilfully deaf. It is quite in order resolutely to advocate a Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan. But Arafat says: Who is championing with equal resolution the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab regions? International politics evidently apply different criteria.

[Question] Austria's situation is also rather delicate. Do you fear a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia once President Tito has died?

[Answer] I consider that quite impossible. Even Stalin did not react in this manner, although he was then at the apex of his power. Yugoslavia is a well armed country and far more stable than generally assumed. Any intervention by the Soviet Union would lead us perilously close to World War Three.

11698
CSO: 3103

MAERTENS INTERVIEWED ON STATE, ECONOMIC REFORM

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 15 Feb 80 pp 26-27

[Interview with Wilfried Maertens, prime minister of Belgium; Brussels, no date given]

[Text] [Question] Prime Minister, how long will there be a Belgian Prime Minister?

[Answer] Don't worry, there will be a Belgian Prime Minister for hundreds of years to come. The problem of the decay of the Belgian state does not exist. The very strong materialism of Flemings and Walloons alone would not tolerate such a development.

[Question] Still, things do not look too good in Belgium.

[Answer] In fact there is a danger that the two parties may block one another. Without constitutional reform the mechanism required to recover our economic health might well become immobilized. That is why constitutional reform is so closely related to the recovery of the Belgian economy. Federal Chancellor Schmidt warned me against excessive autonomy for the Belgian regions...

[Question] The chancellor has often been seriously exasperated by the German Laender...

[Answer] ...but we need a democratic and institutional framework which will function properly.

[Question] After all, it was precisely the dispute between the Flemings and the Walloons, which until now has made it impossible for any Belgian Government to reform the economy and restore the obsolete industries to health. Will your latest agreements with the parties offer you a breathing space so you can get on with your real work?

[Answer] I am convinced that the latest agreements have every prospect of success. Among the people anger about the language conflict is growing. The public is calling for action in the economic and social spheres.

[Question] Has this public aversion already been reflected in election results?

[Answer] Not yet.

[Question] How is it possible in the long run to govern with all the tiny ethnic groups who nowadays carry a Brussels Government?

[Answer] For the purpose of constitutional reform we need all parties. I do think, though, that their importance will decline in the years to come, and that their voters will be absorbed by the traditional parties.

[Question] Would not a 5 percent clause narrow the field?

[Answer] The Belgians are not fond of that kind of approach. An attempt at that was made about 20 years ago, but the proposal never managed to clear parliament.

[Question] What are your markers in the obstacle race between regionalization and the reconstruction of the Belgian economy?

[Answer] Initially we have two major problems: Unemployment and public finance. In October 1979 our unemployment rate of 8.9 percent was the highest in the EEC countries. Regarding public finance Belgium has been living above its means for some years. Our 1979 deficit has been estimated at just about 100 billion Belgian francs.

[Question] Not what you would call conservative budgeting.

[Answer] We must restore the balance. We intend to save 20 billion in the 1980 budget and another 30 billion in 1981. It is impossible, after all, to make good an about 80 billion deficit within a single year. For 1980 our social security will also show a 25 billion deficit, and we have therefore initiated restorative measures in the amount of 17 billion. I see the only chance for public finance in such thorough-going efforts.

[Question] In the European currency system the Belgian franc has been at the bottom of the heap for nearly a year.

[Answer] The rise in the balance of payments deficit confronts us with immense problems. The exploding oil prices alone will raise our deficit to 115 billion. We will have to stringently curtail our energy imports. The chief reason for the franc's weakness was concern about public finances.

[Question] Prime Minister, in the past foreign firms have made a considerable contribution to Belgian economic growth. Does your economic plan include something for foreign firms and corporations...

[Answer] ...which you consider objectionable?

[Question] ...which interests those who are already there and those who are to come?

[Answer] As you know I began in government with a program which caused a sensation abroad: The proposal of a cut in weekly working hours to 36. In the meantime this proposal has been substantially toned down in order to save the social consensus in our country. As the employers vehemently rejected the original proposal, we submitted a compromise: 38 hours from the end of 1980 on a voluntary basis. Everyone who accepts the proposal will receive 120,000 francs per annum and employee. We expect thereby to save a policy of concerted action in our country...

[Question] As in Germany?

[Answer] ...as in Germany. Since the 1975 crisis it has been virtually impossible to produce any kind of contact between labor unions and employers. By the end of the year that will at last have happened. As a left-of-center government we have already made concessions to the employers in the matter of restoring the social security system. We have insisted that the profitability of firms must enjoy priority. We could have raised contributions by 2 percent, thereby gaining 15 billion. But we wished to save the firms from new burdens.

[Question] Chancellor Schmidt is having trouble with his pension insurance. Are you keeping some advice in hand for your German guest?

[Answer--laughingly] I don't know.

[Question] Despite the central bank's warnings to Belgians to tighten their belts even more in future, the signs seem to be somewhat rosier. The gross national product rose by more than 3 percent, productivity by 5 percent. Is the worst behind you?

[Answer] Most certainly not. But provided we maintain our low inflation rate and are able to convince the labor unions to moderate their wage demands, we will be entitled to some hope. We will also have to curtail the waste of energy, which is enormous in this country. Should we also achieve success in the renewal of our industries (and here Wallonia in particular worries me), we would be bound to do well.

[Question] Rising energy prices obviously represent the greatest danger to your program.

[Answer] Of course. Even so you must appreciate that Belgium is already a leader in Europe when it is a matter of producing electricity from nuclear energy. By now 25 percent of our electricity derive from nuclear power plants.

[Question] It therefore remains for us to hope that the linguistic conflict will not continue to act as an example of the impossibility of cooperation by two ethnic groups, thereby disrupting your efforts.

[Answer] Should we be successful, we may well serve as a good example for Europe.

[Question] What in fact does oppose Flemings and Walloons?

[Answer] Brussels. The capital has a Flemish tradition going back for centuries, but at the moment a majority of its residents are French speaking. The majority of Flemings opposes the regional autonomy of Brussels demanded by the Walloons.

[Question] Why not make Brussels...

[Answer] ...a European district? There are some such suggestions. In future new functions will certainly be found for Brussels, which would emphasize its European role. Already the city is no longer exclusively a city of Flemings and Walloons. As of now most Brussels school children are not even Belgians.

[Question] Prime Minister, have you the same kind of European ambitions as your predecessor Leo Tindemans?

[Answer] I feel that we will render Europe the greatest service by first putting our own house in order.

11698

CSO: 3103

PQ, PLQ REFERENDUM ACTIVITIES REPORTED

PQ Membership Drive

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 4 Feb 80 pp 3, 6

[Article by Bernard Descoteaux]

[Text] Quebec. The PQ [Parti Quebecois] has thrown itself wholeheartedly into organization work for the past 2 weeks, in an attempt to make up for time lost last fall because of the strikes which thoroughly disrupted the PQ schedule.

The goal of this new drive is simple: to again remobilize the party militants, and above all to enlarge the party membership, and thus to begin to set up the referendum machine of the "Yes" supporters before the official signal is given to start the actual referendum campaign.

For the moment, the PQ troops are busy, essentially with two major operations: Operation Contact, and the travels of the ministers and deputies. These operations, which began 2 weeks ago, will continue until the end of February when two other operations, which are even more important, will begin: the party financing campaign, and the National Assembly debate on the referendum issue.

Operation Contact is a door-to-door program that normally would have been done last fall. Once the white paper on Sovereignty-Association was filed at the end of October, it was planned that all through November the PQ members would scour their county to tally the largest number of votes possible, and to begin the work of persuasion.

Prepared well in advance, at the time of a series of organization rallies that were held all through September, this was to have been the key operation of the fall.

But the organizers of this operation quickly realized that nothing was working well. First of all, the people didn't want to hear anything about the referendum, as they were more concerned about the strikes. Also, the party members didn't really have their heart in it, especially those members who were also union activists. Then the results of the partial elections completed the disbanding of all those who were still working.

The members of the referendum committee had no other choice but to postpone this operation for later, which gave the PQ organizers time to review their strategy and objectives, and also time to get new working tools ready for their members.

This week Operation Contact will be underway again, but with more modest goals this time. Those in charge of this operation have indicated that the goal is now not so much to make a systematic survey, but to persuade the voters.

The party activists are being asked to visit the largest possible number of homes in their counties until the end of February, but without necessarily trying to draw up a precise profile of the voters' intentions. They want to use these visits to start to spread the message, to talk with the citizens, and to try to convince them. For that purpose, the party members have been given "educational materials": a newspaper that is to be left with the citizens visited, and a manual to be used in their door-to-door work.

This manual deserves a closer look. Presented to the party members as a "salesman's catalog for Sovereignty-Association," it sums up under 21 topics the main arguments to be used to convince the undecided. Each topic has one page of text and one page of illustrations, and the party militants are told not to mind using the manual in front of the people they visit, and are even encouraged to show it to them.

According to the party's national information officer, Ms Marielle Seguin, Operation Contact will also be an opportunity to restructure the party organization in the counties and to recruit new militants. She pointed out that the PQ has

encountered some problems in getting its campaign machinery moving, primarily because of the federal election campaign. As attention is not focused on the referendum, many of the party militants are holding back on getting involved, because the spirit of the referendum campaign is still missing. So the party can only rely on the usual circle of workers, and this is the circle they want to enlarge in preparation for the financing campaign scheduled for March.

While Operation Contact will be an opportunity to enlarge the group of militants within the party, it will also be an opportunity to spread its activism to party sympathizers in preparation for the "Yes" campaign. The referendum campaign will not be conducted on a partisan basis, since the "Yes" supporters will have to unite under the "Yes" program itself, so their party affiliation does not really matter.

Most of the "Yes" supporters have so far been drawn from within the PQ because of the close identification existing between this party and the Sovereignty-Association issue. But for months the PQ has been getting ready to enlarge the field of "Yes" supporters.

A first effort was the creation last fall of the Foundation of Quebecois for "Yes." This has still not had the success hoped for, especially financial success, and so the PQ organizers have increased their efforts.

With this in mind, Operation Contact will to some extent form a basis for a "Yes" membership and support drive, and in their door-to-door work, all the PQ militants will be given "Yes" membership cards which will be sold for the symbolic sum of \$1.

This effort made by the PQ to widen the circle of "Yes" advocates has also been a main concern of the "Pequistes" during the ministers' and deputies' travels.

Since coming to power, the PQ has gotten in the habit of twice a year making these ministerial visits. For several weeks in January and again in September, the members of the Levesque government make a real "blitz" throughout the province in order to renew contact with the people, to learn about their major concerns, and to explain the latest steps taken by the government.

The present round of travels, which began in mid-January, will last until the end of February. In comparison with previous years, it seems that there has not yet been as systematic an effort to have all the ministers visit each of the regions of Quebec, if not each of the voting districts.

The main issue of concern to the ministers in these travels, and of the deputies who have to visit their counties, is obviously the referendum. Special attention has been paid so that the groups met with are not formed just of already convinced people. Of course these trips generally do end with a meeting with the party faithful, a sort of "stirring up of the troops," but most of the meetings are with citizens who sympathize with the Sovereignty-Association bill or who are still undecided.

According to Andre Sormany, one of those in charge of these travels, these trips do have still another objective: to encourage public support for the "Yes" movement. Every time a minister visited a county, there was an attempt to get a "local personality" to join the movement and to make a statement in support of it. This support was encouraged by a meeting with the visiting minister, and if possible announced in a joint press conference held with the minister.

According to Andre Sormany, 300 or 400 people have now joined the "Yes" bandwagon all over Quebec. Although this will have little impact on a national level, locally there is great interest in this sort of support, which often makes headlines in local newspapers.

This drive naturally is drawing on the energy of a number of party activists in the counties and regions. Not only do they have to encourage memberships in the movement; they also have to set up new nonpartisan structures to handle these new people. Therefore, over the next few weeks, "Yes" committees or groups will start to spring up all over. When the time comes to officially establish the national "Yes" committee and the local committees, once the question is adopted in the National Assembly, everything should be ready. The Foundation of Quebecois for "Yes" will yield to the national committee chaired by Prime Minister Levesque, and locally the county groups will yield to the local "Yes" committee which will be headed by one of the "local personalities" now being recruited.

Liberals Trying to Modify Referendum

Montreal LE DEVOIR in French 4 Feb 80 pp 3, 6

[Article by Bernard Descoteaux]

[Text] Quebec. The referendum strategy of the Quebec liberals has not yet been worked out in its minor details, but it has already been established that one of the major elements of this strategy will consist of trying to modify the referendum question bill made public by the Levesque government in December.

This was indicated by the head of the Liberal Party of Quebec, Mr Claude Ryan, at the end of a meeting of the general council of his party that was held in Quebec on Saturday; this was the last meeting of this body before the general congress which will take place on 29 February and 1 and 2 March.

Several months away from the referendum, it is obvious that all the party's efforts are concentrating on the referendum. The liberal leader, during a press conference held to discuss the various issues considered, said that almost all of them, except for the teachers' strike, concerned the referendum and preparations for the referendum strategy.

The members of the general council approved a resolution introduced by Mr Ryan himself, which defines the mandate of the deputies during the debate on the referendum issue that will take place in March in the National Assembly.

This resolution calls on the deputies to pay close attention so that the question will submit directly and openly, without concealment or camouflage, the government's true intentions as defined by the PQ program. In this regard the resolution reminds the deputies that this program asked that a mandate to achieve Sovereignty-Association through negotiations would be asked at the time of the referendum, while the question asks a mandate to negotiate Sovereignty-Association.

Mr Ryan, who terms this bill a "slippery issue," says that the question that will be submitted to the people of Quebec in the referendum must be unambiguous. By the resolution passed on Saturday the liberal members, he said, expressed their clear desire to change the formulation of the question in order to avoid such ambiguity.

All the details of the strategy that will be used to do so have not yet been decided, but according to Mr Ryan, it has already been agreed that the liberal deputies will introduce one or more amendments to modify this question during the National Assembly debate.

Another way of modifying the text of the question will be an appeal to the Referendum Council, a judicial body provided by law 92 on elections. This council, which is composed of judges from the Provincial Court, may be asked to rule on the legality of the question. However, there are still many uncertainties about this possibility, and the liberal leader, before getting more deeply involved in this course, has asked his party's legal commission to advise him.

Mr Ryan, who would like to know if the Referendum Council has been formed and if the procedure providing access to it has been settled, has let it be known that, if necessary, the liberals will ask for two rulings from the Referendum Council. The first will deal solely with the legality of the question, while the second will concern the preamble of the bill submitted by the government. This preamble, which summarizes the Sovereignty-Association option, will be printed on the ballot, and according to Mr Ryan, this will favor the government's proposal at the expense of the federalist option. They would like to know if this is legal..

During their meeting, in addition to these strategy issues, the liberals also considered organization problems. They studied a political expense-sheet for the next 10 months; approved a budget of over \$2 million, most of which will be spent on the referendum, since everything depends on it; and considered prospects for the referendum campaign and its organization.

They were particularly interested in the preparation of referendum structures with the establishment of local "No" committees in the counties. As early as last fall the party activists had approved the major outlines of the method of operation of the national "No" committee. This will consist of about 60 members, including the 30 liberal deputies in the National Assembly, liberal organizers, representatives of nonpartisan groups and deputies of other Quebec parties, and about 10 representatives of federal political parties.

On Saturday the establishment of local committees was approved. According to law 92 these will be under the authority of the chairman of the "No" committee. So it was decided that in each county there will be one committee and it will be chaired by what could be called "local personalities."

A series of criteria were determined, excluding the deputies from this position. It was also indicated that the chairman will not necessarily be a liberal party member. If not, he should at least be a person with ties with liberal activists.

Each committee should also include a general organizer, a county official in charge of local spokespersons, an official agent, a treasurer, a person in charge of the information committee, a legal adviser, sector heads, the deputy, representatives of various political parties supporting federalism. According to the Liberal Party organizer, they decided to use the pyramid structure on which the party is based, but also to be sure to integrate the other federalist groups and to work out compromises with them when necessary.

During this meeting of the general council, preparations for the congress at the end of the month were also considered. Amendments to the constitution which will be presented at the congress were studied, including the abolition of the governing council, a body placed between the general council and the executive council. There was great interest in the constitutional issues to be discussed at the congress.

The liberal leader then gave a report on reactions to his constitutional document. In the Quebec press, reactions were generally positive, even if the editorialists did not always favor the document, he said. For the English-speaking Canadian press, he found the record fairly favorable, despite two negative criticisms in the TORONTO STAR which, while it is the largest daily in Canada, is not the most influential, according to Mr Ryan.

Politically, the negative reactions of the PQ formed a return to the Duplessis methods, trying to make people believe that the liberals "want to take what we have away from us." That is an old tactic that will not influence the liberals, he claimed.

As for reactions in English-speaking Canada, he said he was very pleased by the reaction from Ontario and from the Davis

government. He is now waiting to hear the reactions of the prime ministers in the west and in the maritime provinces; he will meet with these leaders in mid-March. Countering the PQ accusations, he said that he was not seeking or asking for their support, but that he just wanted them to consider his proposals and to make their comments in order to advance the debate.

On other issues, the liberal members took several positions, for example, on holding partial elections in Johnson, Brome-Missisquoi, and Megantic-Compton. They also took a position on the dispute with the teachers. While hoping that this dispute will be resolved by negotiations, they reminded the government of its duty to safeguard the democratic control of educational content against the special interests of a minority. Mr Ryan said that, if necessary, he is ready to support the passage of a special law to safeguard this control by elected officials over education, which the teachers would like to share.

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CSO: 3100

BRIEFS

WALDHEIM FORMULA--The government spokesman has stated that there is no truth in today's press report [in 1 SIMERINI] that the government has rejected Mr Waldheim's formula for the resumption of talks. The spokesman referred to a recent official statement which said that by means of Mr Kyprianou's message to Mr Waldheim, the Cyprus Government has responded constructively to his efforts and expressed readiness for the resumption of a substantive dialog. [Text] [NC141215 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1130 GMT 14 Mar 80 NC]

KYPRIANOU CONDEMNS LIMASSOL BOMBING--According to a police announcement, a bomb exploded around midnight last night in Limassol under the car belonging to Mr Iraklis Dimosthenous, Democratic Party deputy and Limassol district secretary of PEK [Pan-Cyprian Farmers Union]. The car was parked on Gladstone Street outside the office and residence of Mr Dimosthenous and was totally destroyed by the explosion. Damage was also caused to another car parked nearby and window panes in neighboring building were shattered. The police are investigating the case. President Kyprianou issued a statement today condemning this bomb attack with abhorrence. He stressed: Such criminal acts cause tremendous damage to our country, particularly at a time when we are waging a struggle for national and physical survival. [Text] [NC121220 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1130 GMT 12 Mar 80 NC]

GREEK AMBASSADOR'S STATEMENT ACCEPTED--The government spokesman, answering a question from the Cyprus News Agency about yesterday's address by Greek Ambassador Zakharakis at the annual general meeting of the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Nicosia, said the Greek Ambassador's address has caused deep satisfaction. The government spokesman pointed in particular to the passage in the ambassador's address in which he said the Greek Government consults and closely cooperates with the government of the Independent Republic of Cyprus and that it supports the Cyprus Government's actions and decisions which are made in a responsible way. [Text] [NC131850 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1830 GMT 13 Mar 80 NC]

'GREENS' IN NORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA BAN DUAL MEMBERSHIP IN PARTY

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Feb 80 p 5

[Article by Lothar Bewerunge: "The Greens Don't Want Any Reds on the Slate"]

[Text] In the Niederrheinhalle at Wesel in North Rhine-Westphalia, after a verbal, often chaotic battle which lasted for more than 9 hours, the decision was taken over the weekend that on 11 May in Duesseldorf the "Greens" will not march to the Landtag elections jointly with the "Reds." All so-called dual memberships will have to be given up by the end of April. This applies not only to the various K-groups which would like to use the "alternative movement" to get into parliaments which in reality they hate; many Young Socialists and Young Democrats from whom the "maternal parties" have withheld mandates so far will also have no other choice now but to go with the Green slate. The men around Grubl, Hausleiter, Beuys and Knabe have prevailed. The Land statute for North Rhine-Westphalia is being brought into conformity with the Federal statute of the party adopted at Karlsruhe. To express it in sporting terms it can be said that in North Rhine-Westphalia the Greens have beaten the Reds by 285 votes to 182.

The intention was not clear nor was it meant to be; after the decisive vote in Wesel, the Greens immediately disclosed the tactical purpose of the hotly fought over maneuver. "We are sorry, you communists," people were overheard to say, but the incompatibility decision had to be taken, the campaign line must not be ambiguous because of voter diffidence. "We have no intention of looking into your heart and also in the future we are not going to probe your conscience." The initial reaction of the K-groups was also by no means as if they had been excommunicated. Should the Green slate, to be chosen in March, offer no refuge, then a "Multicolored Slate/Defend Yourself" will simply be nominated. In any case, the situation will be more difficult for the SPD and the FDP because those Greens advocating the "Ruhr Region Alternative" can now claim with at least formal justification that they have nothing in common with the communists.

This Green movement, which fits only uneasily into the party statute, is essentially a collection of democratic social utopians as clearly indicated by their advocacy of the "Ruhr Region Alternative," which has now become the program of the Greens in North Rhine-Westphalia. Nuclear power, the

program says, is quite unnecessary because the demand for energy can be met by "district heating, natural gas or electricity" and when need be by "solar power, biomass conversion, wind power and in places also by geothermal power." Machines should be run by the "fluidized bed combustion" system, individual local traffic should be replaced by mass transit. Because of reduced demand future power plants should exist only in the form of the smallest possible decentralized plants. Synfuel production is rejected because it "pollutes people." The building of department stores should be discontinued in favor of "mom and pop" corner stores. Land where coal was once mined should be restored to "large afforested and green areas." Bikeways and footpaths should enjoy preferential status. "Center city parking garages and parking lots should be abolished." Old working class neighborhoods should be "neither converted into private dwellings nor forcibly modernized." The housing shortage problem should be solved by establishing "white zones" and forbidding land speculation.

Even if it became inevitable, all this is doubtless not to the liking of all those hardworking Ruhr coal miners and steel-workers who, in addition to their modest private homes, are frequently able to afford a second family car. This is why the prevailing opinion of the SPD and CDU parties in North Rhine-Westphalia is that the arguments of the Greens carry the least weight here of all places. But to the FDP, whose survival depends on the young vote, it is heavenly music.

But the Greens mistrust themselves most. The bitter fights over their own party statute in Wesel revealed that they consider themselves to be potentially corruption-prone: whoever is elected to a seat in the Landtag or the Bundestag or even only to a local government council must immediately relinquish his seat on the executive committee of the party.

This "alternative movement" has more in mind than just fighting nuclear power. A glimpse at the program chapter on sexuality reveals how dogmatically it might also liberalize private life. Since heterosexual freedom serves only the profit-making interests of large-scale industry, "overpopulation of the earth constitutes the gravest ecological problem." The Greens offer the following solution: "The possibility offered man by nature to enter into sexual and social relationships by individuals of the same sex constitutes the natural and most effective long-term tool for birth control and the reduction of population density." The Greens advocate the restructuring of society in accord with ecological postulates. Nevertheless, while saying all this in the heat of debates, they still kept an eye from time to time on the cribs and playpens in rooms adjacent to the Neiderrheinhalle where they have parked their infants and toddlers.

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CSO: 3103

CIRCULAR LETTER OF DKP DISSIDENTS PUBLISHED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 26 Feb 80 p 4

[Article by diw., datelined Frankfurt, 23 February: "We Are a Dependent Sect, Bought and Paid for by the SED"]

[Text] The difficulties involved in even keeping their ranks intact are increasing for the groups and parties on the extreme left, particularly the dogmatic left. The notorious lack of success by communist organizations in FRG elections certainly is one of the numerous reasons for this. The growing revolt by younger Marxist-Leninists in the DKP as well is reflected in a document, the text of which follows. The document is a circular letter from a group composed mainly of graduates of the DKP education center, the Karl Liebknecht School in Leverkusen. We have been assured of its authenticity:

Dear Comrades,

We address you in a matter which we consider of the utmost importance.

We are a group of party members who became friends at the Karl Liebknecht School in Leverkusen. Not only have we been involved for years in the Marxist educational efforts of our party groups, the MAB and the MASCH (editor's note: Marxist night school), but we are above all industrial workers for large corporations. Every day we experience firsthand the profound contradictions in capitalist society. This distinguishes us from those leading comrades in the PV (editor's note: party presidium) who have been shielded and isolated by the party apparatus for decades and who have lost all touch with the realities of the FRG and the needs of our country's working class.

We find that our country's revolutionary workers' movement -- founded by and identified with Rosa Luxemburg, Ernst Thaelmann, Max Reimann, Hugo Paul, Heinz Renner -- has degenerated into a political sect without influence on the masses. Taking the place of important labor leaders who enjoyed the confidence of the working class and its allies have been gullible and unknown party functionaries, so-called intellectuals or

unstable comrades whose struggle was more with alcohol than with the class enemy. They are letting themselves be showered with gifts and supplementary salaries by the capitalists in our party's own companies, while the pensioners and students among us are being called upon to pay higher dues and make larger contributions.

This Has Ruined Our Credibility With the Public

We therefore demand party leadership bodies at the federal and district levels that will measure up politically and morally to the major challenges facing the revolutionary party of the working class during the present phase of the class struggle. We consider it wrong that such highly regarded antifascists as Kurt Bachmann, Karl Schabrod, Hans Jennes, Gustav Frambowsky and Clemens Kraienhorst, and such party veterans as Walter Lill, Alfred Gecks, Hans Vossen and Erhard Witulski -- to name only a few -- have either been forced into other organizations or occupy only subordinate positions in the party.

We declare that Comrade Lenin placed great value on hearing the opinion of the young KPD. Although it was only one section of a large international party, the KPD was an equal partner of the glorious Bolshevik party. What has become of this relationship? Our party leaders see their main task to be that of defending everything -- and we mean everything -- that takes place in the GDR according to a "Who/Whom?" formula. This has made us appear ridiculous and ruined our credibility with the public, in the factories and in the unions.

We therefore demand that we profess friendship with the GDR and the other true socialist states but that, as an autonomous and equal part of the world communist movement -- like our comrades in Italy, France, Spain and Romania -- we must have the right to express open criticism of substantiated errors in the development of the GDR's social system. And at the same time we must make clear to the working class in our country that, by reason of the different conditions that exist in the FRG, we intend to follow an independent path to socialism and will also be giving substance to socialist society in the FRG.

Consequently, our chief demands are these:

A socialist metamorphosis only by way of free, universal, direct, equal and secret elections based on existing law, with abolition of the 5-per-cent clause;

The option of revoking the mandate of a socialist government;

Inviolability of basic rights guaranteed by the Basic Law, also for the opponents of socialism;

Equality of opportunity for all, including bourgeois parties;

Independence for trade unions; an express avowal that the right to strike and the right of collective bargaining shall remain inviolate also under socialism.

We Shall Be Accused of Collaborating with Intelligence Agencies

We know that we shall not be able to put through our demands with the present party leadership from one day to the next;

That we in the DKP must back away from rigid, dogmatic positions ("Only the class struggle can decide the path to socialism"; "irrevocability of the power of the working class"; "leading role of the party"; "no freedom for the fallen exploiters" and so forth);

That we shall be accused of "splitting the party" or of collaborating with intelligence agencies.

But we also know that only the trust and approval of the overwhelming majority of our people -- and this majority is the working people -- can open the door to socialism.

Without this trust we shall remain for the working class of our country what we have been to them for years: a dependent sect which has been bought and paid for by the SED, whose only obligation is to the interests of the GDR.

Forward in the spirit of Rosa Luxemburg and Ernst Thaelmann.

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CSO: 3103

NEGOTIATIONS DUE ON SWING CREDIT TO GDR

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 22 Feb 80 pp 14-16

[Text] Bonn and East Berlin must negotiate a new settlement of swing credits. The Federal Government is resisting another increase. On the other hand strong interests oppose any reduction. There may be an "optical solution."

At the Bremen general meeting of the Trade Federation Federal Republic of Germany/German Democratic Republic, Heinz Weseloh, reelected senior chairman, only briefly mentioned the most important decision to be made in inner-German trade in 1980: The proposal for a new settlement of the swing credit was likely to be adopted only "when more favorable conditions prevail."

Negotiations must begin this spring despite the worsening conditions caused by international politics. It was agreed in 1974 that "by mid-1980--starting from the status of trade relations achieved--negotiations must be conducted on the further organization and replayment of the swing credit for the period 31 December 198-31 December 1985."

The swing credit, an interest-free overdraft reciprocally granted by the two parties, is designed to help support the "bilateral straitjacket" in inner-German trade. Transactions between East and West are settled not in practicable currency but in clearing units (VE).

A long time ago this compromise was negotiated in Berlin over some bottles of wine, at a time when the common Reichsmark currency was abolished. The VE has the purchasing power of 1 mark but--with the exception of some agreed items (oil)--it is not convertible.

Interest was waived because the swing credit was initially quite insignificant (only 30 million in 1951) and used by both parties. In the meantime the nature of the swing credit has changed. No longer does it serve merely to ease clearing.

In 1968 it was noted that the development of trade with the GDR was "somewhat puny"--to quote the words of Detlev Rohwedder, later state secretary

in the Federal Economics Ministry. Consequently the swing credit, then amounting to 200 million VE, was transformed into a lever for raising turnover.

On 6 December 1968 both parties agreed to link it to GDR deliveries. The swing credit was to amount to up to 25 percent of the value of these deliveries in the respective following year.

That worked. The GDR raised its deliveries from 1.5 billion VE in 1968 to 3.4 billion VE in 1975. The swing credit climbed right along, to 790 million VE.

According to the agreement this settlement, profitable for the GDR, was to end in 1975. As Bonn was not particularly keen on making further gifts of interest exemption without any counter considerations, East Berlin wielded the whip. It doubled the minimum exchange rates for Western visitors, and this promptly shrank down tourist travel.

Protests fell on largely deaf ears. The GDR leadership merely consented to raise the minimum exchange rate by "only" 30 percent instead of the initial 100 percent.

By way of recompense--again on 6 December--a generous swing credit settlement was arrived at, signed by Willi Kleindienst, then head of the trust agency.

This provides that interest-free credits may, until the end of 1981, continue to achieve 25 percent of the value of GDR deliveries in the respective previous year, but that they may not exceed 850 million.

That, said NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, represented "a substantial rise." Bonn interpreted the settlement differently. Government spokesman Dr Armin Gruenwald explained that "no way could one speak of an increase; on the contrary, what we have here is a ceiling." Still, without the new agreement the swing credit would have declined to 200 million.

No wonder that the government camp liked to indicate the agreed "reduction" in the period after 1982, thereby deflecting increasingly vocal criticism. Lately, though, not much has been heard of a genuine reduction.

-- The trade federation in Bremen considers desirable the 25 percent settlement without upper limit. This would mean that swing credits might run to far more than 1 billion by 1982.

-- The parallel organization, the Trade Federation German Democratic Republic/Federal Republic of Germany in East Berlin, asserts the view that the current settlement is to be retained (up to 850 million).

-- The Bundesbank which extends the interest-free credit, has long favored restrictions. Should the swing credit be drastically raised, there is likely to be a growing inclination to have the loss of interest financed by the federal budget.

-- A particularly wilful interpretation has it that the swing credit could be raised and yet such a process described as "reduction." For example, in 1982 an absolute increase in the swing credit to 1 billion might mean that it had become relatively smaller (with respect to its proportion of the turnover).

-- Another game plan suggests taking into account in the course of negotiations for a new swing credit agreement whether West German firms had been awarded the major contract (worth more than 1 billion VE) for the construction of factories near Eisenhuettenstadt (formerly Stalinstadt).

-- Earlier proposals suggest simply to make the swing credit liable to interest payments whenever it exceeds 200 million. That is unrealistic because it does not take GDR interests into consideration.

Foreign affairs and the federal election campaign will make sure that the topic swing credit is hotly debated. It is therefore unlikely that the "swinging spring" will "take wing" in this respect. Unless, of course, those involved agree to postpone negotiations until 1981. In fact that would be quite early enough.

11698

CSO: 3103

SOVIET ACTIONS CAUSE CONCERN FOR NATURAL GAS SUPPLY

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHEN in German 22 Feb 80 pp 16-18

[Text] Not only oil supplies, the natural gas supply of the Federal Republic also is menaced by shortages. A Soviet embargo is no longer an impossibility. The economy is badly prepared for such a contingency.

Almost unnoticed by the Federal German public the Soviets cut in half their natural gas deliveries to the south German gas association. The loss could be made up by underground storage facilities carefully kept replenished in the past.

Last week the second blow fell: Moscow abrogated the contracts concluded with the Essen Ruhrgas AG, which were intended initially to run through the year 2000. In one fell swoop the Soviets aimed to raise the price of natural gas by more than 30 percent and adjust it to the oil price. Nor can the possibility of a Soviet gas embargo be excluded any longer. Since 1973 natural gas has been flowing to the Federal Republic from the Ukraine via a 1,800 km long line. Since 1978 an approximately 4,500 km long pipeline system has linked us with the permafrost regions of western Siberia.

The energy suppliers from the Eastern Bloc were compelled to undertake immense investments in order to supply the European natural gas system. "If deliveries were to stop completely, this pipeline system would represent dead capital," says Folkert Mindermann, spokesman of Essen Ruhrgas AG, explaining his optimistic outlook.

As the same pipeline also carries natural gas to several other West European countries, any premeditated interruption is bound to affect the Community as a whole including, situated at the Western end of the system, France, a friend of the USSR. Still, lately the French have been obtaining some of their natural gas directly from the Soviet Union. Even Martin Gruener, parliamentary state secretary in the Federal Ministry of Economics, who until recently saw "no reason whatever to doubt the contract fidelity of the Soviet Union," now admits the possibility of "far reaching disruptions of supplies in case there is a Western economic boycott."

Currently the Federal Republic obtains 34 percent of its needs from its own natural gas deposits; the Soviet Union supplies 16 percent. The Netherlands are the largest suppliers at 38 percent; the Norwegian contribution to our gas supplies is 12 percent.

It appears doubtful, though, whether this is sufficient provision for the future. By 1990 the Federal Association of German Gas and Water Suppliers e.V. [registered association] assumes German natural gas demand to achieve 90 million tons of hard coal units. That is 33 percent more than in 1978.

According to this estimate Iran was to supply 7 percent and the Netherlands 25 percent of Federal German gas imports; domestic production was to decline to 23 percent. According to the same estimates Norway would supply 12 percent in 1990, and the Algerian share in imports was to amount to 19 percent. Currently no gas is imported from Algeria.

But--the Iran contract much acclaimed by the German gas industry, has evaporated. Nor is Algeria a really reliable partner. In 1977 Ruhrgas AG, Salzgitter Ferngas GmbH and the Nederlandse Gasunie N.V. concluded a purchasing contract amounting to 11 billion cubic meters from 1983 on. Fifty percent of the liquid gas to be supplied in the course of 20 years were earmarked for the two German firms. Later came a syndicate consisting of Thyssengas GmbH and the BEB-Gewerkschaften Brigitta and Elwerath Betriebs-fuehrungsgesellschaft mbH which are owned to 50 percent by Esso AG and Shell AG. In the mid-1980's the two firms intended to obtain 4.5 billion cubic meters of liquid gas from Algeria.

Now, though, the Algerian Government has announced that it considers a pipeline system to offer greater prospects for profitability than liquid gas tankers. Nevertheless the German firms do not believe that the contracts already ratified could be broken. BEB spokesman Dr Reimar Fuchs "assumes secure supplies."

Yet only the quantities involved are secure. The last word has not been spoken either as regards price or the method of transportation. Algeria has invited the managers of Ruhrgas AG to a new round of talks in late February.

In mid-1980 the Deutsche BP also intends to buy 4.5 billion cubic meters of liquid gas from Algeria. At this point it is uncertain, though, whether a contract will in fact emerge. Since the death of Algerian President Houari Boumedienne the energy policy of the country has undergone a change. Algeria has "frozen" all long-term supply contracts with potential liquid gas purchasers. The reason: More liquid gas sales require too many investments. In addition about 20-25 percent of the precious methane are lost in the process of liquefaction and subsequent gasification at the consumer end.

In the meantime Dr Helmuth Buddenberg, board chairman of BP, is negotiating for natural gas purchases from the Soviet Union. The topic of the discussion

is a pipeline project worth DM20 billion. These talks evoked some surprise in the industry because the contract concluded between the Soviet Union and Ruhrgas AG stipulated that any additional deliveries to Central Europe would first have to be offered to the Essen firm.

In Buddenberg's view the Soviet Union would be well able to send 40-50 billion cubic meters per annum to Western Europe. Currently, however, the energy situation in the Soviet Union is somewhat strained, because the rate of oil production is declining.

Quite possibly the energy source natural gas may be affected also because its production depends in part on oil production.

In the case of a crisis it would first be necessary to safeguard adequate gas supplies for households and small users, because these have no real alternative. In industry, on the other hand, dual facilities ensure that coal or oil can be used if gas is short. Currently this is done mainly at peak hours. It is doubtful, though, whether the alternative energy sources will turn out to be sufficient if the flow of natural gas from the Soviet Union should dry up completely. A sharper struggle for the distribution of energy would then be inevitable.

The consequence: Another rise in the price level of energy. Last week already the German gas companies announced price increases of up to 60 percent. Iran intends to quintuple its gas prices and cut back deliveries. It is quite possible that the offer will decline further in order that the precious resource may be hoarded. Dr Juergen Schuermann from the Institute of Energy at Cologne University warns that "the world may easily be sucked into a vortex."

Ruhrgas, the only recipient of Soviet gas, is unwilling to say what volume short-term losses of supplies might assume, and whether supplies at home are safe. Spokesman Mindermann said: "If we say that we are well armed against a loss of supplies, this might be interpreted as a challenge to the supplier countries. If we say that we are not prepared, German consumers would panic. The truth is somewhere in the middle."

11698
CSO: 3103

CONTINUED INTEREST, NEGOTIATIONS IN TRADE WITH USSR

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 4 Feb 80 pp 107-108

[Text] Representatives of German industry are thronging into Moscow: They are hoping for billion-mark orders, despite political tensions.

The rulers in Bonn have met with one rebuff after another--Prague, Warsaw, and Moscow do not want to see German ministers at this time, and East Berlin is deferring the meeting of government heads. At the same time, German business leaders are highly welcome in Moscow.

The top managers from the West have flocked together in the Soviet capital as if the Soviets had never invaded Afghanistan. Others are speaking of an economic boycott, but the Germans are speaking only of business.

Following the Afghanistan crisis, Krupp administrator Berthold Beitz and BP (Benzin und Petroleum AG) chief Hellmuth Buddenberg were the first to adhere to the appointments agreed on before the crisis, seeking talks with high-ranking functionaries in Moscow. A little later, Babcock head Hans Ewaldsen took his leave from the dedication party of his new Moscow bureau in order to conduct further business.

Ewaldson had just flown off again with his fellow board members in the direction of home when the steel industrialist Willy Korf of Baden landed at the Moscow airport with a crowd of technical experts. Following a lecture to Soviet managers about modern steel technologies, Korf was summoned to the deputy premier, Nikolay Tikhonov--at present one of the most important men in the top Soviet leadership.

Seldom before have FRG businessmen in Moscow been so gladly paraded as in these January days. In order to show the people that contact with the West had not been broken off by any means, the national television reported in detail on the visits of the Germans.

The ostentatious Moscow TV show, segments of which could also be seen on the ARD (Working Group of FRG Broadcasting Institutes) channel,

alarmed the rulers on the Rhine. The people in Bonn are afraid, probably not unreasonably, that the German bosses who are being courted by the Kremlin could become a scandal elsewhere--above all in the United States.

Several times already, Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has admonished the German industrialists that they should really postpone their touring to the East to more peaceful times. The chancellor suspects that the more conspicuously the Germans strive after new deals with the Soviets, the more adamantly will the Americans insist that the FRG itself take part in a trade embargo against the Soviets.

The consequences for the German economy--which with a volume of trade of DM 13 billion is Moscow's most important trading partner in the West--would be far more disastrous than for the Americans, who have only half as flourishing a business with the Soviets. Moreover, a Soviet boycott would come at a time when the German exporters can expect a heap of orders as never before from the planning bureau of the Kremlin.

In recent weeks, the heads of almost every concern have scheduled definite appointments with their colleagues from the Soviet Union. Because by the end of the year, the Soviets want to have orders placed for major projects of the new 5-year plan which commences in 1981.

These involve contracts and sums of hitherto unimaginable dimensions. A single order, which the two travelers to Moscow, Beitz and Buddenberg, negotiated over in the second week of January with Soyuzgasexport, is worth around DM 20 billion.

From 1985 on, the Soviets want to pump annually up to 50 billion cubic meters of natural gas into the West from their natural-gas fields in western Siberia, whose content is around 10,000 billion cubic meters--10 percent of the world reserves. The BP is hoping to strongly improve its position in the international gas trade by way of this deal.

At present, the Soviets are already forcing 11 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually from a gas pocket in the southern Urals through a pipeline up to the Bavarian border. About 15 percent of the German gas consumption comes from this pipeline.

If the FRG were to go along with a boycott against Moscow, the Soviets would have a powerful lever for counteractions here. A loss of the gas from the Urals, fears the state secretary for economics, Martin Gruener, would have extremely detrimental consequences for the FRG's energy supply.

A tough reaction by the Soviets could also severely hurt the German steel industry. There would be short-time work and lay-offs in this industry if Soviet orders were dropped.

For example, since 1970 Mannesmann has been doing the most business with the Soviets, with annual deliveries of ultimately 700,000 tons of large-capacity pipes. In 1974, Mannesmann built at Muelheim on the Ruhr a pipe works for 1,200 employees expressly for the handling of this standing order.

Even on Tuesday of last week, Mannesmann representatives were negotiating with a Soviet delegation at Essen's secluded forest chateau of Hugenpoet. This pertained to repeat orders for the 10th delivery year, amounting to about DM 2 billion.

If Buddenberg's gas deal with the Russians comes off, the steel trust can expect its fattest order so far--the production of seamless pipes for a pipeline 4,000 kilometers long, which is scheduled to be ready for use as early as in 3 years.

The machinery-building concern of Babcock as well would not like to give up its lucrative Russian business. Just shortly before Christmas, Babcock sold valves for nuclear power plants to the Soviets, for around DM 50 million. "This trade between the two peoples," philosophized Babcock chief Ewaldsen, "is based on long-term investments, and it should be independent of the vicissitudes of politics." And it has been just in these past months that the German firms--with an eye to the Olympics--have been making their moves quite nicely in Moscow.

Large businesses such as Daimler-Benz or Osram, Kueppersbusch, Kalle, or SEL [Standard Elektrik Lorenz AG], but also relatively small firms such as the Black Forest vending-machine manufacturer Ortmann--all are cashing in on the games. They are building service stations and are producing tungsten halogen lamps, large-scale catering facilities, tele-photocopiers, pay-telephone equipment, and food vending machines.

The last major project for the now-disputed sports spectacle is being turned over in Moscow on 9 February by the head of the federally-owned Salzgitter concern, Ernst Pieper: The new airport of Sheremetyevo II. This steel concern had undertaken to do all the work on this project, costing DM 230 million, as its general contractor.

Pieper too would not like to see its plans upset by the vicissitudes of politics. In any case, in exchange for DM 200 million, Salzgitter intends to supply ore-conveying equipment as well as a sponge-iron plant for the metallurgical combine in Kursk, 500 kilometers south of Moscow, which is scheduled to be done by 1982. According to Pieper, it is "completely clear that both sides are adhering to the agreements."

Right next to Pieper's undertaking in Kursk, Krupp and Korf is also engaged in building: A steelworks for DM 350 million and a direct reduction plant for just under DM 0.5 billion.

Meanwhile, at the Mogilen combine in the neighborhood of Minsk, other Krupp technical engineers are busy with two chemical plants which are to be finished by the end of next year. Also by the end of 1981, the Wiesbaden company of Linde AG intends to finish building a petrochemical plant in the Caucasus for the preparation of the plastics primary product of olefin.

Linde board chairman Joachim Mueller has been negotiating with Moscow functionaries in recent days over a follow-up contract. To Mueller, haste seems called for here.

Because like other exporters, the Linde people too are afraid that East-West relations--boycott or not--could quickly freeze further and that trade with the Soviets would then become more difficult.

Major projects above all, which require time-consuming preliminary work such as design plans and complicated analyses, are worrying the German negotiators. Thus, the Mannesmann subsidiary of Demag fears for the DM 250 million contract for the construction of a rolling mill in Kursk. The Kloeckner concern is anxious about the construction of an aluminum works having a contract value of DM 1 billion.

But not only the Germans are pressing for haste. The Russians also have much to lose.

For already cancelled deliveries from the United States, the Soviets have been seeking ready substitutes among Germans and Japanese. Smaller suppliers with special products, such as the firm of Pittler from the Hessian city of Langen (lathes), the Solingen factory of Rasse Soehne (pipeline control systems), or the Steuler Industrial Works (sewage disposal plants) in Hoeher-Grenzhausen, have good chances to clinch new agreements with their partners to the East.

The growing political tensions and the boycott threats by Washington have made the German exporters uncertain and nervous. And the view of the situation overseas does not make the German business leaders feel exactly optimistic.

The president of the Federation of Chambers of German Industry and Commerce (DIHT), Otto Wolff von Amerongen, who returned from Washington on Thursday of last week, has brought with him bad news. Wolff had spoken with high-ranking business officials and leaders in the United States on instructions of the Bonn cabinet, in order to present to them the misgivings of the German exporters about an economic boycott. The Americans were intransigent.

Now the chancellor himself intends to take action. At the beginning of March, Schmidt is flying to Washington, accompanied by the industrialists Wolff and Rolf Rodenstock (of the Federation of German

Industries) as well as by the trade-union leaders Eugen Loderer and Heinz Oskar Vetter.

Schmidt has chosen his traveling companions with care. If the Americans get tough and insist on Western solidarity, then the representatives of capital and labor are to bear emphatic witness to the fact that in Germany it is not only the head of government who thinks little of boycott actions.

12114

CSO: 3103

TRADE UNION LEADER OPPOSES ECONOMIC BOYCOTTS

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 13 Feb 80 p 3

[Article: "Eugen Loderer: "No Economic Boycott for Political Reasons"]

[Text] Duesseldorf. The IG Metall [union of metal industry workers] has now indirectly answered the question whether the FRG should participate in an economic boycott of the USSR. In DER GEWERKSCHAFTLER, an IG Metall unionist magazine, IG Metall chairman Eugen Loderer postulates principles for investment abroad and economic relations with other countries from which guidelines regarding attitudes towards Russia may be derived.

Loderer said: "Up to now we have not considered it useful to generally refuse approval of an investment abroad if the country to be invested in is not governed according to democratic principles."

According to Loderer, the German ideas of a functioning parliamentary democracy and of free and independent unions unfortunately had been realized in a very limited number of countries only. "If we were to be strict and make these ideas a criterion for the admissibility of international economic relations, this would have to have the effect of a dangerous reduction of worldwide economic activities and thus employment."

According to Loderer, these kinds of deliberations are permissible only in extreme cases, when reverting to such strict boycott measures would promise success in the fight for human rights, freedom of unions, fundamental democratic rights and inviolability of national frontiers. This did not have anything to do with approving the political system anywhere.

What Loderer's point of view means is that since a fight against the superpower USSR through economic means hardly promises any success, for instance with regard to the inviolability of Afghanistan's national frontiers, it is not worth even starting this struggle. One can make a pact with the big aggressor and then declare smaller, less powerful nations "extreme cases."

While Loderer's article does not mention the word Russia, reference to Argentina is made by stating: "We disapprove of the efforts of the Argentine government to give the final blow to the existing union leadership by passing specific legislation. Union activities are intended to be limited to mere corporate and regional organizational structures. The bill passed some weeks ago neither provides for the formation of a national association of unions nor for any industrial unions on a national level."

The article states that in spite of this, the employee members of the VW supervisory board had agreed to VW's involvement in activities in Argentina, arguing that anyone who was committed to a democratic development of this country should not reject making a contribution to assuring and creating jobs, even if it is done by means of foreign investment.

IC Metall did not believe that it could convince the VW management to become a forerunner of a progressive international union policy there; the union could, however, urge that the management of the Argentine VW subsidiary respect the union as an industrial partner and thus strengthen its influence.

According to the article, Brazil was also lacking a liberal attitude towards the union activities. However, the managements of large foreign enterprises, VW do Brasil above all, could make an essential contribution to improving the social climate.

9544

CSO: 3103

MJCF EFFORTS REDIRECTED DURING 1980 CONGRESS

Paris LE MONDE in French 31 Jan 80 p 10

[Article by Patrick Jarreau: "The Communist Youth Movement Redirects Its Activity Towards the Young Workers"; passages enclosed in slantlines in italics]

[Text] The French Communist Youth Movement (MJCF), a youth organization of the Communist Party, is holding its National Congress in Vitry-sur-Seine (Val-de-Marne) from Thursday, 31 January, to Sunday, 3 February. Some 1,400 delegates are supposed to discuss a manifesto called "Long Live the Revolution," the result of reflections going on within the MJCF and the PCF, in order to develop a communist audience among the youth. On Sunday, Mr Georges Marchais is scheduled to deliver the closing speech of the Congress.

The Communist Party's activity, aimed at the youth, was at times /"inadequate"/, and was denounced by Mr Marchais at the last PCF congress in May 1979. The MJCF, which claimed to have 110,000 followers in the spring of 1978, had only 90,000 on 31 August 1979. The attempt to stimulate its publication AVANT-GARDE ended in failure, and prompted Mr Jean-Michel Catala, then secretary-general of the movement, to write in April 1979: /"Unless there is a spectacular change for the better, AVANT-GARDE is doomed."/ The situation does not seem to have improved, for, according to the leaders of the movement, the bimonthly publication AVANT-GARDE has a current circulation of 25,000 to 30,000, though this circulation /"varies"/. While CLARTE, the organ of the Union of Communist Students, was published only three times in 1979.

The erosion of the PCF prestige among the youth is translated by a setback in the European elections of June 1979. While 28 percent of the 18- to 24-year-old voters had voted for the Communist Party in the first general elections held in March 1978, 23 percent of that age-group voted for the column headed by Mr Marchais last 10 June. It is true that this group of voters was not so easily mobilized by the European elections (36 percent abstained), but the PS [Socialist Party] and the far left suffered less because of this than the PCF. In fact, they kept 24 percent and 8 percent

respectively of the voters in this age-group, as opposed to 25 percent and 9 percent in March 1978.*

The "Principal Tool"

The leaders of the MJCF attribute these results to two causes: the disappointment brought on by the failure of the left in March 1978, and by the fact that the young usually do not understand the criticism leveled at the Socialist Party by the PCF.

The communist leaders have restructured their speeches in order to address themselves to the youth. Last November, Mr Charles Fiterman, member of the secretariat of the Central Committee, presented a bulky report to the Central Committee on the present situation regarding the youth and on the perspective the PCF can offer them. He assumed responsibility for this area last summer, when he replaced Mr Guy Hermier, member of the political department. Confirming the MJCF in its role as the /"principal tool"/ for PCF activity among the young, Mr Fiterman pointed out that the movement did not want to /"assume responsibility for all the objectives of the Party"/.

Hence, the MJCF can emphasize in its activities the topics which will influence the youth the most. Besides, it is trying to redirect its activity towards young workers and apprentices rather than towards high school and university students, which is in agreement with the present PCF party line. It is a question of reactivating the "class" reflex for the young workers. This attitude is fading, as was shown by election results in communist-run towns.

Hence, the communists insist on fighting what they consider the factors that integrate the youth into the established order. Lately, therefore, they ran a vigorous campaign against any suggestion to legalize soft drugs, denouncing this attempt by the /"bourgeoisie"/ to blunt the spirit of the youth in their struggle against their condition in life. For the same reason, the communists polemicize strongly against the LIBERATION, considered to be the /"organ of despair and resignation."/

* SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company] polls published by LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR on 24 April and 23 July 1979

PCF DISSIDENT ELLEINSTEIN REFUSES TO START OWN PARTY

Paris LE MONDE in French 6 Feb 80 p 10

[Article by Jean-Yves Lhomeau]

[Text] Pont-l'Eveque--"Reux Stud Farm. Public not Admitted." But the "public" was admitted despite that nasty sign posted alongside the road a few kilometers from Pont-l'Eveque. At least it was admitted to the manor's chapel-museum-boudoir-conference room. It is true that on the morning of Monday 4 February, the "public" and Reux were not just anybody. Jean Elleinstein, an intellectual critical of the PCF, was the guest of Mrs Alix de Rothschild, lady of the manor, as stated on a piece of cardboard reading as follows:

"Jean Elleinstein: 'Eurocommunism and the Soviet Union. Chronicle of a Time of Peace.' Mrs Alix de Rothschild and Mrs Marguerite Marie Tran invite you to attend the press conference by Jean Elleinstein, guest of the serene lands of Reux and Pinterville. Monday 4 February 1980. At 1100 hours at the Reux Manor in Pont-l'Eveque and at 1700 hours at the Pinterville Manor in Louviers."

Agitator or rehabilitated? Jean Elleinstein held his morning press conference in the ancient and freezing chapel of Reux before 14 listeners: Mrs Tran, sponsor of his Norman tour; four Paris reporters there to see "Elleinstein with the rich"; two photographers determined to get the best picture of "Elleinstein at the Rothschilds"; Mrs Ciampi, wife of filmmaker Yves Ciampi, with whom Elleinstein produced a television program; the chairman and managing director and the sales manager for Normandy of the new publishing house that Elleinstein helped to establish; two unidentified well-dressed young men; Mrs de Rothschild; and a furry little thing named Papou, the baroness' Pekingese.

Rehabilitated? Not by anyone! Jean Elleinstein made that clear beyond all dispute on 17 August 1979, when he said on Television Channel 1 that "I would rather be rehabilitated by my party than by its opponents." His wish is certain to be granted beyond all expectation. Elleinstein? Three years ago, Georges Marchais wanted 200,000 like him. The dissident intellectual says: "Today he wouldn't want three, or even two." The fact is that Marchais will

be satisfied with one if that one continues to converse with the devil and tell him about his Eurocommunism, which he sets in opposition to the PCF leadership's "solemn and antique archeocommunism," assert that he will not call on the voters to vote for Marchais in the 1981 presidential election, and regret that the left as a whole is "incapable of offering serious answers to the crisis."

Agitator? No doubt. He willingly let himself be dragged to Reux, and the reporters followed him that afternoon to the Pinterville manor in Eure, near Louviers, a property bought just before the 1978 legislative elections by Mrs Marguerite Marie Tran. He took an amused pleasure in introducing her. She is, he said, the great-niece of Chiang Kai-shek. Mrs Tran confirmed it. Not really rich. Her manor is open to every breeze. It is chilly. Elleinstein said, "Ideologically, I feel uncomfortable when it drops below 25 degrees."

Open to every breeze and to everyone. "Never ask a guest 'what is your nationality, your religion, or your political party?' but simply 'teach me what you know.'" So writes Mrs Tran, whose wealth of cultural activities--of which Elleinstein's press conference is one--are financed partly, she says, by several American universities and the Arab Emirates.

There is a desire to transform the PCF. One man of good will insisted that Elleinstein establish a dissident communist party.

"Establish a new communist party? That is not necessary."

"But it would go over well."

"Nothing doing. I don't want to."

"That would be too bad."

"I want to remain in the Communist Party and win it over from archeocommunism to Eurocommunism."

"All of that is not very effectual. You lack a Saint Peter."

But Elleinstein refuses to build a new church. He only wants to transform from the inside the one belonging to Georges Marchais. Since he is unable to express himself in L'HUMANITE's pages in an effort to do so, he writes in the Paris press and goes off to meet the provincial press. On Monday the reporters came to the manor in great numbers. For Elleinstein, the balance sheet is positive. Too bad if, in order to insure that, he has to place himself in ridiculous situations.

FORMER PCF WRITER THIBAudeau LISTS REASONS FOR QUITTING PARTY

Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Feb 80 p 16

[Article by writer Jean Thibaudeau]

[Text] I was a militant in the PCF from 1970 until the beginning of last year--in other words, after 1968, from the years when a common program for leftist government was being worked out and decided on until the failure of that policy and some time beyond.

I was militant in the rank and file--attending cell or section meetings, selling newspapers, distributing tracts in mailboxes or from door to door, sticking up posters, taking part in demonstrations, and so on, and also as a writer. At no time did I seek or was I offered any kind of power or responsibility in the apparatus. I was never invited to an Eastern country.

I wrote a great deal for LA NOUVELLE CRITIQUE and for other party magazines, for FRANCE NOUVELLE, and for L'HUMANITE with great freedom. I also spoke frequently in debates and conferences. I tried to contribute as best I could to new definitions of culture and politics (for example, by taking an interest in the question of language in teaching, in light literature, and in modern art, as well as by opposing the corporatism of Communist writers who developed under Stalinism). My basic reference was (and still is) the work of Gramsci.

It is remembered that the leadership dictatorially intervened in the preparations for the 22d Congress to impose, with no discussion, abandonment of the concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and to forbid the discussion of "morals." It is very obvious now that those two measures were connected. Rigid moralism (as opposed to a progressive analysis of civilian society) would serve to hide the rejection of a concrete theory of democratic socialism. From that time on--from the time of the 22d Congress (and quite paradoxically, since the "opening-up" was strongly asserted there)--the mechanism for the worst regressions was in place. And minor research or speeches such as mine were simply ruled out of bounds.

It was not the electoral defeat of March 1978 that made me leave the party, but the "normalization" of the vast debate that had opened up spontaneously

among the rank and file following that defeat. From that spring of 1978 until now, the leadership has steadily provoked the shunting aside or departure of thousands of Communists. Particularly in the case of writers, artists, and agents of culture, the losses are very sizable. It must be concluded from this that the French Communist leaders, just like the Soviet leaders, fear the political dimension of culture and its wholly democratic strength to transform.

More generally, the leadership's policy toward the intellectuals is becoming a policy of hostages. An example is the pressure exerted to make them agree with the leadership in approving the occupation of Afghanistan. There is every reason to think, however, that the emergence of Communist dissidence is the logical and perfectly sound consequence of the party's liberalization in the 1960's and 1970's. That liberalization was assuredly not the will of the leadership, but instead was one consequence of the development of our society as a whole. In any case, as far as I am concerned, the tasks that I conceived for myself when I was in the party are still before me.

During my years in the party, my efforts in the area of fiction led to only one novel and a few short stories. I concerned myself primarily with criticism or theory without, however, actually producing any books. For all that, I will not say that my membership in the party "sterilized" me (I write 10 times as much now that I am "without a party"). On the contrary, it seems to me that I "stored up energy." A degree of Communist conviviality cut through and upset the usual cleavages or straitjackets and was very helpful in freeing me of the narrow literary circle I had come from. The price I had to pay in literary circles because of my membership was, therefore, not too high.

I believe it was not until the left began to break up in the autumn of 1977, when the Communist leadership chose regression over a "fight for union" that had become more difficult, that writing and being Communist became for me contradictory. And soon reached the point of being intolerable.

11798

CSO: 3100

NATION'S DEFENSES QUESTIONED BY ADMIRAL ACCARY

Paris LE MONDE in French 17-18 Feb 80 p 6

[Report on statements made by VADM Jean Accary to the monthly periodical OBJECTIF SUD, February 1980]

[Text] "We certainly do not have what would be necessary for protecting France definitely in the dangerous world in which we are living," is the opinion of VADM Jean Accary, commander of the port of Toulon and commander in chief in the Mediterranean. He adds: "We might find ourselves in a state of defeat, of a lost war, with a country that would be plunged into disaster without really having fought."

Vice Admiral Accary, who was deputy chief of staff for operations on the staff of the Navy before taking over his post at Toulon in January 1979, answered some questions put by the monthly periodical OBJECTIF SUD* on France's place in the world and the role of the Navy, which he commands in the Mediterranean.

"If France extracted from its ground 60 million tons of oil, that is to say half what it consumes, it would be infinitely less vulnerable than it is at present. Imagine," Admiral Accary points out, "that in 1980, as the result of events that we do not yet see but that are not impossible, France's oil supply is reduced, not to zero but to half its requirements. I do not know what consequences that would have for the entire economic activity. The thought is not ruled out that then France would find itself suddenly with several million unemployed -- who could not be paid compensation -- with the whole chain of consequences that can be imagined and that could only be catastrophic."

"When we talk about war, we think quite a bit about military operations, with reference to the past. But we might find ourselves in a state of defeat, of a lost war, with a country that would be plunged into disaster

* OBJECTIF SUD, February 1980, 20 Louis Salvator Boulevard, Marseille 13006, 7 francs.

without really having fought. When we talk about France's national defense, we must first take a look at the state of the world. It is becoming more and more dangerous. And, since we have never seen a war waged as had been imagined, I do not know what would happen if we were, unfortunately, involved in a military conflict. On the other hand, we can evaluate rather well the kind of armed forces that we would have to face. The technical level of those arms is formidable. In certain respects, France is well situated; in others, less. Our country cannot rise up to the technical height of the great powers in everything."

The commander in chief in the Mediterranean stated further: "Relatively speaking, the great powers devote a much larger share of their resources than France authorizes for this. Should we follow their example and, for the sake of clarification, double our military expenditures? That certainly would put our defense in a more comfortable situation with regard to this superarmed world in which we are living, but is it possible? Imagine the situation of a French government that might decide to double military expenditures. That is not possible in our economic and social system. You ask me if we have what we need? We have what we can offer ourselves, in the French economic system. We do not have what would be necessary for protecting France definitely in the dangerous world in which we are living. In order to have those means, all the French people would have to acquire an awareness and say to themselves: 'Now it is going to be necessary to pay the insurance premium and accept some hard sacrifices.' But, even so, I can hardly see how that could be achieved in a short time without truly upsetting our economy. Let us put ourselves in the government's position. It can hardly do anything other than what it is doing: it can only modify tendencies, increase the share of defense gradually. This is possible only slowly," Admiral Accary concluded.

(In his statements to OBJECTIF SUD, Admiral Accary ties in with the remarks made by Giscard d'Estaing, on 13 July 1979, when he received senior military officers in the Elysee Palace to tell them why he had decided to revise the 1980 defense budget upwards (LE MONDE for 31 July 1979). The president of the Republic stated the following in particular: "This effort, moreover, will be continued during the next few years, because, regardless of the effort that we have made so far, our means of defense are not yet entirely up to what is required for guaranteeing our nation's security and for enabling our defense forces to hold up in every respect in comparison with the defense forces of our principal partners or possible adversaries.")

10,042

CSO: 3100

CONTROL, SURVEILLANCE OF FOREIGNERS BEING COMPUTERIZED

Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Feb 80 pp 1, 12

[Article by Bertrand Le Gendre: "Control of Foreigners in France"]

[Text] The Ministry of Interior is organizing a system of computerized files.

Even before the Stoleru draft bill, restricting the stay of foreigners in France, has been debated in parliament, the Ministry of Interior is completing the computerization of resident cards. This is a factual police file which will put foreigners under surveillance.

Surveillance

The order which Christian Bonnet is preparing to sign is brief: "An automated system for the issuance of identity and resident cards to foreigners has been organized by the Ministry of Interior." Even though innocuous seeming, this project is the first cousin of the "Bonnet law" on clandestine immigration, a law, which despite its partial abrogation by the Constitutional Council, makes it possible to expel undesirable foreigners for the flimsiest of reasons.

The automation of foreign residents cards will take place after the formulation of a decree which stipulates the establishment of a single identification card, replacing the work and residence cards currently used. As new cards are delivered, millions of computerized data will be stored by the Ministry of Interior, constituting a so far unparalleled source of information.

In addition to civil status, family status, name of father and mother, and data on consort and children, information covering every active foreigner will include the administrative measures taken in his case, along with his profession. All in all, 40 facts per individual will be recorded.

Considering that about one million foreigners will be the subject of such files, this represents 40 million data items available. For what purpose?

The Ministry of Interior has cited the need to prevent the use of forged residence permits and . . . the unaesthetic appearance of the current cards. All in all, the arguments are based on the non-falsifiable and easy to understand nature of the new documents. However, this does not explain the reasons for a computerized storage of such a large number of data.

However, we should not look very far to understand the usefulness of a foreigners file in the case of a state which wishes to control and limit immigration. We know the economic uncertainties and diplomatic dangers which such a closing policy may have at a time when the north-south "dialog" is hardening. This makes even more concerning the obstinancy of the French Government in pursuing a policy which flaunts freedoms--as we saw in the decision of the Constitutional Council to put a stop to the arbitrary detention of foreigners--and which, today, is preparing the development of facilities to control immigration scientifically.

This would be an effective tool which, for example, would make it possible to refuse to renew the residential card of any North African 50 years of age with too many children--too many in the eyes of the French authorities--thus determining in advance their number and the impact of their departure on the various sectors.

According to the Stoleru law such a refusal could affect any foreigner whose resources are considered "inadequate or irregular," i.e., if necessary, temporary unemployment compensations or compensations to victims of an economic layoff. Unless parliament acts, the authorities could use this law, along with that known as the Bonnet law, as political instruments. They needed a technical tool to carry it out. The computers of the Ministry of Interior would provide it.

Cross-Referencing

It has been confirmed that the foreigners' file will be cross-referenced with the file of "wanted people," which is also managed by the Ministry of Interior. Therefore, it is not a question of a simple population file, but of a real police file which would show assigned residency, warrants, or prior sentencing. Such a file would be unprecedented in France, with the exception, perhaps, of the file on the Jews during the Occupation.

The establishment of a national computerized identity card for the French people, stipulated in the same order, does not raise the same objections. The features of this plan are familiar (LE MONDE, 8 January): Orange colored, 125 by 88 millimeters; the new cards will be plastic lined and unforgeable. Here again it is a question of fighting forgeries and, the minister of interior emphasizes, a measure against "terrorism." Was Jacques Mesrine not in possession of an impressive number of forged identity papers at the time he was killed?

However, this plan gives grounds for some concern. Should the management of these new cards be computerized by taking the risk of cross-referencing

them with other files, even if the Ministry of Interior swears that nothing of the sort would happen, even though such cards, unlike those issued to foreigners, would carry no other information than that currently shown in the present identity cards?

Those in charge of the project emphasize that this card is optional and would remain so. This objection would be convincing were it easy to ignore what daily experience shows. The card would be unforgeable. This would be tolerable in terms of the "terrorists," but what about those who might oppose a foreign occupation, or people who might be wanted because of their views or their race? The veterans of the Resistance know how many Frenchmen and Jews were saved by having forged identity papers. The new cards, the Ministry of Interior claims, would be more difficult to forge than a banknote.

The French people should be able to do without such a document, which exists neither in the United States nor in Great Britain. Furthermore, the concept we have of human rights should encourage the government to abandon its plan for the systematic registration of immigrants.

The two projects are already underway. One of the six centers for the manufacturing and coding of cards for foreign residents and of identity cards for French people is ready to begin operations. It is located in Levallois-Perret (Hauts-de-Seine). Others will be put into operation in the months to follow, in Toulouse, Nancy, Le Mans, Valence and the Paris area. They will be interconnected and, therefore, act as a centralized file.

This would occur unless the National Commission for Informatics and Freedoms, informed of the draft law, would issue a negative opinion. Naturally, this would be no more than an opinion, but one could hardly see the government ignoring it. The opinion will be made public at the end of March. Should it be unfavorable, the government might submit the question to parliament. This would be a more acceptable procedure compared with a bad project planned in silence.

5157

CSO: 3100

ARIANE FUTURE SEEN 'PROMISING', EXCEEDS EXPECTATIONS

Paris AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL in French 15-29 Feb 80 p 18

[Article by Georges Leclerc: "Ariane: Promising Results"]

[Text] Evaluation of data from the European launch vehicle's first test flight was practically completed by the end of January. The preliminary finding is that Ariane's performance exceeded expectations, not only for the first stage but for the second and third stages as well.

But technicians of the European space program and the French CNES [National Center for Space Studies] will have to wait until after the second test launch to determine whether the capabilities of the launcher's first version can now be effectively upgraded. It will be recalled that this second launch is scheduled for late May or early June this year.

From a technological standpoint, the second launch vehicle will be strictly similar to the first, with two modifications, however. First, the aluminum-alloy ballast is to be replaced by two satellite "passengers." One will carry a scientific experiment package called Firewheel. The other will be an Oscar, one in the series of small applications satellites launched for amateur radio operators. The second launch will also test a system for damping the second stage's vibrations caused by pressure differentials within the flame as it is exhausted through the nozzle. This phenomenon by which the flame vibrates somewhat like a guitar string, with "nodes" and "ventral segments," is called the pogo effect. This effect can prove disastrous to the rocket and the satellites. Consequently an anti-pogo device is used to limit the effect as much as possible. It should be noted that in the first Ariane launch this device was not activated on the second stage. A pogo effect was noted during the second stage burn but it was quite weak. The second stage's anti-pogo system will be actuated for a few seconds during the second Ariane test flight.

Above and beyond technical considerations, however, there is the impact of this first launch on potential customers. Pending legal formation of Ariane Espace, the commercial firm--in which France will hold a large majority of the shares--destined to handle sales of the European launch vehicle,

negotiations for the sale of operational launches are making good progress. It will be recalled that between Ariane's first aborted countdown on 15 December and its successful launch on 24 December, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) paid a deposit of 100,000 dollars on a 1983 Ariane launch of a satellite for strictly American use.

Other potential customers with whom negotiations are underway include: Arab League countries for the Arabsat project; Indonesia for the orbiting of second generation communications satellites (Palapa B series manufactured by Hughes); and Western Union for the GAPSTAR project (American domestic communications satellite service).

Yet these prospects are already clouded by the problem of congestion of the Ariane launch pad at Kourou, French Guiana. In addition to the European satellites under development--Meteosat, ECS [European Communications Satellite], Marecs, Telecom-1 TDF-1, Spot, Exosat, etc.--the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), Ariane's biggest private customer to date, has booked a December 1981 Ariane launch of its fifth Intelsat 5 satellite and taken options on two later Ariane launches for the sixth and seventh satellites of this series.

From the three launches scheduled for 1980--May, September, and December--it will be necessary, therefore, to raise the launch rate to four or five in 1981. European Space Agency officials even foresee the possibility of attaining a rate of six launches per year by the end of next year, this by preparing the launch vehicle in an assembly building to be built at Kourou.

Hence the decision to build a second launch pad must be made quickly, not only because of congestion problems but also to give the Kourou facility the capability of handling upgraded and more powerful versions of the Ariane launch vehicle.

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CSO: 3100

MILITARY PROMOTIONS, APPOINTMENTS NOTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 15 Feb 80 p 22

[Text] The Cabinet approved, on 13 February, the following promotions and appointments in the Armed Forces, proposed by Yvon Bourges, minister of Defense:

Navy: RADM Philippe Lejeune is appointed commander of the maritime zone of the Indian Ocean.

(Philippe Lejeune, born in Paris on 7 September 1926, a graduate of the Naval Academy, served, among other duties, in Indochina until 1951, before becoming a specialist in radar and radio monitoring on the aircraft carrier "Bois Bellau," the destroyer escort "Bouvet" and on the staff of the Navy.

After commanding a coastal escort and an escort craft, he served on the "Jeanne d'Arc," then, among others, he commanded the destroyer escort "Du Chayla" (1969) and the missile-launcher frigate "Suffren" (1974). Since August 1977, he held the post of flag secretary to the chief of staff of the Armed Forces, General Mery. He was promoted to rear admiral in December 1978.

In his new post, Rear Admiral Lejeune replaces VADM Jean Paul Orosco, who had been serving in that post since November 1978. The Indian Ocean naval forces at Djibouti and Reunion consist of about 15 warships of all tonnages and around 5,000 men.)

The following appointments were also made: RADM Rene Chabot, inspector of naval materiel; RADM Henri Bousquet, commander of the port of Brest and deputy for logistics to the naval commander of the 2nd Naval Region.

Army: MGEN Rene Xhaard is appointed commander of the 5th Army Region (Lyons).

Armament: The following are promoted: engineer generals, second class, Charles Boutry and Pierre Prache, to engineer general, first class.

Engineer General, Second Class, Aime Festier is appointed deputy to the director of industrial supervision of armament. Engineer General, First Class, Paul Combes is made available to the inspector of armament.

Medical: The medical officer chief of normal class departments Henri Revil is promoted to medical officer general with the rank of brigadier general.

Medical officer general, chief of normal class departments Jean Rigaud is made available to the minister of Cooperation for appointment as chief of the French Medical Mission in Ivory Coast.

Gendarmerie: COL Guy Meignier is promoted to brigadier general.

Military Justice: Military Magistrate, First Class, Guy Paris-Leclercq is promoted to magistrate general.

10,042

CSO: 4100

DOMESTIC PETROLEUM EXPLORATION EFFORTS INTENSIFY

Paris LE FIGARO in French 11 Jan 80 p 8

[Article by Christian Guery]

[Text] A triple green light for petroleum exploration on French soil. The central planning council, presided over yesterday by Valery Giscard d'Estaing, has, to use a hackneyed expression, decided to "go all out." At present crude oil prices, it is now reasonable to increase explorations and to develop resources which until now were not technically viable.

A five-year exploration program was set up:

1. In areas accessible to present production techniques (metropolitan territory and continental shelf), in 1981 the oil prospecting rate will reach an annual level of one billion francs.
2. In high-risk areas or those which are inaccessible to present production techniques, a systematic inventory will be undertaken. Cost: 1.5 million constant francs during the next 5 years.
3. The program for development of undersea petroleum technology will be intensified.
4. The undersea parapetroleum sector (engineering, drilling rigs) will be the subject of an industrial development operation.
5. The program for perfecting assisted oil recovery techniques and for stabilization of heavy oils and oil shale will be strengthened during the next five years. Commenting on this plan, the president of the Republic declared: "Beginning this year, France will be committed to a very extensive effort in the area of petroleum and gas recovery in national territory on land and undersea. Beginning in 1981, corresponding expenditures will be doubled in comparison to 1979 and tripled in comparison to 1978."

Concrete Applications

What will be the first concrete applications of all of these measures?

In the Southwest, the Elf Aquitaine group has recently announced a vast plan for prospecting. This will be strengthened by governmental measures. It seems that "deep oil," in particular, could actively profit from government subsidies. It is also known that Esso will soon begin drilling near Lacq in search of gas. Large-scale explorations will be undertaken in this region in an attempt to locate a "gas ring" at great depth. Gas is also being actively sought in the northern coal-mining regions with the CFP-Total group. Another consequence of the foregoing measures is that offshore oil drilling will be resumed in the Bay of Biscay, in spite of the difficulty which it represents for the military firing ranges in the sandy moors.

To note a final point: Government authorities will certainly support agreements of the type that the oil industry is negotiating with Venezuela for the processing in France of heavy oils, that is, the oil of tomorrow.*

* Note: Some small Texas companies are presently attempting to begin drilling on French territory.

9174
CSO: 3100

ERRATUM

Please substitute this article for same which appeared in JPRS 75054, 4 February 1980, No 1536 of this series, pp 101-104.

COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

SMALL HYDROELECTRIC POWERPLANTS NOW PERMITTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 27 Dec 79 p 30

[Article by Marc Ambroise-Rendu: "Small Hydroelectric Powerplants Will Multiply Because of Less Strict Regulations"]

[Text] Are thousands of little dams going to transform the still wild torrents and rivers into staircases of water? In any case, the administration is prepared to facilitate the systematic "harnessing" of French water falls. An edict which should soon appear is going to relax the constraints binding those wanting to build a small power plant. For plants under 500 kW only an authorization is needed, but above that, a concession must be obtained.

This very complicated procedure through the intricacies of the ministries can take 5 or 6 years and sufficed to discourage many projects. About 10 concessions at most were granted per year. The edict is also going to raise the limit for simple prefecture authorization to 4,500 kW. It is said that many entrepreneurs are waiting for this liberalization so they can deposit their applications in the prefectures.

Because of its mountainous terrain and the rains which water it, France has available a large hydroelectric potential. It was estimated at 270 billion kWh; more than enough to satisfy total French electricity consumption (220 billion kWh.) In reality only 100 billion kWh could technically be harnessed, and 80 billion kWh can be obtained economically.

EDF [French Electric Company] (to whom the 1946 nationalization law grants a monopoly on distribution only), the Rhone National Company, SNCF [French National Railroads], and a few big businesses have built dams capable at present of supplying 60 billion kWh. Other facilities are under construction, which will harness 5 billion kWh more, and 80 billion kWh will doubtless be reached toward the end of the century.

However, many Alpine and Pyrenean waterfalls of the Central Massif are not suitable for a large construction. According to an EDF study, 4,000 falls

could be harnessed and given a turbine smaller than 2,000 kW. Finished, these sites could supply 8 billion kWh. Only a quarter of them are presently provided with a power station, furnishing a total of 2 billion kWh. ECF does not wish to plunge into the development of this potential.

A Savings of 4 Million Tons of Petroleum

Such a policy is no longer satisfactory today. The petroleum crisis has revitalized interest in small powerplants. It's a matter of the Industry Ministry's making every possible effort. Two billion kWh could easily be added to the electricity supply by favoring the development of a few hundred of the most suitable sites, by private businesses or local communities, thereby saving 4 million tons of petroleum each year.

Such are the calculations which inspired the forthcoming edict. Within Mr Andre Giraud's department it is hoped that companies and even some banks will more willingly invest in electricity production. Nevertheless, the investments are large; from Fr 1,500 to Fr 5,000 per kW installed. However, there are scarcely any economic risks, since the entrepreneurs are certain of selling their production. In fact, ECF is obliged to buy all current produced by private installations not used on the site. The price varies from 8 centimes to 28 centimes per kWh, according to the hour and the season.

Construction of a small power plant could be very attractive to communities. It allows them to regain an energy autonomy lost 150 years ago. It's also an opportunity to promote irrigation and even local tourism. Several projects are under study in Haute Loire, Ardeche, and Lozere [Departments].

Although these little enterprises use hardly any manpower, they pay a professional tax and land taxes. These expenses represent, according to the case, from 2.5 to 15 percent of the business volume of the small private powerplants already in operation; not an insignificant contribution to the mountain collectives' finances.

The Interior Ministry financially aids those municipalities which endeavor to save energy. It is prepared to also help those that are seeking resources in heat from the earth, solar energy, or small dams.

Until now the Counsel of State was opposed to communities' building such facilities with the sole purpose of profiting financially. There always had to be another justification; irrigation or rural improvement. However, it is probable that, in the spring when the proposed bill on "energy saving and heat utilization" comes before the Senate, an amendment will be proposed to free collectives from all constraint. The government will not oppose it.

However, for 20 years the fishing federations have been waging a constant battle against pollution of the rivers. All their efforts are not going to be wasted now, by a series of concrete dams. At their last congress they condemned the small power plant policy, for dams have disadvantages. They

hinder fish migration and the fish ladders provided are often unsuitable. Behind the dikes the waters become warm and sediment is deposited. Then when water is released, the entire bed is polluted by sludge. Finally, the often poorly protected turbines are a death trap for the fish. Mr Jean Rapilly, founder of the National Association for Salmonidae Protection states, "Small powerplants are not ecologically innocuous. They can irreversibly deteriorate a water course."

Canoe and kayak enthusiasts, more and more numerous, and simple hikers along the river banks are not happy either. So the Dordogne's 2,000 canoeists are rising against the project to install 16 small turbines in the old sluices of the Isle river. They point out that this water course, as well as the Vezere, Auvezere, and Dordogne are veritable "natural nautical stadiums." Their opposition is supported by fishermen and by river property owners who fear that their way of life will be altered by concrete constructions, pylons, and turbine noise. The departmental authority from Environment also gave an unfavorable opinion, at the opening of the first public hearing this summer, because of "insufficient impact study."

Some Prohibitions

The best founded worries are about the facilities, generally large, which are necessary to take the river water and precipitate it into an artificial conduit towards the turbine placed several kilometers downstream. Thus over part of its route the waterway is practically dry and lost to all other usage. So, at Thiers (Puy-de-Dome), the Durole, already polluted by the cutlery works, is going to be diverted over 5 km to supply a small 6,000 kW plant. The same situation exists on the upper Rhone, where CNR is building a 6,000 kW plant at Bregnier-Cordon (Ain), which will divert the river for 30 km.

For 4 years the projected edict prepared by the Industry Ministry has also collided with the objections of environmental services. They have given their final approval only after having been assured that prefectural authorization would have many safeguards. First an impact statement (for less than 500 kW) or an impact study must be presented to support all requests. A public hearing will be necessary. Finally, the company which is seeking authorization to build a small powerplant will agree to respect water regulation. It must insure a minimum flow, install equipment to measure it, provide defenses against erosion, build the construction in a way which does not trap the fish in the turbine, etc. Generally, it will be forbidden to involve the water in other uses.

As a precaution, small powerplant construction will even be totally forbidden on about 20 streams: all those that migrating fish can still go up; the Loire, the Canche, the Normandy rivers, those of the Adour basin, and the Breton streams. It would be absurd to compromise, in the name of the energy crisis, the financial efforts which are also approved to replenish the rivers with salmon.

It's not only the fishermen and ecologists who are worried. Who is going to control such a little powerplant's water regulation? A fish warden cannot be placed behind each electricity producer. And what, if any, sanctions would it incur? The only real deterrent, in case of infraction, is for EDF to stop buying its current. Unfortunately, that is not provided for in the articles.

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'I AVGI' REPORTS LARGE SCALE DISSENTION WITHIN KKE RANKS

AT141500 Athens I AVGI in Greek 14 Mar 80 pp 3, 5 AT

[Text of statement released for publication on 13 March 1980 by a group of KKE dissenters, many former members of the KKE and subsidiary organizations, who were 'expelled' from the party's ranks]

[Text] We publish the text of a statement released for publication yesterday by dissenting members of the dogmatic communist party in their effort to shed light, through their personal testimony, on the situation prevailing today within one of the representative organizations of the Greek left wing. "Today," stress the dissentors, "We cannot remain silent." The text is as follows:

Preamble

For a long time now the fate of political dissention within the KKE was only one: silence.

Today a new element is being added to the country's political affairs. This is the voice of those whose political disagreement placed them outside the party which at one time concentrated their ideals and political expectations.

The choice of the moment is not at all coincidental. Through a series of developments within mass movements, through the progress and development of political affairs we see a reflection of the causes and reasons of our own dissention. There is a confirmation of the clash between necessities of the times and party theory and practice.

It is not permissible that we should remain silent today. We must speak out accepting the responsibility for our political views in face of the more general problems which the people's movement is facing.

Conditions dictate that the dissenting faction must come out of the corner into which it is led by silence. It must make it clear that it will not accept its political retirement. Examining, without rejecting, the experience of participation within the KKE it must help maturely, calmly, through a constructive discussion, without any "revenge" complex, without any anti-KKE hatred, but also without aspiring to appear as some form of new "pioneering" force, to shed light, through its own personal testimony, on the true situation within the most "active" representative organization of the Greek left wing."

It does not escape us that although we choose to pursue the road of open criticism yet an entire world which is thinking and which disagrees only remains within the KKE hoping for a change of elements in its physiognomy or in its ability to contribute "from within" toward overcoming the deadlocks.

All these people have their own place in this dialog and criticism which is opening up.

Naturally we know in advance what the probable party reactions will be: "Willing provision of space and acceptance of our views by the bourgeois press." Support, even unwittingly, of the positions propagated by "the class enemy." These are well-known arguments from "older hard times." Today, however, they are unable to stop the imperative necessity for discussion and responsible criticism of the main ideological and political problems which party practices try to keep in obscurity.

This is because nobody can argue that discussion of these problems must be sacrificed in the name of the impenetrable barrier of silence of the KKE press organs, the barrier which the party's structure imposes between the leadership and the base, the organization and its members, the workers and the party.

In the name of what expediency should one remain silent on issues whose natural place of discussion should be within the party organizations, in the press as well as within the world of the left wing, whether it belongs to the party or not, because of their trials within the mass movement?

We state openly: We believe that the best support to reaction and to the bourgeois apparatus is offered by those persons who fail to make internal left wing criticism heard, who reject any attempt at dialog and discussion, who level and condemn every effort of critical juxtaposition on issues which are of interest not only to the KKE but also the entire world of the Greek left wing, who in the end disarm the movement and deprive it of the possibility to judge and consciously create its own history.

This belief permits us and obliges us to proceed under the primary guidance of our established experience and naturally without any aspirations of exhausting the issues theoretically.

The KKE in Face of the Crisis of Greek Capitalism

We will not be the first to draw the conclusion that Greek society today is in an all-sided crisis. Its evidence appears in relief from all sides of the country's social and political life. It is not only the "burning" social problems of the country, the increasing economic crisis, the deadlocks in a series of issues of domestic and foreign policy which demonstrate this crisis. There are also more general structural problems which the capitalist world is facing as a whole. There is also the crisis of ideology and political identity of the ruling classes.

Is there a way out of this situation?

This is where the crossroads is to be found. This is the lode stone upon which the credibility and responsibility of the policy of each party will be judged. Naturally, the bourgeois forces attempt to limit the way out toward an alternation of succeeding political forms within their own system.

At the same time, while new social systems make their appearance with new dimensions in mass struggles, the forces of the left wing appear without the ability to present an effective alternate prospect. Within such a framework which is characteristic because of new social demands and the search for solutions, which on many issues are different to those offered by the experience of the countries of "existential socialism," the political statements of the left wing have lost a great portion of their ability to convince.

[AT141649] Despite the fact that the KKE particularly condemns efforts to relegate the problem to an alternation of succeeding political forms it is, at the same time, in no position to guarantee some other prospect which would be able to meet the modern needs of Greek society. A series of elements which make up its political, organizational and ideological character testify to this weakness.

We will refer to these elements, primarily guided by the party's political action and also bearing in mind the relevant lack of consistency which often appears between its statements and reality, phraseology and policy.

What Is the KKE's Policy?

Under the conditions created after the political change the KKE--now legal at long last--appeared as the "continuer" of the revolutionary traditions of the people's movement. It was something which concentrated memories of old heroic relics interwoven with a history of defeat, disillusionment and fragmentation the causes for which could exclusively be blamed upon the British-U.S. imperialists, the exhaustion of senior leftists, to the wear of consciences under the regime of the right wing.

The considerable number of pioneering fighters with the strong participation of the students which joined its ranks in the last years of the dictatorship furnished it with a new fighting spirit after the dictatorship.

All this supported the drive which led the KKE to a quantitative improvement, the result of a considerable organizational activity and a political expression based upon the most intense opposition phraseology and allowed it to take up the most important position within the area of the left wing.

Today, however, delusions cannot support themselves nor can myths cover up the true situation. Experience from 6 years of legal activity has proved its political inefficiency. Its inability to base its policy upon any specific analysis of the current true Greek state of affairs is characteristic.

The 10th congress spoke of general revolutionary principles and about future "all people's states." It propagated direct goals and economic demands, it made a series of wishes. It failed, however, to carry out a fundamental analysis of the modern development of capitalism in the country, of current forms of bourgeois social relations, of the modernized presence of the establishment in many sectors, of the institutions and apparatus of the establishment and of any specific presentation of alternate solutions. It failed to present a convincing revolutionary strategy.

How can the essence of KKE policy be described?

It stems from an outdated strategic viewpoint that realization of change will be the "work of forces which will be concentrated on the basis of direct economic and political issues." These forces if "initiated" will be concentrated and will be prepared until such time when "the sun will shine" so that they can take over authority.

Such strategic viewpoint is related to lack of orientation toward basic structural changes which would touch upon the essence of institutions and would go beyond the limits of tolerance by the ruling class, which would be connected to revolutionary prospects in conjunction with the development of mass movements which represent revolutionary change. Revolutionary change was limited to being the result of changes in state authority which the party would capture "by assault."

What are the limits within which a policy based upon such a summary viewpoint be able to move?

It could only move within the limits of economic demands, of simple, direct, "burning" as the party describes them, demands. It attempted to unite the masses at the base on the basis of these demands, but it did not want the masses on center stage. Yet, it wanted them to wait together with the party for the proclaimed battle and for the "great day of the change."

Such a policy fettered to economic limits does not cross the boundary which touches upon social relations and institutions. It does not give political character to the masses; it does not orientate mass struggles toward the target of questioning the very nature and essence of the exploiting social system.

Being radically contrary to such a prospect of political conversion of the masses struggles the KKE understands conversion to politics as a simple interconnection between economic issues and general political issues in a simply anti-government drive.

Motivated by the requirements of a policy whose opposition "aces" were directly concentrated on economic and political issues to the degree required to separate the "left" from the rest of the parties. It is being pushed to an "intransigent" opposition phraseology which takes the form of "calamity-mongering" rhetoric. This can clearly be seen in its

press, in its statements and even in its slogans as a perpetual amassing of hardships and unbearable conditions upon the people's masses in the form of an epidemic under which everything and always is going from bad to worse.

Even this on the surface intransigent policy, however, is always exhausted by the KKE within the framework of statements, renunciations or even by "prepared-in-advance" public demonstrations with the people's factor on the sidelines as a patient spectator of future clashes.

[AT141910] If we ask which are the battles in which, during periods between elections, it concentrates the maximum of its potential, where it expresses its views, then the answer comes easy: festivals and anniversaries, celebrations, campaign manifestations in theaters. These are well organized "public relations" affairs where people are always in the corner, they are not politically used, they do not mobilize but they see, listen, applaud and, possibly, they are conscripted.

This lowering of the level of political struggle is not a coincidence. It reflects the fact that under present conditions the KKE supports a parliamentary mentality and tactics often in face of developing mass struggles and movements which threaten to leave it behind.

Relegation of issues from the field of mass struggles exclusively to parliamentary practice reflects the viewpoint on mass movements which the KKE has on such mass movements as auxiliary and controlled elements used to promote the party's role and its positions at all levels, positions which they are never permitted to go beyond.

The definitive factors in the formulation of KKE policy are the positions and the ideological and political options of the Soviet Communist Party. This applies whether it involves our country's internal affairs as, for example, the Aegean issue and the right of our country to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles; whether it involves international issues such as the situation in Argentina or developments in Afghanistan; whether it involves issues related to the particular experiences of the countries of "existential socialism" (as, for example, the current issue of the "all people's" state), or whether it involves differences between the world communist movement. In all instances the KKE accepts without criticism the positions of the Soviet Communist Party.

In this way, however, it is unable to support a policy which starts from the true needs, the specific conditions of Greek reality. This one-sided ideological and political orientation creates the character of a party which does not judge but which simply accepts which does not argue but which obeys. An unequal relationship is created which escapes the limits of internationalistic solidarity. Within these limits the KKE is virtually turned into a maker of excuses and a praiser of Soviet policy. There is a tragic addendum: with every sudden change in this policy it finds itself often obliged to renege unanimously whatever it unanimously supported only yesterday.

As to the differences of views and conflicts between communist parties, these disappear in a mysterious grinding mill to make room, in a sleight of hand manner, for the raised fists and smiling faces of communists throughout the world, united in brotherhood.

The Role of the KKE and the Mass Movement

Conditions created with the removal of the dictatorship gave the opportunity to the people's masses and forces which were entrapped to pass onto the center of the stage seeking a democratic way out. The development of labor mobilizations after long years of enforced inaction, appeared with a vitality which promised many developments. Anti-dictatorial traditions had a strengthening effect in this direction and radiated authority, possibilities and prospects.

It is a common conclusion today that the expectations on the formation of a mass people's movement did not come true.

It is characteristic that in 1979, a period, in other words, of fast deterioration of economic and social problems the number of workers strikes, even when viewed in absolute and reinforced figures, declined. Negative developments at the level of the qualitative function of mass organizations and movements is even more severe.

What are the causes for these negative developments and the difficulty in developing mass movements? Primarily they are the same obstacles raised by bourgeois apparatus both through measures of "suppression" (authoritarian, reactionary laws, etc.) as well as measures aimed at forcing people's concurrence (social policy, readjustment of ideological relations, etc.) on the other hand. However, stress must also be placed on the responsibilities of the opposition forces and in the forefront of "the representatives of the people's voice," in other words of the KKE. One glance at the recent development of mass struggles is sufficient to reveal the negative role of these forces.

In the area of workers movements the KKE, after denouncing and fighting against factory associations by sabotaging their creation at significantly important establishments it then passed on to their apparent acceptance but at the same time their practical undermining.

For a long time it went after control of administrative bodies and key-associations in order to undermine labor tradeunionism from within. It did this so that today it remains hanging between its separation from the Greek general labor confederation and acceptance of this body as an organizational functionary. In the progress of labor struggles and demands, while on the one hand it calls for and then undermines militant strikes, on the other hand it pushes the workers of controlled associations to 24-hour panhellenic strikes, fiascos and to recreational gatherings at the resorts of Ippokratiss Street.

[AT151230] While as a result of such a position, failure and loss of courage weighs the conscience of the workers, wild mathematical transactions are undertaken at party offices so that the number of strikers each year becomes greater than the year before, so that the progress of the workers' movement may be proved to be on an upward trend.

The students' movement being "settled" within its representative trade union organizations, signing decisions and announcements from the offices of the students' union, would have remained in a state "between heaven and earth" if only a wave of students' mobilizations which, despite the contrary desire of its trade union leaders, managed to expand destroying forecasts on election percentages, organizations and fronts and managed to develop into a considerable student victory in the past 4 years.

In face of this movement the forces of the KKE, after massing through phases of denunciation and provocation-mongering as well as disruptive efforts, in the end were swept away behind it, even finding the courage to celebrate, in the end, the imaginary "confirmation of their own line."

In an effort to theoretically justify the checking of mass struggles and the orientation toward low forms of struggle we have a recourse to easy theories about the "climaxing by stages" as well as theories about mutual support, alliances which, however, are not handled as processes arising from the increase and coordination of struggles and demands but rather as elements of a necessary stage setting to be erected within which the party will be able to control "at will" the start and conclusion of various struggles.

As a rule the KKE favors the development of struggles only when they are conducted under its own leadership and control but always within a limited direction both in the form of goals and forms of struggle. By contrast it opposes such struggles with determination when the mass movements choose goals and forms of struggle which go beyond and overthrow the framework of its own strategy and tactics. This is the essence of the position of the KKE and its role today within the mass movement.

It is based upon a specific understanding of the relationship between the party and the masses as a relationship within which the party plays the role of a leader given the leadership privilege in advance. The trade union movement of the workers must be led without protest and reaction. Cultivating among its members the belief of imposing its own line "at all costs" it often creates a phanaticism which replaces political juxtaposition with antidemocratic confrontation and even with bodily violence against those who have an opposite viewpoint. The claims, the forms, the intensity and development of struggles do not have an independent significance except only as negotiating "aces," so that it can prove its role as a basic negotiator of the working class at all levels. This role is promoted by the associations already under the control of the KKE and its trade union organs.

Under the light of these views the mass movements are dealt with not as fields for initiative development and creativity of the masses but as areas which can be fenced in and can function as "transition disguises" of the party line, as a mass projection of party organizations and as a privileged area for conscription.

In this way and according to the party's influence over trade unions and associations and according to whether they follow or not the party line they are classified into democratic, progressive, reformist, reactionary and so forth.

The KKE also faces a series of new mass movements with mistrust. These are movements such as the environmental movement, the feminist movement and others, which are appearing under the conditions of developed monopolistic capitalism and which are described as "movements of social criticism."

More generally the entire progress of the mass movement to date has demonstrated that the center of its functional weaknesses lies in the violation of its autonomy for which the KKE has a particular responsibility. "Party character" in the sense of creation of fenced in areas of party influence by the political parties disrupt internal cohesion and unity.

In this way a situation is created under which basic decisions, which have nothing to do with the situation, are not reached through internal regulatory processes but are taken outside the mass movement itself by the "heads" of the political parties. In this way the unavoidable preservation of the cohesion and its progress rely on the options of the party and the movement's clashes.

The so valuable unity of the trade union movement becomes a case which affects exclusively the heads of the parties and not the process of initiatives and activities at the base where it is tested, judged and erected on a daily basis.

[AT151600] In this way EFEE [the National Student Union of Greece] and the Administrative Council of ESEE [National Socialist Union of Greece], rely upon the KKE-PASOK political agreements instead of on their own recognition by the mass of students. Committees of struggle do not emerge from united struggles and activities by the workers at the base but emerge as a result of some agreement between ESAK [United Antidictatorial Labor Movement], PASKE [Panhellenic Militant Workers Trade Union Movement] and AEM [Antidictatorial Labor Front].

Is it necessary for us to add that as a whole such a viewpoint and practice toward the mass movement undermines its development and is wholly responsible for the phenomenon of inactivity and bureaucracy which inundates democratic trade union organizations and particularly those which the KKE has already managed to control?

Ideological Practices

Treating Marxism as a closed system of eternal truths is what is characteristic of KKE's ideological practices. Naturally the authenticity of such references to these truths are subject to serious questioning since they are dominated by distortion, falsification and "condification." Any ideological searching is confined by the effort to justify, in any way possible, the models of the so-called "existential socialism."

It is not at all strange, therefore, that the main party effort for many years can be summarized into a frantic attempt to laud theoretic Soviet Marxist contribution and to prove the value of excerpts through time.

What is the result? Ideological practices survive only under an alien light, drawing for Marxist authenticity from Soviet textbooks and USSR schools on Marxism.

In this way every effort at original theoretic production primarily based upon Greek reality, is frustrated. It is characteristic that the KKE, "Center for Study and Research, Marxist," which supposedly is responsible for the weight of theoretical productivity by party forces only functions partially far removed from any true research and fundamental theoretical contribution. More generally the theoretical activity within the KKE functions through axiomatic truths without any fundamental dialog or the ability to disagree. Suspicion, mistrust, rejection in advance, the label of "intelligentsianism," are the only replies to every attempt to deal with ideological issues in a scientific way. Under such a climate the few scientific forces within the KKE's ranks are dying of asphyxiation.

The nonexistence of theoretical dialog within the KKE, the way in which ideological issues are handled and solved is unavoidably also transferred outward and generally affects the KKE's intervention on issues of ideological struggle in Greece. Confronted by modern issues which feed Marxist thinking and discussion the KKE remains "closed" and suspicious.

It is an inviolable rule to exclude any contrary and opposite viewpoint. The false dictum that "whatever is to the interest of the people is the truth" and that naturally the party knows the truth, absolves the KKE's press organs of the irritation of having to cope with a different viewpoint. In this way the KKE contributes in a negative way to the conduct of a Marxist dialog in our country even at levels far lower than the true needs of our country.

The administrative way of handling ideological issues by the KKE is in no way an isolated phenomenon. To the degree that it finds equivalent phenomena of persecution and policing of ideas in the countries of "existential socialism," which the KKE in any case does not condemn, it demonstrates that it is deeply connected to the same way of thinking which it also shares in respect of ideas acceptable in tomorrow's socialist society.

The inability of the KKE to utilize Marxism as a tool for a study of and intervention into Greek reality prevents it from forging a Marxist ideological line in social relations which could help the working classes from the models of petty bourgeois ideology and morals which prevail today. On the contrary the KKE not only fails to question, from a Marxist viewpoint, the petty bourgeois ideology and morals which prevail today among the people's classes but it also bows before them and reproduces them.

On the one hand the century-old texts of Engels about the "origins of the family," are relegated to the desk drawer while on the other hand the KKE puts into the limelight the good communist and strict father; the permanent and legal relationship of the youth; the poor but honest, in his dealings with his employer, worker; the student who is first in his lessons and sports, always modest who never talks back to his seniors.

[AT151724] What of the cultural sector? The KKE's intervention in this sector means promotion or tolerance of the forms of expression and creation to the degree that can be subjugated to its political position. We thus come to an inborn mistrust of new forms of art. We are satisfied with the known forms of expression, we are satisfied with the flattery of the people and with "peoples" art, we are even satisfied with the mediocre or even the bad artist if he is one of the "conscripted" ones.

To the above must be added a preference and use of a crude tradition of Greek art by juxtaposition to any "foreign imported" modern creation. Naturally we also have the imperative censorship of creation which affects or opposes the party's word.

What is left? We have culture as an admirable organizational complex of personalities, movements, associations together with, once again, public relations for festivals or pre-festivals.

A Picture of the Internal Party Situation

The basic goals and provisions as well as the functions which prevail over the organizational structure of the KKE are none other than the following: A) Guaranteeing stability in leadership and leading personalities who prevail and, B) Naturally, the reproduction of the given party ideology, mentality and practice.

The principle for organizational structure on the basis of which the KKE's internal party functions are established consists of a political division enforced between the leadership and the base. "The leadership produces the line" and the base guarantees its "practical implementation."

Within the framework of this division, on the one hand there is enforcement--in the form of an accepted fact--of the "infallibility" of party leadership and on the other hand the mere members are treated as second class material. The directive, "deal with the problems of your area" in practice only means sticking posters onto walls, economic campaigns, sale of tickets and distribution of printed material. Where does this political division lead to?

--It leads to a prevention of any material involvement of the members in the adoption of decisions.

--It leads to suppression of any attempt at fundamental dialog and criticism on serious political issues. The line given is: "Practical and speedy decisions because history does not wait."

--It leads to an undemocratic treatment of dissenters or of those who have serious differences. This ranges from "advice" to "special meetings," to rejection and to distortion of views. It ranges from personal slander and often terrorization to political ostracism.

--It leads to development of super-centralization which is expressed in two directions. On the one hand there is a confinement of political decisions within the limits of an extremely narrow leading circle of personalities and on the other hand there is a large-scale limitation of issues upon which lower functionaries can take the initiative of a decision.

Under these limits the relations between members and leadership, the style of work which prevails, develops within strict models which are dominated by a severe bourgeois influence. Fear of responsibility, the mentality of the subordinate, authoritarian leadership, respect of the person of the leader, manipulation of meetings, their closing and leveling off by the leader, all these elements reign supreme.

The entire organizational structure leads to the creation of watertight and cut off areas between which there is no intermediary communication. All information channels operate in a vertical way, they are absolutely controlled and operate on the basis of the principle: "It is not necessary for you to learn more than what is necessary."

In this way its participation in the election of leading party organs takes place in the most ineffectual way. Participation of the base in this process is merely formal and it must always be exhausted in approval of personalities put forth by the leadership. In a contrary instance, when the base does not agree then the leadership apparatus is set into motion, all available means, accepted or not, are conscripted in order to "convince" it.

The basic role in the reproduction of the political division between the leadership and the base, in the establishment of cohesion and the primary characteristics of the organizational situation is born by the personality apparatus and particularly by medium level personalities.

These personalities are chosen on the basis of a policy on personalities which places over and above the criterion of political ability another criterion: "party spirit." In the language of the party leadership this means a "special" quality of character and behavior which accepts without protest and without problems the role which party practice has in store for medium level personalities. What is the role of these medium-level personalities?

[AT151805] Being fated to have no responsibility in the adoption of decisions these personalities have as their mission the transmission of views of the leadership, as well as of controlling the internal organizational situation. Imperative ideological requisites are: "modest and measured in his opinions," and "he must preserve and enforce discipline."

Theoretical half-knowledge or lack of knowledge and the attribute to uncomplaining attendance at marathon-long meetings on practical duties are necessary and convenient qualifications. The economic dependence of a considerable number of professionalized leading personalities and the identification of progress within the party with revolutionary duty leads to the cultivation of a conscience which feels answerable only in the direction of leadership above it which at the same time also guarantees its own stability.

Leading personalities are "convinced" of the necessity of the integral expression of the leadership's views among the members. In this way they are pressured to limit disagreements within the organizations to which they belong, as well as not to raise them for discussion at organizational meetings. In the mind of the leading personality (particularly of the professionalized type) original ideals are soon confused inseparably with his "revolutionary career" where the duties of the revolutionary are identified and in practice are replaced by the duties of the bureaucrat who is thus converted into one of the links of the party's apparatus.

Such a structure and organization as the one which is characteristic of the internal situation of the KKE could not be enforced onto members and leading personalities who support it without the existence of a strong ideology. This ideology plays an important role in giving a convincing character to internal party policy, in the uncomplaining acceptance of distributed roles and in creating a forged picture of the good communist according to the requirements of a bureaucratic structure.

The party's history is conscripted--what else--for the purpose of creating such an ideology. The search for historic lessons is conducted in such a way that heroism and self sacrifice, often elevated to the levels of a myth, cover up any critical delving into the causes of past mistakes.

"Devotion to the party"--this supreme lesson from the pantheon of past martyrs--provides the necessary ideological cover to the demands of the leadership for devotion to it. The youth fighter, coming face to face in awe with the leading-personality-fighter who is the embodiment of heroism and the myth, finds himself politically disarmed and without the ability to conduct any fundamental criticism.

More generally the identification of the party and the leadership, strengthened with the appropriate chosen historic lessons of devotion and "iron discipline" make up the ideological framework of internal party practice and organization of the KKE.

The primary negative result of this type of organization--in conjunction with the conscriptions conducted under insufficient criteria and through mass

struggles--is to be found in the lowering of the political function of the party's base. This of itself brings about the blunting of the political criteria of the members. A political passive spirit, theoretical insufficiency and indifference are often cultivated and they predominate.

Conclusion: The KKE and the Crisis of the Left

These elements of the ideological and political physiognomy of the KKE, as they are drawn from our own political experience and confirmed by its relations with the mass movement, as well as in its internal party function, provide a picture of its inability to respond to the needs for social change. This is a weakness which predetermines the progress of the left wing in our country and underlines its crisis.

Most certainly the views which make up our critical experience are not "novel." Many of the issues with which we have dealt and which make us think were raised years ago while others are pushed onto center stage by modern reality.

An important element of the period through which we are now passing is that a number of forces in the area of the left wing are freeing themselves from the watertight compartments of ideological dogmas. There is a multiplication of forces which take on a radical character by questioning the effectiveness of the left wing and of other forces and which understand its historic defeats and insufficiency.

Even forces which operate within the organizations of the left wing understand the need for a different policy of a different physiognomy which will provide an outlet to the necessary revolutionary processes and changes. Today the ground is favorable and it is more imperative than ever before to set in motion a process of discussion of political experiences with a parallel and firm search of effective ways for intervening in the mass movement and for a protracted examination and testing of the views originating within it.

Our target remains a left wing which is not on the sidelines and which is not "disarmed." If this is to be achieved it is essential to overcome views, structures and elements which now predominate. We espouse this difficult but also necessary prospect.

[Editor's Note: I AVGI also carries the names of approximately 400 signatories to the statement. No processing planned unless requested.]

CSO: 4908

PROGRESS IN PREPARATION FOR ACCESSION REPORTED

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 23 Feb 80 pp 6, 7

[Text] One of the most critical aspects of Greece's accession to the European Communities involves the harmonisation of Greek economic and other procedures to meet Community standards and norms. Much work has already been carried out in this process of harmonisation and the table below gives an indication of which particular Ministries and other State agencies are involved with preparing the different aspects of the economy for accession. The table indicates in which sectors work has been completed and where work still remains to be carried out.

MINISTRY	SECTORS COMPLETED	SECTORS BEING PROCESSED
FINANCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Tariff sector <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Taxable value b. Anti-dumping duties c. Origin of merchandise d. Small parcels -Exemptions -Budget without explanatory notes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Tariff sector -FPA -Taxation of company contributions -Taxation of tobacco -Small parcels -Government subsidies
AGRICULTURE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Adaptation of market structures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Decree concerning agricultural subjects such as veterinary legislation, technical obstacles, etc.
INDUSTRY/ENERGY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Tables of abolished laws -Right of establishment -Mining -Movie industry -Manufacturing -ENERGY - statistical data -EURATOM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Technical obstacles
PUBLIC WORKS EDUCATION INTERIOR PUBLIC ORDER COMMERCE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Public projects -Technical training -Personal situation of Greeks -Personal situation of Aliens -Competition -Government procurement -Foreign relations -Commercial interventionary relations -Insurance -Technical obstacles 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Technical obstacles -State procurement regulations -Companies -Services
COORDINATION		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Regional policy
BANK OF GREECE		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Environment -Capital market
SOCIAL SERVICES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Banks -Social security -Right of settlement of physicians -Pharmaceutics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Medical and similar vocations -Technical obstacles -EURATOM
LABOUR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Free movement of workers -Communal funds -Activities of social policy 	
TRANSPORT NATIONAL DEFENSE PRIME MINISTER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Transportation -Border areas -EOT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Railway transportation
MERCHANT MARINE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Seamen's social security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Sports -Press

CSO: 4920

STATISTICS ON EMPLOYMENT, PRODUCTIVITY REPORTED

Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English 16 Feb 80 pp 30, 31

[Text]

Conditions on the labour market from 1974 until today have been very different from those in industrialized countries, unemployment has remained throughout at unusually high levels, the Commercial Bank reports in its latest review. This deviation from international trends is basically linked to the peculiarities and the stage of development of the Greek economy but also, more specifically, to certain trends which have become more pronounced during the last six years. In the OECD's annual review of Greece, which was published last September, certain interesting observations are expressed concerning the state of the labour market in 1978 with a retrospective survey of the preceding stages up to 1974. The OECD's observations are important both in explaining the phenomenon but also in assessing the more favorable development as compared with that of most countries of the area.

Up to 1973, the size of the Greek labour force was decisively influenced by emigration, which entailed a continuous net outflow of a very significant number of people, although since the beginning of the seventies there has been a trend towards a reduction in this movement. Since 1974 the trend has been reversed and each year the migratory movement shows a net inflow of labour. Thus, the total labour force of the country during the last six years has increased at a higher rate than that due to the natural increase in the population. At the same time, its composition is changing in the direction

which has consistently marked its development, which is the increase in the proportion of the urban labour force. The OECD report mentions in this connection that the flow from the agrarian to the urban sector continues at an annual magnitude which in 1978 is put at about 40,000 individuals. This number, even though much smaller than that at the beginning of the seventies (around 70,000), does not show a slackening in the trend of moving away from agrarian employment because between 1970 and 1978 the actively employed population of the agrarian sector has come down from 1,300,000

to 850,000 persons approximately. On the other hand, the urban labour force has been increasing since 1973 at a rate much higher than the average rate of the preceding decade.

Changes in employment and productivity

Ultimately, the increase of the labour force during 1974-78 did not have unfavorable repercussions on the relations between supply and demand on the labour market. After the temporary — of a cyclical nature — increase in the number of unemployed between 1974 and 1975, the percentage of unemployment in the urban sector has been limited to about 2.5%.

More specifically, in manufacturing the reduction in employment during the recession was very small and of a short duration. Since the middle of 1975, employment in manufacturing is again marked by an upward trend which, however, has been slackening in 1978. In that year the percentage of increase was around 3% as against 4.5% in the previous year.

This favourable development of employment in comparison with the international trends during 1974-78 is, however, accompanied by a more unfavourable development in productivity. According to the data of the OECD report, the average rate of increase of productivity in the urban sector of the economy declined from 4.7% during 1964-1974 to less than 3% during 1975-78. More specifically, in manufacturing the corresponding average rate of 1974-78 declined to 2% as against 6.5% approximately, which had been the long-term average rate of increase in productivity until then.

The OECD report observes that the decline in the rate of increase of productivity per employed person may partly be attributed also to government regulations which entail additional charges for the first, thus having

an inhibiting effect both on the dismissals of workers and on the resorting to overtime work.

Changes in the structure of employment

The correlation of the development of employment and of the development of productivity is of much greater importance in the case of an economy which, like the Greek one, has not yet reached full maturity. Its distance from the industrialized countries is still such that the gradual approach to the levels which they have already reached through technological improvements entails very high rates of increase of productivity.

The period 1974-78 is characterized by a slowdown in the rate of increase of the national product and by a trend of declining production investments. The continuing increase in employment — calculated in numbers of employed — during this same period reflects the opposite effects of these two characteristics. The slowdown in the upward trend of the economy would have led to stagnation or at least to a still lower rate of increase in employment if the development of investments had continued at the until then long-term rates of increase and had thus ensured a corresponding decrease in the productivity per employed. The OECD report mentions as one factor which contributed, during this period, to the increase in employment in the urban sector among others the changes in the structure of the urban sector. A strengthening of the labour intensive industries is being deduced from the fact that in manufacturing the fastest growth is being recorded by the textile industry, the clothing and footwear industries, and the food industry and that there has also been recorded a small increase in the share of the service sector in the gross national

product. Both this factor, however, and the inelasticity of adjustment in the employment of the labour potential which has been observed with regard to manufacturing during the slowdown in its rate of operations, may have affected favourably the size of employment but from the point of view of economic growth they do not, in effect, express progress.

Parasitism intensified

During the first post-war decades, when there was a large population surplus, underemployment in the Greek economy expressed itself mainly through the partial employment in the agricultural sector and parasitism in the urban sector. Emigration on the one hand and the significant progress towards industrial development since the end of the 1950's eliminated underemployment in the agricultural sector and reduced parasitism in the urban sector. The facts mentioned earlier with regard to the development during 1974-78 justify the suspicion that during this last stage the parasitic element in the economy has been boosted.

The low level of investments in industry means a slowdown in the technological improvement of existing production units and a curb for the growth of capital-intensive industry with a high proportion of added value. It means therefore a check in the progress towards a more efficient utilization of the labour force in industry.

There are many indications that the growth in the service sector and the greater absorption by this sector of labour reflect to some extent a growth in parasitic activities. Of course, the growth of the tourist industry creates opportunities for productive employment. But in other service sectors, where inflation has created profit opportunities, their growth is an expression of parasitism and symptom of regression from the point of view of the economy's structure. The conclusion which is warranted is that from the short-term point of view the development of employment in our country appears more favourable but from a long-term point of view it rather means regression.

RUFFINI INTERVIEWED ON MATTARELLA, TERRORISM, MAFIA

Palermo L'ORA in Italian 19 Jan 80 p 4

[Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Attilio Ruffini on Mattarella, terrorism, the Mafia and the government, by Antonio Calabro; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Honorable Ruffini, they say that you are a man of power, friend of the Mafiosi.

[Answer] All slander. Statements without foundation. They say I have met with a Mafia leader. One needs only to investigate this; none of it is true. I do not know what the Mafiosi look like; I only see the photograph in the newspapers when one of them is arrested.

[Question] At least do not deny the image of a man of power.

[Answer] I do not want power; nor do I have it. It fills me with disgust. And I would not even know how to use it.

Attilio Ruffini, 55 years of age, minister of foreign affairs since a matter of days after years spent in the Ministry of Defense, sinks into an old armchair in a small corner drawing room of Villa Igiea. And he speaks with a singsong and slow voice. He explains, accuses, defends himself with calm tones. But those pale blue eyes which avoid the interlocutor, those sharp witticisms which break the monotony of the conversation from time to time, display great anxiety. Many DC [Christian Democratic Party] members have been in the killer gun sight, even at present unknown. Many others are laboring under the weight of suspicion through bad governing and compromising friendships. The malaise which is disturbing the entire DC seems also to be troubling this man who wants to appear a man of ice.

[Question] Honorable Ruffini, in your opinion, who killed President Mattarella?

[Answer] It is difficult to say. I go by the process of elimination. I do not believe it is a question of terrorism, since, in this case, the elements of typical terrorist organization are lacking and there is no justification. A political crime is involved.

[Question] Be a little more precise. What does "political" mean?

[Answer] They killed a politician because of the way in which he was carrying on politics.

[Question] Can we speak of a crime desired by the Mafia?

[Answer] What Mafia? I believe that the investigators will thoroughly examine the administrative acts carried out by Mattarella, the laws for which he fought, to see if there is any faint indication which will lead them to come up with any motives for a terrible crime. Otherwise, I see no possibility of an explanation.

[Question] Homicide against a man who was following the path of renewal, then?

[Answer] For other politicians or, generally speaking, public figures, it could be said basically that the frequenting of certain circles, certain activities, a certain style of living might reveal a certain angle. But none of this can be said about Mattarella. It is difficult to imagine any deviation from his honest and orderly manner of carrying on politics.

[Question] What about the DC secretary in Palermo, Michele Reina? He was also killed. And there were many rumors about contracts, business, compromising friendships.

[Answer] I hardly knew Reina. The fact remains that they killed the DC secretary. His friends speak very well of him. And I must believe them.

[Question] A city wracked by violence, Palermo. Everyone says: "Something must be done." Some again speak of an anti-Mafia committee. ORA proposed a parliamentary inquiry on the city. The communists are preparing new laws. What is the DC doing?

[Answer] The DC has taken and is taking action. In my opinion, it is not a question of creating new investigating committees but, rather, of taking corrective measures. There is the government's proposal on inheritance assessments, for example. And greater attention should be paid to the intelligence services.

[Question] Is the secret service following up the Mattarella crime? Until a few days ago, you were minister of defense; you should know something about that, should you not?

[Answer] About the secret service, the less said the better.

[Question] I shall change the question. Should we be concerned with the problem of Mafia violence in Sicily?

[Answer] Certainly. We are faced with a criminal phenomenon of vast proportions.

[Question] Let us return to you. They say that you know a lot about the Mafia.

[Answer] If it is true that the Mafia world is centered around business, contracts, I tell you that I do not know how an when the contracts are made; nor do I know the contractors. All these things can be verified. I then begin to doubt the intellectual honesty of the one who writes and spreads these rumors.

[Question] The rumors also come from within the DC. It seems that you have many enemies in your party.

[Answer] I hope, I wish, I believe not. Certainly, there will be some who are envious, jealous, but on a modest scale. Certainly not on the part of the leaders.

[Question] But you yourself had recently declared, after an initial wave of polemics: "I am not speaking, for, otherwise, I might harm my friends." To what were you alluding?

[Answer] I am not speaking in the sense that I avoid controversy through insinuations which arise not only in the circles of opponents.

[Question] Which arise in the DC, then?

[Answer] Some, at lower levels, may even speak badly. But be clear on this point: I did not want a boisterous accession, because I enjoy a certain amount of support. No one in Sicily can boast a political curriculum as enlightened as mine. Consider the Youth Resistance.

[Question] Graziano Verzotto, former chairman of EMS, thought differently about it. He said: "Ruffini boasts of having made the Resistance Movement, but he was only a very modest messenger."

[Answer] At 19 years of age, I was confined in San Leonardo prison, in Verona, condemned to death. I must have done something. But let us forget that. I was giving my curriculum: I began with university organizations and, in time, had increasingly important roles in the DC: I have been national vice secretary and then, several times, minister. Nevertheless, my tendency here, in Sicily, has been to remain a small group, a minority. Where do you find my being a man of power?

[Question] You were reelected to the chamber last June with more than 100,000 preferential votes. Heading the list. They say that, in order to have so many votes, Mafia groups must have given you a helping hand.

[Answer] It is not true. Those are lies. I was helped not only by the friends in my group but also by those of other factions: Mattarella, Lima, the Forze Nuove [leftwing faction of DC].

[Question] Even Ciancimino maintains that he got votes for you.

[Answer] I never saw Ciancimino during the electoral campaign. And I do not have the impression that he supported me. If it had been true, I would not have had any difficulty saying so. Ciancimino is still a party leader, although I did not put him in that position.

[Question] Among your friends, some have ended up badly. Let us consider Gaspare Giganti, former provincial president, who ended up in prison due to fraudulent contracts.

[Answer] I hardly know Giganti; I saw him perhaps a few times. I am not sure what he is supposed to have done. I am awaiting the verdict of the court. But tell me: Why does everything come back to me? When Gui was accused in the Lockheed scandal, no one said: "He is Moro's man." Here, however, every pretext is used to strike at me. I say this is a dishonest way to carry on a controversy. I am even criticized for my political ideas. But there is a difference between political judgment and moral judgments. And they do not refrain from spreading false scandal to attack a politician for the orientations he expresses. That is a sign of bad upbringing.

[Question] The Sicilian DC is getting back into congress. This is a change in internal balance, since Lima is taking the strongest partisan position away from Cullotti. What will happen?

[Answer] Congress is scheduled for Sunday. We shall see. But I believe nothing will happen. I believe conditions are right for continuing with a unified party leadership. Moreover, the DC cannot be governed by dint of majorities, even when they have 51 or 65 percent.

[Question] It is known that you are discussing new organization charts for the presidency of the region and other positions of power. What will you do?

[Answer] With the death of Mattarella we have no sure reference point left for the presidency of the region. Nothing has been decided with regard to the new organization chart. It is being discussed.

[Question] In Rome the PCI and PSI [Italian Socialist Party] are saying: "We need a government of national unity with the participation of leftist parties." What is your opinion on that?

[Answer] I would not attribute miraculous powers to political formulas with regard to the many problems we have. I do not completely deny the worthwhileness of a confrontation and agreement with the PCI on certain major questions. But I do not believe conditions are right for the PCI's

participation in government together with the DC. The path of national solidarity is being pursued, certainly. But every party plays its own role, in the government and in the opposition.

[Question] Is the PCI then condemned to the role of opposition?

[Answer] Why no. Every party can be a part of government, if it has the necessary consensus. I say we must avoid forceful measures. And it does not seem to me that the electorate has given government consensus to the PCI.

[Question] Then, to assure the country governability, what can be done?

[Answer] I think we must avoid divisionism, disintegration among so many parties. I am not thinking of constitutional changes. But I think that, in addition to indicating a party, the votes should clearly indicate a government formula, which would be adopted and would apply to the entire legislature.

[Question] Can we not even in Sicily speak of the PCI in government? Yet, it is known that, even in your party, this possibility is widely discussed and that possibilist orientations are coming to a head.

[Answer] We are waiting to know what the DC's national congress will say. But I do not believe we can contemplate liberal solutions, experimentation in the regions, except for a framework of homogeneity in national behavior. Even now, it seems to me to be worthwhile continuing the policy of confrontation, even in the region. In another 6 months, 1 year, 2 years, we shall see.

8568

CSO: 3104

LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PIFANO CONTINUE

Cagliari L'UNIONE SARDA in Italian 23 Jan 80 p 14

[Text] Chieti, 22 January--Ten years of imprisonment and a fine of 2 million lire were asked by Prosecuting Attorney Antonaldo Abrugiati for Daniele Pifano, Giorgio Baungartner, Luciano Giuseppe Nieri, Jordanian Abu Anzek Saleh and Lebanese Nbil Kaddoura, the only defendant still at large. The representative of the public prosecution considered all the accused responsible for the crimes of having and bringing war weaponry into our national territory and, for each of them, asked the court to preclude any leniency due to the gravity of the crime, the dangerous nature of their conduct and their intrinsic character.

The hearing at the Chieti court of the trial for the event involving two Strela S.A. 7 missile launchers, discovered in Ortona last November on board a long-distance bus near which were Daniele Pifano, Giorgio Baungartner and Luciano Giuseppe Nieri, was begun in an atmosphere of tension by the arrest of a self-employed person.

After a short meeting in the council chambers in the morning, the court had rejected all requests made by the defense council in the previous hearing. In the injunction with which the trial investigation was closed, the judges defined as "irrelevant to the purposes of the decision" all requests made to use the testimonies of Francesco Cossiga, chairman of the Council of Ministers, Vito Miceli, former head of the SID [Defense Intelligence Service], of the Italian ambassador to Beirut and all other persons who, according to the council for the defense, should allegedly have cleared up the relations between the Italian authorities and the Palestinian organizations.

In today's hearing Prosecuting Attorney Abrugiati had exhibited two communiques sent by Interpol in response to requests for news about the arrest in Athens in August 1978 of the Kaddoura brothers, Abdel and Nabiul. The latter, a defendant in the trial and still at large, was allegedly the man who actually delivered the missile launchers at the port of Ortona to the three self-employed persons from Rome, unloading them from the hold of the Lebanese motorboat, "Sidon," on which they had been shipped.

The information from Interpol confirms in substance that the two brothers were arrested on 19 August for being found in possession of 200 kilos of explosives and numerous weapons and an abundance of ammunition contained in seven suitcases. According to the news from Athens, among the weapons there was also an "instrument for launching projectiles against tanks." Abdel and Nabiul Kaddoura were sentenced by the court of appeals in Athens to 1 year imprisonment and were shortly thereafter banished from Greece for life.

8568

CSO: 3104

MOLISE PCI-PSI-PRI ACCORD FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ELECTIONS

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 23 Feb 80 p 2

[Article by G.M.: "Document Agreed Upon by the Three Parties"]

[Text] Joint lists in the municipalities having less than 5,000 inhabitants. Overcome the monopoly of the DC government.

Campobasso--An important agreement was reached by the PCI [Italian Communist Party], PSI [Italian Socialist Party], and PRI [Italian Republican Party] in Molise. The delegations of the three parties have agreed on an important document for the forthcoming administrative elections in one of the few regions where the DC retains an absolute majority and where there has not been any institutional agreement in the past.

The document mentions the existence of vast areas where disgregation and decline are most accentuated and where the unemployment of young people is now increasing.

"This situation," said the document, "is the consequence of the 30-year old power of the DC government of Molise, based on interventions concluded exclusively for the purpose of maintaining the administration of an essentially clientele-type government, one that has been closed to any comparison with other democratic forces."

The divisions and the dispersion of the initiatives of democratic forces have made it possible for the DC to win an absolute and exclusive majority in the administration of the government. The three parties believe that it is necessary to immediately begin a new political discussion that will involve all the democratic forces, the opinion of the world of work and private industry, the trade unions, the youth movements, and the world of culture, and--with respect for their political autonomy and judgment, and with equal consideration--be based on planning, on comparison of the choices regarding development, and on the absolute necessity that local entities also be informed of the initiatives of a planned development.

The three parties agree to present joint lists in the forthcoming elections in municipalities having less than 5,000 inhabitants, lists that will be open to all democratic forces, for the purpose of proposing to the people a new method of public government that will make it possible for the citizens, themselves--the workers and the economic operators--to be informed of the developmental choices of the individual zones and that will provide the small centers also with that role that belongs to them according to the legislation in force. The PCI, the PSI, and the PRI augur that this agreement will make it possible to draw the absolute majority away from the DC, essential to bringing about a profound change also in Molise.

8255

CSO: 3104

PCI'S 4-POINT PROPOSAL FOR AUTO INDUSTRY

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 23 Feb 80 pp 1, 17

[Article by Bruno Ugolini: Fiat: No Handout"]

[Text] PCI Auto Proposals.

Turin--Problems connected with the administrative capability of the industry challenged; anything but a rush to the rescue of the Agnelli brothers. This is the sense of the national conference of communists on the Fiat company that opened yesterday at the Nuovo Theater, filled with workers, technicians, trade union and political leaders. This is the red line that was introduced and developed in the introductory report of Renzo Gianotti, secretary of the Turin federation; these were the first interventions in the discussion. A careful statement of errors and delays (in the workers movement also) that brought the auto colossus to a critical point and also a package of proposals based on planning. No desire to subject the Fiat company to the bureaucratic fetters of the State; no belated rediscovery of the auto industry. Of course there are changes in viewpoint, but there is also coherence. The PCI does not at all reject the struggles against a pattern of development that sacrificed every other productive choice for the automobile. It does not reject the struggles for the priority of the South, nor those for productive diversification, nor those to arrive at an integrated public transportation system. However, in the face of such an important part of the Italian economy that has been struck by a series of crises, the problem today consists of indicating a role, a place, for the automobile industry.

With respect to the Fiat company, three hypotheses are on the agenda: either the small cabotage that defers the problems; or integration with a foreign group; or a financial choice that will assign to the public area a substantial portion of the industrial installations. The PCI is against all three hypotheses even if, for example, it considers as positive the

search for a parity agreement with a foreign group, in order to effect considerable savings. Of course there are however preliminary basic conditions to a way out of the crisis: the exercise by the trade union of its rights for information (including even the CGIL proposal with regard to enterprise).

Improvement in the professional role of the "manager" and, above all, "a national government," emphasized Gianotti, "that is able and willing to administer."

The basic line is that of a State-planned intervention that concerns the entire sector of transportation on rubber in order to obtain greater competition, productive decentralization to the South, the rationalization of the sector, energy saving, anti-pollution measures, security, research, and innovation. Business firms on the other hand are asked to submit to the State authorities a program for several years of investments and of interventions that would meet public objectives.

These are suggestions that require strong mobilization on the part of the people, led by the trade union. With what demands? The communists advance four objectives. First: new installations in the South, with appropriate checks on the experiments that are carried out (avoiding, for example, the transference to the South of only unskilled labor). Second: the quality of work. A discussion is in progress on the possibility of increasing work output and already there is opposition on the part of the Fiat company. In the meantime there are possible interventions with respect to automating certain work, introducing robots, reorganizing tasks, experimenting with "assembly islands." Third: productivity--the social, but also the business; with interventions in the matter of work organization, experimentation with new forms of weekly and annual work hours. Fourth: professionalism. Suitable recognition must be given to new, emerging professionals; new outlets must be opened; old professional figures replaced. The installations must have new professional profiles. Special attention must be given to those in charge, with consideration being given among other things to the firm's "staff planning."

It is a complex proposal of demands that is tied in directly with the most general of economic choices. It is a way of intervening directly in developmental matters and in "administration." There is a great enemy to this commitment: terrorism-- "the enemy of the forces that want to democratically bring about change." Workers at the Fiat company have started to reflect also on their own indecision and failings, indicating--in the questionnaire distributed by the PCI--a real answer to terrorism--social justice and harsher punishments.

It is also with this inspiration that they face "the Fiat case." "We are truly seeking," said Gianotti, "a third way in this case also. We do not accept the Weimar alternative: either Spartan defeat or the defensive subordination of social democracy."

4255
CSO: 3104

STATE OF CPN IN AMSTERDAM DISCUSSED

Amsterdam POLITIEK EN CULTUUR in Dutch Jan 80 pp 17-20

[Article by Roel Walraven, political secretary of the Amsterdam district of the CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands] and member of the Executive Committee of the CPN]

[Text] The changes that have affected Amsterdam for a number of years are not small. Under the influence of modifications in the economic pattern of the city, great changes have been taking place in the composition of the population, while issues connected with city renewal and housing shortage have been leading to a great population shift--especially to the tip of Noord-Holland, Purmerend, Lelystad and Almere.

The population of Amsterdam is decreasing, as is the case in all large cities. The year 1958 was a high point in the number of inhabitants, namely 872,428. Since that time the population has decreased very rapidly. In 1972, for the first time, there were fewer than 800,000 and at the end of 1977 there were 728,746 inhabitants. Each year the population decreased by 10 to 15,000 persons and it looks like this development will continue for a number of years. Yet these figures are not reflecting a correct picture of the great change that is occurring. That can only be clarified on the basis of this table of arrivals and departures which clearly reflects the large movement within the Amsterdam population for a number of years.

It gives the following picture for 1977.

	<u>Settlements</u>	<u>Departures</u>
January	2427	3270
February	2286	2693
March	2626	3229
April	2955	2906
May	2088	3156
June	2543	3524
July	2117	3419
August	3083	3667
September	3147	3578
October	2602	3410
November	2701	3676
December	2211	3646
Total	<u>30786</u>	<u>40174</u>

More than 30,000 new inhabitants settled in the city while over 40,000 left. This movement takes place year in year out so that the change in composition of the population occurs on a really large scale.

Of the total Amsterdam population, 15.5 percent is over 65 years of age. More than 52,000 are foreign nationals. All these figures show the complex situation that the Amsterdam party has to work with. The continuous population changes affect the activities and main issues of the party. They show that rigidity unavoidably leads to decline. An active, lively policy and continual intensive contact with the people remains the first requirement.

Party Changes

The changes that have occurred have not passed the party by. There are many Communists among those who left the city. Because of that, party branches could be set up swiftly in new places like Lelystad and Almere, where representatives of the party were chosen directly into the existing bodies by the population. Reversely, the number of party members coming to Amsterdam from the country is much smaller. That means that the important growth of the party in Amsterdam--and it still is a net growth--consists of newly won members, an increase that is larger than the number of party members leaving the city. It is an interesting phenomenon that these new members are often young people from places in the country that have no party branch. Thus they become acquainted with Communists and the party for the first time in Amsterdam. That direct experience with our party, its policy and activities, causes them to become members. This may indicate the possibility of establishing many party branches even in the small towns of our country! At the same time it gives meaning to the need to improve the internal party life and to take a serious and active hand in education and membership meetings.

As it appears from the increasing membership figure, the party reacts positively to the changes in the city, and falling back on old ways is out of the question. On the contrary, stagnation occurs more often in branches that have a less mobile population nearby, such as, for example, in the western garden cities. The most interesting development is shown in the Bijlmermeer where a large and active party branch occupies itself with literally all political and administrative questions that occur in this district, and which leads important battles, for instance against the high rents, the parking tariffs and the interference in social benefits by "Specifications '81." At the municipal elections our party received more than 9 percent of the vote in this district. For the entire city it was 10.7 percent.

Industry

In the development of party work we cannot overlook the big economic changes occurring in Amsterdam. A large number of businesses have serious problems

or have closed. Industry branches such as the leather and textile industries have virtually disappeared; the port has strongly deteriorated, and the metal industry is also in decline. Shipbuilding is in severe trouble, with a strong reduction in personnel at the NDSM [Netherlands Dry Dock and Shipbuilding Co.] and a merger with ADM while the Verschure shipyard of the IHC concern in the Zamenhofstraat will be closed. On the other hand there is the important growth in the financial sector, where about 24,000 people are employed by banks and 9,000 in the insurance industry. Another point of concentration for modern business is Schiphol where about 24,000 people work. The process of party efforts addressed to these developing industry branches goes very slowly. It takes a great effort by the cadres, especially since the concentration point of party work in those businesses where the party traditionally has had much influence, should not be abandoned, especially because of their potential in the battle for wages and social benefits.

Political Center

The above mentioned changes in the city give a bird's eye view of the new problems that continually confront the party in Amsterdam. The area of the city's two universities and their influence on political life is of no small importance in this context. Naturally, there are other issues, e.g., the curious developments within the Amsterdam PvdA [Labor Party]--curious even by national standards--where differences of opinion lead to colossal and unbridgeable conflicts and the dropping of people. That same PvdA, with its great number of votes and 19 seats in the city council, is not active in most Amsterdam districts and is absent at big conflicts. But that does not subtract from the fact that Amsterdam is the center of political activity and battle, and that the Communists succeed in moving the population on scores of issues.

Numerous great movements--and not only in the past--have had their cradle in Amsterdam. Actions against the neutron bomb and against the introduction of new rockets still bring thousands of people to their feet. The national demonstration against the neutron bomb last year, with all that preceded it--like the signature campaign--had far-reaching consequences in Amsterdam. Posters were hanging in every street and everywhere you saw people with "Stop the neutron bomb" billboards. That campaign still has enormous impact, noticeably in the still growing movement for peace, in which close cooperation with other peace groups was accomplished. Also the "Anti-Specifications '81" demonstration on the Dam Square in June was an example of how intensively political life develops in Amsterdam and how much influence our party has.

Conspicuous, on that account, is the great knowledge and experience that the party has picked up in a relatively short time during long series of issues that, in the past, occupied them barely or not at all. There is hardly an action or movement in Amsterdam in which the Communists did not play a decisive role. That goes for direct municipal questions and also for national or international affairs. An enormous potential of active

Communists has been created covering a very wide area. Thereby it is important that many of those comrades developed themselves within those movements and on grounds of their experiences in those movements found the way to our party. That confirms the belief that the people, through the battle itself and through becoming acquainted with our party during those battles, decide to become members. Should we be content with that development? Only in a certain sense, because the party is growing more slowly than seems possible. We have even determined that it is growing more slowly now than it did a year ago. At the root of this lie problems of a political and organizational nature, it is true that we have to talk longer to convince people to become members. Under the influence of propaganda by our opposition it is necessary to be better prepared for discussion. It is also true that during the past year the propaganda in the district has deteriorated and the systematic recruitment for the paper and new members has fallen back. Not because of reduced activity. It should rather be said that, because of the large amount of activity, this part of the work has fallen behind. Yet that indicates a serious shortcoming in the political orientation of the job. The avoidance of discussing memberships and subscriptions to DE WAARHEID during actions and in the movement can never be brushed aside because of work pressure within the movement. That is an underestimation of the role and position of our party. Finally, the growth of the party in the action also reflects the political consciousness of the people in the battle.

9314

CSO: 3105

FINANCE MINISTER RESIGNS OVER BUDGETARY DISAGREEMENTS

Government Crisis Averted

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 21 Feb 80 pp 1,3

[Text] The Hague, 21 February--In spite of the decision of Minister Andriessen (CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] finance) to resign because of the too slight reduction of public expenditures for 1980, in his opinion, the Van Agt Cabinet intends to remain. After Andriessen's letter of resignation of yesterday noon, the 15 remaining CDA and VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] ministers decided in consultation with group leaders, Lubbers and Rietkerk, to limit its results to a ministerial crisis.

Today the cabinet should send a letter about the contemplated savings to the Labor Foundation. This letter is a result of the cabinet's decision of last Monday (public economies of about 3 billion, ministers Andriessen and Albeda, social affairs voted against it at that time) and discussions held since.

The letter still would be submitted to Andriessen for forwarding. He then will be offered the opportunity to still reconsider his decision to retire, but in circles close to the cabinet, it is assumed that it will have to look for another minister of finance.

The preference then would be for one of the present ministers, for example, Doctor of Laws W. Scholten (defense, state secretary of finances from 1971-1973), because he is well informed about what has involved the cabinet in recent months and moreover, is bound to the cabinet decision of last Monday.

However the initial discussions in the cabinet indicate that no one is willing to take over Andriessen's position, so that

a successor must be found elsewhere. As long as that does not succeed, minister Van Aardenne (economic affairs) is also acting as minister of finance.

The search for a successor for Andriessen, whom the cabinet in a letter to the foundation today tried to conciliate as much as possible on the proposal, among others, of Vice Prime Minister Wiegel (VVD) is hindered because the letter (and the line taken in it) can no longer be changed. Just like Andriessen himself could only say yes or no about a successor after that. An important point, moreover, is that the VVD (parliamentary group and members of government) were substantially in agreement and are willing to go far with Andriessen to avoid a cabinet crisis and new elections (with the chance of a considerable loss).

The CDA is also very interested in the present social-economic and political situation (in the case of a difference of opinion between two CDA ministers from a cabinet led by Van Agt) in preventing a cabinet crisis. Consequently group leader Lubbers requested Andriessen's resignation yesterday evening only for other than personal differences and he attributed everything to the minister of finance's overfatigue and thus, as it were, attempted to minimize the political aspect of the conflict.

Minister Albeda's position (which is supported by the majority of the CDA group in its opposition to far-reaching economies) is not yet completely clear. If today's letter to the social partners meets his wishes too little to preserve a basis for negotiation in the foundation, Albeda threatens to leave the cabinet later. The draft letter which lay on the table this morning in a discussion of the ministers most involved, so it was reported in official circles, gave Albeda very little room for maneuver.

Prime Minister Van Agt informed chamber speaker Dolman this morning that he wants to make a statement at the beginning of the evening about Minister Andriessen's request to resign. The Second Chamber will probably discuss immediately afterwards the situation which has developed and the cabinet's efforts to smooth over the rift. The letter to the social partners will also be involved in the discussion.

Chamber speaker Dolman reported Minister Andriessen's request to resign yesterday early in the evening to the Second Chamber. Andriessen had his chauffeur deliver his letter of resignation

at the Catshuis [prime minister's residence] at about 1700 hours. In his letter to Van Agt, Andriessen explained in detail the reasons for his request to resign, which amounted to intense concern about the financial-economic situation and the shortcomings of the cabinet decision.

It was announced that Andriessen's letter would be sent to the Second Chamber on Thursday. This has become uncertain because of the efforts which the 15 remaining ministers are making to get Andriessen back in the cabinet's ranks. The cabinet would have little inclination to make Andriessen's grievances public, as long as a chance still exists to meet his objections.

During the cabinet discussion which lasted from 1930 to 0030 hours yesterday evening, Vice Prime Minister Wiegel said he considers it very important that the cabinet stay together, including Minister Andriessen. He said he understands Andriessen's point of view, but still wants to seek ways to settle the dispute. Wiegel did not want to say what the six VVD ministers are going to do, if Minister Andriessen sticks to his guns.

Minister Albeda declared that the cabinet still had contacted Andriessen yesterday evening, but that had not led to a change in his point of view. According to Albeda, "Andriessen did say no to the cabinet compromise, but the question is whether you always must resign yourself to a no." He added that the differences of opinion with Andriessen are, in his opinion, not so profound that Andriessen should have to resign.

CDA group leader Lubbers said he accepted Andriessen's request to resign as a personal defeat, because he recently urgently appealed to Andriessen to remain. Lubbers hinted that fatigue could have perhaps played a role in Andriessen's decision to resign. According to him, there were no great differences of opinion between Albeda and Andriessen but "he saw Andriessen not remaining any longer," especially in view of the expected important problems in making and carrying out the economies of 3 billion guilders.

Before it was known that the cabinet still would try to keep Andriessen on board or at least to limit the dispute to a ministerial crisis, VVD group leader Rietkerk declared that the VVD always had supported Andriessen's policy wholeheartedly and that it would be very difficult for the VVD ministers

not to follow Andriessen's example. Yesterday noon he considered the chances of getting Andriessen to change his mind very slight.

The acting PvdA group leader, doctoral candidate E. van Thijn thought that the Van Agt Cabinet should resign without further ado, now that the minister of finance cannot be responsible for policy, since he holds the key post in the cabinet.

According to Van Thijn, "Andriessen is the spiritual father of the 'specifications' policy, his departure affects all cabinet policy. There is no question of a ministerial crisis, but of a policy crisis and therefore the cabinet must resign." The acting D'66 group leader Brinkhorst (Terlouw is sick) expressed himself in a similar vein.

'Unwholesome'

PNV [Netherlands Trades Union Federation] Chairman Kok criticized what he called the "unwholesome machinations" in The Hague. The cabinet now has been involved for 6 weeks secretly discussing what social-economic measures to take. He thought that the credibility of the policy which soon must be submitted to the social partner is not improving. Kok said that the PNV actions in progress in the Rhine mouth area are not affected by the crisis in The Hague. He was of the opinion that the cabinet would have to resign, but according to Kok, "their own employment is apparently most important of all to the ministers."

Cabinet Fights Over Allotments

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 21 Feb 80 p 3

[Article by editor Jose Toirkens: Weeks Long Crisis in Cabinet Dispute About Billions]

[Text] The Hague 21 February--Andriessen's decision to resign as minister of finance occurred after the cabinet had been in a crisis for weeks. The viewpoints of Minister of Finance Andriessen and Minister of Social Affairs Albada about the question where priority must be given in the solution of social economic problems were diametrically opposed to each other during these weeks.

However, while in Minister Albada's view there was some flexibility--he would be willing under certain conditions to go

along with Prime Minister Van Agt's compromise--Andriessen consistently stuck to his initial position: in the first place the government's financial position must again be sound. For this purpose economies of at least 4 billion guilders are necessary and such wage restraint that all income groups will follow it.

The weeks' long struggle in the Catshuis was aggravated especially about the amount of the necessary economies, but fundamentally it involved the direction of the policy in coming years and the entire philosophy behind that policy.

New Figures

The origin of the conflict was at the beginning of January when the statisticians of the Central Planning Bureau submitted to the cabinet new figures on the development of our economy in 1980.

The unforeseen oil price increases and especially the great disappointment in tax revenues would lead, without government intervention, to a substantial deterioration of our economy, higher inflation and unemployment, a larger budget deficit and less profit for business. Prime Minister Van Agt mentioned a national impoverishment of 7 billion guilders. The cabinet took measures at the same time: When the conversation with the Labor Foundation did not lead to an agreement on voluntary wage restraint, a pay freeze was announced. A ceiling on expenditures and a ceiling on public employees appeared later in the month.

In the selection of priorities for the policy Albeda chose discussion with employers and employees about a voluntary wage agreement in 1980. For that purpose cabinet policy would have to be so organized that no employment would be lost and that alongside proposals for wage restraint there would be concomitant measures, including the proposal for a new capital gains distribution.

Depression

Albeda also thought that people's purchasing power should not be affected as much as Andriessen had in mind. That would lead to a drop in spending, which would again result in greater unemployment. The cabinet would then itself see to it that our economy winds up in the depression which the

Central Planning Bureau predicted. Moreover, Albeda questioned the Central Planning Bureau's figures. He could not share the extreme pessimism which dominated minister Andriessen. We did not want more than 2 billion guilders in economies.

The consistent attitude of Minister Andriessen was based both on his character as well as his position. As Minister of Finance he must see that no unexplainable gaps appear in the state's accounting book.

Consequently the high financial deficit worried him: over 6.5 percent instead of the 5.5 percent which he and Dr Zijlstra, the president of the Nederlandse Bank, considered the maximum allowable and financeable. Zijlstra's pressure on Andriessen's policy seems to have been very great. The latter had repeatedly indicated in the past that he would not cooperate in financing a budget deficit which would further play inflation's game. If it was up to the Nederlandse Bank, the amount of money would consequently not be increased.

Record Height

That means that the minister of finance is especially dependent on loans on the capital market to cover his deficit. Because he must compete there with business, which needs money, for example, for investments and housing construction, too great a demand for money by the government leads to an increase of interest. Dutch interest has now risen to a record height. An even higher increase could put many businesses in the red. All that meant that a financial deficit, as was estimated by the Central Planning Bureau, according to Andriessen, could not be financed any longer.

Zijlstra's position regarding the policy to be carried out by Andriessen, was even stronger because the government's capacity to borrow short term funds at the Nederlandse Bank is practically exhausted. It is unusual that it is happening so early in the year. Normally, being in the red occasionally appears, when very many payments come due all at once.

Minister Albeda feels himself supported by CDA group leader Lubbers more than Minister Andriessen. In an interview with NRC HANDELSBLAD on 12 January, he declared for the first time very emphatically that the cabinet must see to it that the purchasing power of the lowest paid is not affected and that economies are so limited that no employment is lost. Later

Lubbers also mentioned [word missing] billion. As the conversations in the cabinet proceeded, the opposition among other ministers to Andriessen's radical economy proposals began to increase. The first to protest were Scholten (defense) and Beelaerts van Blokland (public housing).

Readjusted

Their departments were hard hit by the overall economies which Andriessen proposed for all departments. Political consultation with the government parliamentary groups led to Andriessen's economy plans being readjusted on that point. However the amount of the proposals was still around 4 billion guilders. On Friday 8 February Prime Minister Van Agt wrote to the Second Chamber that he hoped to complete the economy plans soon, so that talks could be held with the social partners about wages. He would repeat that letter again a week later.

However, at that time, it was already clear that the differences between Andriessen's policy and Albeda's policy were practically irreconcilable. In the weekend of 9 February all VVD ministers dropped below Andriessen. The following Monday there was a compromise proposal of Prime Minister Van Agt to limit economies to 2.7 billion guilders. Both Andriessen as well as Albeda continued to stick to their former position. The cabinet broke up at night dejected. Discussion with group leaders Lubbers and Rietkerk led the following noon to the conversations being continued Wednesday.

However, the cabinet could only draw the conclusion that there was no way out, that the conversation with the social partners could not go through the following day and that the bill which would authorize the government to intervene after 10 March in wages, meanwhile will not materialize. The previous week on Friday, a day and evening meeting, again did not bring the solution closer.

Therefore last Monday Prime Minister Van Agt brought up for a vote an adjusted compromise proposal which he submitted (3 billion guilders in economies). The VVD ministers went along with the compromise. Andriessen and Albeda voted against it. Andriessen was against it because he did not find the proposals substantial enough, Albeda because he thought the economies too high and he obtained too few promises of supportive policy and maintenance of purchasing power for the lowest paid. Albeda still saw opportunities to discuss supportive policy further in the cabinet.

Alone

Andriessen was deprived of all support, both inside as well as outside the cabinet and he drew from that the conclusion that he would have to resign. Whether Albeda still gets his way somewhat more than the rest of the cabinet wanted to allow him Monday will soon be seen.

Today there should again be a meeting about the letter which Albeda wants to send to the social partners. The draft has been ready for several days. However, until now he obtained no permission to send the letter.

8490

CS0: 3105

PRIME MINISTER SA CARNEIRO INTERVIEWED ON DOMESTIC, INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

LD171420 Lisbon Domestic Service in Portuguese 0001 GMT 17 Mar 80 LD

[Report on 16 March interview granted by Portuguese Prime Minister Sa Carneiro to RTP-1 journalists Jose Eduardo Moniz Antonio Mega Ferreira-- questions summarized by radio announcer, Carneiro's replies recorded]

[Excerpts] [Question] Prime Minister Sa Carneiro was interviewed this evening on television's first channel. In view of the situation in the transport sector [the previous news item reported the start of the railmen's strike] this topical question was bound to arise during the interview. Starting with a succinct analysis of the country's economic situation, in which the adopted austerity measures and last February's price rises-- indispensable in Sa Carneiro's opinion--provide the basis for preventing inflation from reaching 20 percent--in 1979 it was as high as 24 percent-- the prime minister went on to announce a decision that should go some way toward reassuring the public.

[Answer] There will be no widespread rises in transport fares. There may be isolated rises in special services, such as the first class service on the Lisbon-Faro air links, but, generally speaking, there will be no rise in transport fares, despite the extra burden this represents to the state. The fact is, the public has been very overburdened and, moreover, there exist no immediate conditions for compensating any rise with an improvement in quality.

[Question] In this connection and in connection with the revaluation of the escudo, which had led to a fall in the costs of some imported goods, the prime minister drew attention to the difficulty that the government will have in meeting its budgeted commitments if inflation rises any further, which will happen, he stated, if some current pay demands of the order of 25 to 30 percent are granted. [Passage omitted on government-opposition confrontation]

A piece of news conveyed by the prime minister concerned the way in which the government intends to mark the historic 25 April anniversary [of the 1974 coup].

[Answer] I hope to be able to announce on that date a program of assistance to the farmers of northern Portugal, a program that never came into being in the past. I would also like to announce other measures of social justice on the same occasion, for it seems to me, and this is the government's view, that any celebrations--be it the 25 April, the 10 June, or the Camoes anniversary--are best marked by improving the people's living standards rather than by speeches, public sessions and such like. Although important, they are mere external trappings. Such is the government's intention, which in fact is fully in keeping with the spirit of 25 April, with its goal of social justice.

[Question] Back to the subject of confrontation, it exists at present in the specific area of the agrarian reform. Sa Carneiro maintained that actual physical confrontation in Alentejo Province has been very limited, pointing out that in 95 instances of handing over tracts of land to the former owners under the right-of-retention clause, incidents occurred in only 7 of them, and of minor significance at that. He stressed that the government will continue to enforce the agrarian reform law which, he emphasized, is not actually of its own making.

[Answer] Above all we are going to do--we are in fact already doing--something unprecedented: We shall enforce the law not only by handing tracts of land to the former owners under the right-of-retention clause but also by giving land to landless farmers. In my opinion this is the real point of agrarian reform, of true agrarian reform. To carry out an agrarian reform is, above all, to share the land, to boost production.

We must also think of the true agricultural reform that the country needs in the center and north of Portugal, which will entail effective assistance to the farmers of those regions, assistance that has so far been nonexistent. There must be a concentration of human and financial resources not only in the agrarian reform region but also in the center and north of the country and in the Algarve.

[Question] A subject that was bound to be raised was the current political situation, especially the relations among the organs of sovereignty. In this connection the prime minister stated that, in his opinion, the much proclaimed institutional solidarity is nonexistent. He explained why:

[Answer] I do not see how you can claim that there is institutional solidarity when members of an organ of sovereignty, even if in a personal capacity, engage in attacks on the government elected by the Portuguese on 2 December. Just as, conversely, the government could not claim solidarity with the Council of the Revolution if members of the government engaged in attacks on the council or on the president of the republic--which has not happened so far and will not happen. Neither the government as a whole nor any of its members have ever attacked the Council of the Revolution or the president of the republic. Nor has it, or they, said any [few words indistinct] things.

Such are the political facts that must, in my opinion, be kept in mind and the proper conclusions be drawn so that matters may be clear and transport as befits a democracy. As far as I am concerned, the conclusion to be drawn from this regrettably agitated week, during which attempts were made to cause the government serious problems and curtail its ability to administrate and make decisions with the required calm and serenity--with the country aware of what was going on--one clear conclusion can be drawn: That the only real and indestructable solidarity is that between the government and the majority that supports it. Which in a way is understandable, because the other organs of sovereignty advocate other political blueprints. They never made a secret of that, not even before the elections.

[LD171430] Anyway, the important thing is that the organs of sovereignty are functioning properly. May they, within the measure of what is possible, refrain from attacking one another, from bringing about confrontations and ruptures. May such matters be clear to the citizens of this country in a year when so many are already concerned with the next elections--a question that does not worry the government overmuch.

[Question] Sa Carneiro declared that he does not even consider the possibility of an antigovernment military coup. It will be recalled this possibility was aired in recent reports alleging a planned military takeover, reports subsequently described as false by the presidency of the republic.

[Answer] The government never considered the possibility of a military coup d'etat occurring. And it never considered it because the armed forces should not be confused with the Council of the Revolution nor with any of its members. The armed forces--whose role in a democratic society is fundamental, and will continue to be fundamental in Portugal after the transition period in terms of defense and in terms of the strengthening, protection and consolidation of the authority of the state and of the democratic institutions, and of national independence--the armed forces have remained aloof from politics in all these disputes. They have displayed an exemplary dignity and uprightness. And this is why the government never believed, and publicly stated it, in the possibility of a coup d'etat or a military takeover in Portugal.

The problem is a different one, it is a political problem and concerns the unwillingness of the parliamentary and extraparlimentary opposition to respect the choice of the electorate.

[Question] The Portuguese have the right to demand of the organs of sovereignty respect for their wish for and need of stability, security and effective government, Sa Carneiro said, adding that it is in this regard that his doubts on the president of the republic and the Council of the Revolution lay. The prime minister maintained that the confrontation among organs of sovereignty is the initiative of an opposition led by the Communist Party and adhered to by the Socialist Party, some members of the Council of the Revolution and groups of workers and trade unions. But, he

added, the government takes a strictly political view of the matter and this enables it to overcome the problem.

Speaking of his government's economic policy, Sa Carneiro maintained that it is aimed at improving the purchasing power of the Portuguese. He said that an overall plan is being studied and will shortly be implemented, aimed at encouraging investment, an encouragement that will take place in the framework of the new law demarcating the boundary line between public and private sectors. The prime minister added that the government intends to effect the compensation payments in treasury bonds as soon as possible--in a matter of months. With regard to the fiscal sphere Sa Carneiro stated:

[Answer] We have no reliable, or rather, accurate figures, but it is estimated that the state is owed something in the order of 50 billion escudos in unpaid taxes. To give an idea of the magnitude of this figure I would point out that the total taxes collected in 1979 amounted to 140.8 billion escudos. How can the state build the schools, hospitals and all the improvements that the country so needs? Can you imagine the sense of injustice felt by those who punctually pay their taxes? This is why I take the opportunity of urging, and the government will continue to do so, all these who are remiss in paying their taxes, who are being unfair on their fellow citizens and are giving proof of a lack of civic spirit and maturity. The government expects them to put matters right and therefore has decided to declare a fiscal truce so as to enable these people to rapidly settle their debts to the state in a few installments on a low interest rate.

[LD171440] [Question] The prime minister also spoke of the recent revaluation of the escudo. He gave the reasons why he believes that the government acted correctly and expressed a certain yet guarded optimism with regard to the future.

[Answer] If we manage to get a grip on inflation we shall in due course reduce the amount of the monthly sliding devaluation and, should the results of our economic policy actually surpass our own expectations, we might even consider stopping the devaluation altogether, or indeed, of revaluing the escudo. But I do not want to be overoptimistic. We all know of the countless economic difficulties confronting us, we all know how hard the international crisis is hitting us, how very hard the rises in the price of oil and of our imports are hitting us. In these circumstances Portugal, a small country lacking in resources, whose basic resources are human beings, must observe great discipline. The entire nation, all its citizens, all Portuguese, must observe great labor discipline, must increase productivity if we are to improve our living standards. Even if the government's overall economic policy proves successful, as I expect it to, without a collective and general effort we shall not get out of our present situation, we will be unable to effect the improvement in living standards demanded by the rules of social justice. Furthermore, without such an unstinting collective effort we shall not deserve, nor shall we receive, the support, in certain areas, which we have been assured by the EEC to speed up our membership and reduce the gap that separates us from the developed countries of Europe.

[Question] Foreign relations were also raised in the interview. This is another area in which government policy has been bitterly attacked. Sa Carneiro spoke of the government's attitudes as being in keeping with its program and stated that there is no disagreement between him and Foreign Minister Freitas do Amaral. Relations with the Portuguese-speaking countries, which seem to have been given a certain boost of late, were described by the prime minister as follows:

[Answer] There is no particular offensive under way. What there is is the defense of Portugal's interests as far as rapprochement with the former colonies is concerned. Such rapprochement is in our country's interests and, judging from my conversations, is also in the interests of the young republics. The intensification of mutually advantageous cooperation is not motivated by partisan or ideological reasons but rather by reasons of national interest, and take place at state level. Such relationships, such cooperation, take place between states and between governments, not between political parties or other forces. And these principles have been fully accepted by my interlocutors, the ambassadors of the young republics, as they themselves, some of them at least, have confirmed.

[LD171448] [Announcer] Speaking of the international situation and specifically of detente Sa Carneiro declared:

[Answer] Personally I believe that the period of detente, of so-called relaxation, contributed essentially to the strengthening of Soviet positions, both in Europe and in the rest of the world. As far as I am concerned the two main developments of the seventies in the Soviet camp were the report by Krushchev denouncing Stalinism and the publication of Solzhenytsin's "Gulag Archipelago." These developments were later to be balanced out by the policy of detente. They revealed the true face of a certain regime but were subsequently neglected, balanced out, overcome, by the policy of detente, a policy now directly placed in jeopardy by the Soviet Union with its military invasion of Afghanistan.

[Question] Asked toward the end of the interview about the possibility of nuclear missiles being deployed on Portuguese territory, the prime minister replied that any decision would belong exclusively to the armed forces, not to the government. Still on international policy Sa Carneiro had the following to say:

[Answer] I would like to see the Western countries united in a common policy, less divided, conscious that all are equally threatened. This fact necessitates a strengthening of unity, of solidarity among the peoples and among their countries, and I would like to see this realized, not merely in the form of rearmament or of strengthening of armaments, but also in the form of political acts of rapprochement. I would like to see an awareness that economic underdevelopment and the nonexistence of democratic regimes in many countries pose a threat to world peace and security and that the organization of the free world is essential to international security.

I would like to see an increasing cooperation among the Western countries. Our country and government are fully prepared to be part of this process of strengthening the countries that uphold the same cultural and human values, that above all believe in the importance of the individual, his preservation and his rights.

[Question] In his interview the prime minister was also asked about the Portuguese Government's stand on the boycott on the Moscow Olympics being planned by several countries. This was particularly topical since Portugal will be represented today in Geneva at the meeting that will consider the possibility of an alternative games.

Sa Carneiro replied that the Olympic Committee has full sovereignty to decide on whether the selected teams should or should not participate and that the question has in fact already been submitted for the consideration of the assembly of the republic, although public opinion should also be taken into account.

[Answer] One thing is certain. Whatever the stand adopted by the relevant authorities, the Olympic games will be broadcast in Portugal. I think there has never been a question of not broadcasting the games.

Our country is following the situation closely. Our government is in touch with other governments, namely with those of the EEC, in order to ascertain the general situation. I think it would be wrong to go--and indeed I believe that our athletes themselves would feel uncomfortable and would rather not be there--to an Olympic games that had been totally transformed into an exercise of Soviet propaganda. This would come about if the Western countries, namely the European countries, jointly decided not to participate, thereby following the example of the Arab and other countries, including European ones, that have already made such a decision. The games would then clearly become a communist propaganda maneuver, and I believe that neither our sportsmen nor our Olympic authorities would feel comfortable there.

A lot depends, therefore, on the overall situation and the government will keep itself informed. But it will respect the limits of its jurisdiction and will try to exercise its best judgment in the defense of our country's interests with regard to this matter.

[Question] At any rate the prime minister thinks that the law should be respected even though a certain politicization is clear in the present dispute. But, he added, the goal at the birth of the Olympic games was a political one when it called for rapprochement among all peoples. However, that goal was political in a pure and praiseworthy sense, which has not always been the case in the history of the games.

CSO: 3101

CAP'S CASQUEIRO ON DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE LEADERSHIP

Lisbon POVO LIVRE in Portuguese 6 Feb 80 p 3

[Interview with Secretary General Casqueiro, of the Portuguese Farmers Association, date and place not given]

[Excerpts] POVO LIVRE: Speaking again of the AD [Democratic Alliance]: There are those who say that in the Assembly of the Republic, the groups that constitute the AD are not in agreement. What do you think?

Casqueiro: I see more advantages than problems in the diversity of trends within the AD. But its leaders cannot go on contemplating their navels instead of thinking about the country. Sometimes I think the Assembly of the Republic has a lot of Indians and no chief.

POVO LIVRE: Do you think there is a lack of political leadership within the AD?

Casqueiro: I think the lack of a well-defined policy is directly related to the lack of well-defined institutional leadership in the AD.

POVO LIVRE: Do you think that the center of power within the AD has yet to be defined? Where would you place it--in the government, the parties, the parliamentary groups?

Casqueiro: There has to be very good sense and a certain amount of flexibility in locating the "political center" of the Democratic Alliance, which can only be arrived at through a perfect interrelation between the various centers of decision, such that the government is the "motor," without downplaying the fundamental role of the parties or transforming the deputies of the parliamentary majority into mere instruments of the prime minister or the government.

It is essential that the leadership of Sa Carneiro and Freitas do Amaral be reflected in a closer relationship with the deputies of their respective parties. The capacity to criticize should not be confused with an unproductive gut warfare, ignoring political enemies to look for conflict among friends.

POVO LIVRE: Some see you as a CDS "reformist." Do you think the reformists could be a source of division in the AD? Do you think, as some analysts imply, that the reformists are closer to Eanes than to the AD?

Casqueiro: There are aspects to the question which only the reformists can answer. It is my understanding that the reformists are fundamental, a basic part of the AD parliamentary majority, not only in the number of votes they represent, but in the philosophical position they take and the intellectual and political quality of some of their number. Regarding the much-discussed problem of disagreements between the AD and the reformists, linked to General Eanes, I think it is nonsense. I think certain analysts confuse a tactical position of the reformists--the fact that they feel institutional conflict between the government and the president of the republic is undesirable--with a presidentialist strategy expressed in the "Reformist Manifesto." In my understanding, presidentialism should not be confused with "Eanism." I don't see how men with political acumen and intellect like Antonio Barreto, Manuel Lucena, Cunha Rego, Sousa Tavares or even Medeiros Ferreira can still have any political doubts about Ramalho Eanes.

6362

CSO: 4401

PCP SCORES U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE, CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO

LD121643 Lisbon AVANTE! in PORTUGUESE 6 Mar 80 p 2 LD

[Apparent text of "Portuguese Communist Party [PCP] Central Committee Political Commission Note Concerning NATO Pressures on Portugal"]

[Text] 1--The recent and upcoming naval exercises included in NATO's activities draw our attention once more to the pressures being exerted by that military-political alliance on democratic Portugal.

2--A "Portuguese-U.S. Phibex" amphibious exercise, including a marine landing at Costa da Gale, between Troia and Sines, took place at the end of February.

This is the first time that these U.S. troops, infamous for their involvement in several U.S. armed interventions against small independent countries, have landed on our soil. A battalion of Portuguese infantry took part in these exercises, but it was split up and integrated with the U.S. troops. Furthermore, the latter took full charge of communications. This was therefore a U.S. Marine exercise to which Portugal opened its coastlines and contributed some troops.

3--Moreover, once again the 25 April and 1 May celebrations will be taking place in the presence of a foreign NATO force and during a naval exercise called "Opengate 80."

In past years it has been asserted that these exercises were planned long in advance and that there is no significance in the dates on which they take place. But 25 April [1980] will be the sixth anniversary [of the 1974 revolution] and the exercises about to take place were agreed and accepted after that historic date which is so important to Portugal. The holding of "Opengate 80" at a time which coincides exactly with a period encompassing both the "freedom festival" and the "workers festival" imposes an undesired presence on our country and our people. The aim of this presence is to exert unacceptable pressure on an independent country, on a people which has managed to free itself from fascism and to achieve complete decolonization, despite all the aid which NATO supplied to the fascist and colonialist regime of Salazar and Caetano.

4--Frequent NATO exercises in Portugal, the foreign bases in our country, the permanent presence of a large number of U.S. troops (according to "The U.S. War Machine" published by Hamlyn in London, 1978, there were 1,729 U.S. soldiers in Portugal in July 1977). The strengthening of their role within the NATO structures based in Portugal to the detriment of Portuguese officers--as in the recent instance in which a Portuguese admiral was replaced by a U.S. officer within Comiberlant--are some of the forms taken by NATO, and especially U.S. interference in Portuguese policy. These interferences are encouraged by the present Sa Carneiro-Freitas do Amaral government through its policy of humble submission to foreign imperialism.

5--As is well known, the PCP has always opposed Portugal's participation in NATO and therefore advocates its withdrawal and the closure of all foreign military bases on national territory.

The path to these objectives must, due to their complexity, be framed in the general context of the struggle for detente and for resolving European and international problems and within the process leading to the elimination of military blocs. In accordance with this aim and with Article 7 of the Portuguese Constitution, which expressly envisages "general disarmament and the elimination of military-political blocs," the PCP considers negative Portugal's orientation toward a greater commitment within this aggressive military bloc which, through its activities, is increasingly clearly damaging our country's patriotic spirit and independence.

Lisbon, 5 March 1980.

[Signed] PCP Central Committee Political Commission.

CSO: 3101

BRIEFS

SOLAR ENERGY UNIT--Appearing on the program "At Issue," taped yesterday by the RTP [Portuguese Television], Alvaro Barreto, minister of industry and energy, announced that the Portuguese Electric Power Co has received the "green light" to study the proposal for construction of a 100-KW solar energy unit, which would probably be installed in Alentejo. The proposal was presented by the "New Technologies" Division of MAN, an FRG firm, in conjunction with Dornier, following contacts established during the Congress of the German Society for Solar Energy, held last October in Lisbon. The unit is of the type known as a "solar farm." Actually, it consists of an area about the size of a soccer field, on which are mounted mirrors that are continually faced toward the sun. There are 48 mirrors, divided into 12 units known as "Helioman" modules, each of which is about 8 meters long and 5 meters high. [Excerpts] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 9 Feb 80 p 3] 6362

CSO: 4401

REASONS FOR VOTERS' APATHY SCRUTINIZED

Vienna EUROPAEISCHE RUNDSCHAU in German No 1, Jan 80 pp 47-53

[Article by Gerd H. Padel: "Why Are the Swiss Voters Striking?"]

[Text] Even those who do not consider a large turnout an indicator of the citizens' commitment to their polity were bound to be taken aback by the results of the Swiss parliamentary elections of last October. And those Swiss journalists or politicians who had persistently tried to induce their fellow-citizens to go to the polls eventually emerged from this election campaign the actual losers: For in spite of an unprecedented--and for Swiss conditions unheard-of--volume of private and party propaganda and media-supplied information, for the first time since the introduction of proportional representation in 1919 the voter turnout fell short of 50 percent. Thus the "Federal Councils," i.e. the 200-member National Council (parliament) and the 46-member Council of Cantons (representatives of the cantons) were elected by a minority of the citizens entitled to vote.

To be sure, in the last few years the Swiss have become accustomed to a poor turnout for elections and referenda. And a public opinion poll conducted in the German-speaking parts of Switzerland a few weeks before the parliamentary elections had indicated a continuing trend toward indifference. The report stated that "only every sixth voter is strongly interested in the outcome of the parliamentary elections." And another result of the poll could be taken as an explanation of this lack of interest: "Over 50 percent of the voters do not expect any changes in federal politics after the elections."

The poll supplied an additional explanation of the citizens' reluctance to expose themselves to the stress of voting: "Sixty-one percent of the respondents are generally satisfied with the conditions in Switzerland ... Nine percent consider the political system in Switzerland to be 'very good'; 58 percent rated the political system 'good,' while 25 percent rated it 'fair.' The need for basic changes is minimal (5 percent) ..." However, over two-thirds of the respondents (69 percent) had stated they intended to go to the polls. The fact that the actual turnout fell short of this projection by a good 20 percent gave rise to consternation--probably more so

on the part of politicians and journalists than on the part of the general public--and fresh speculation as to the causes of the "voters' abstention."

In the foreign press, which generally hardly takes notice of Swiss parliamentary elections--partly on account of the stable "uneventfulness" of their results and partly on account of the fact that for outsiders the place value of such elections in the Swiss plebiscitary democracy is unfathomable--the negative participation trend practically was the only event considered noteworthy.

Some commentators even felt called upon to speculate about a potential weakening of the Swiss democracy. However, the situation does not appear to be that serious after all.

The Lessons of the Past

For example, one could derive a certain measure of reassurance from the fact that during the period from the establishment of the Swiss Confederation in 1848 up to the introduction of proportional representation in 1919 the average voter turnout amounted to 54 percent; and this situation persisted in spite of the fact that in comparison with today the national elections of that time were far more important, since the instruments of direct democracy (initiative and referendum) on the federal level were still largely unavailable, at least until the constitutional amendment of 1891.

Nevertheless, during that stage of its development, Switzerland was considered one of the most progressive liberal democracies in the world.

Upon closer examination, however, this reassuring reference to the early years of the modern Swiss state--which incidentally were politically lively and intense--is not particularly relevant. For after 1919, upon the introduction of proportional representation, which improved the smaller constituencies' chances of success, the turnout immediately increased to approximately 80 percent. And as late as 1947, 72 percent of the electorate went to the polls.

There is one particular point, however, in regard to which the above parallel between the 70 years of majority voting and the present low turnout is instructive.

According to a recent extensive study on the low average and the great fluctuations of the voter turnout around the middle of the 19th century, the citizens refused to participate in the elections, whenever they were convinced that the results were predetermined, either on account of strong majorities or on account of the fact that the parties had already divided up the seats in a "voluntary proportionate arrangement." Under such conditions, the voters could be motivated neither by the parties nor by general appeals to their civic conscience.

This would seem to indicate that the present apathy of the voters cannot simply be attributed to the laziness of sated and satisfied people or to conservative tendencies, but that it could at least to some extent be a result of the development of Switzerland's political system during the last 20 years.

Voter Turnout for Parliamentary Elections

1955	70.1 Percent
1959	68.5
1963	66.1
1967	65.7
1971	56.9
1975	52.4
1979	47.9

In a simplifying manner, one could say that in keeping with its origins and the intentions of its creators this system has been oriented toward stability as a desirable goal. Stability in domestic affairs--and by virtue of the principle of neutrality in foreign affairs as well--can definitely be considered a necessity, even a basis of existence, for a small state made up of 23 "sovereign" cantons the population of which is composed of four different language groups, i.e. for a nation that can exist only by virtue of its sense of unity. However, according to the intentions of the fathers and subsequent promoters of the Swiss federal state, stability was not to mean immobility and torpidity; rather, it was equated with all the possibilities inherent in a continuous, if slow, development generated and controlled by the "sovereign," the people. This development actually took place, making Switzerland a state whose combination of "freedom and socialism" comes off well in a comparison with other countries. But if during the period following World War II--and especially in the last 20 years--the voters increasingly came to feel that their participation--above all in national elections--was unnecessary, since nothing would change anyhow, this must be attributed to a number of factors. Some of these factors are built into the political system, "programmed" as it were; others resulted from recent developments and have become increasingly important. Since these factors are numerous and complex, only the most important ones can be listed here.

Decisive Influence of Federalism

One of these factors is federalism, the will to maintain the maximum possible diversity and independence of the cantons, the member states of the confederacy. This will has remained undiminished and is undoubtedly deeply rooted in the people. It exerts a decisive influence on the mode of government--in the sense of a planned counterforce vis-a-vis an overly "centralized leadership"--insofar as in the parliamentary two-chamber system the cantons in the Council of Cantons enjoy complete equality with the parliament in regard to the right of codetermination. Moreover, since for all

important national referenda (with the exception of the referendum against laws passed by the parliament) the "cantonal majority," i.e. the consent of the majority of the cantons, is required as well, and since each canton can also introduce a bill or a "cantonal initiative" for a constitutional amendment, the cantons remain a crucial factor in the interplay of forces on the federal level.

Thus it goes without saying that the parties of the country are organized in accordance with federal principles and that their bases are to be found in the cantons and communities. Strictly speaking, the Swiss national parties are parent organizations of the cantonal parties, which frequently act on their own initiative. Another factor is the electoral system: The elections to the National Council, the "People's Chamber" (the members of the Council of Cantons are anyhow elected by the cantons), are "cantonal" rather than "federal" ballots, for each canton forms an electoral district which may delegate to Bern its share--commensurate with its population--of the 200 National Council members. Commenting on the elections, the journalist Oskar Reck stated:

"As compared with other countries, the role of our cantonal electoral districts in blocking the federal nomination of parliamentary deputies is much more striking. This state of affairs is remarkable, since it is one of the main reasons for the political stability. One could say that the cantonal obstructions prevent--or at least impede--Swiss landslides. And they favor the established and regionally rooted political groups ..." (BASLER ZEITUNG, 19 October 1979)

The People's Rights of Initiative and Referendum

Aside from federalism, the people's right to introduce initiatives and referenda represents an important factor in the system of checks and balances in the Swiss federal state. Through an initiative, 100,000 voters can demand a partial amendment, but also a total revision of the constitution. If such requests are introduced by the government or the parliament, they must be submitted to the people (obligatory referendum). Furthermore, within a period of 90 days, 50,000 citizens entitled to vote can request a national referendum to decide whether or not a bill passed by the government and the parliament may be put into force.

"The initiative is a motor capable of impelling the government and the parliament; the referendum, on the other hand, resembles an effective brake capable of bringing the legislative machinery to an abrupt halt. Thus one could liken the semidirect democracy to a vehicle which aside from the driver (government and parliament) contains for reasons of safety gas and brake pedals for the passenger as well ..."¹

Whereas the initiatives usually do not fare too well in the plebiscites, the referendum affords the "sovereign" enormous possibilities of intervention in the legislative processes of the government and the parliament,

thus exerting a strong influence on the conduct of government agencies and politicians. To cite a telling, if grotesque, example: In 1978, when the government through the so-called "time bill" sought authorization for the introduction of daylight-saving time in Switzerland, the parliament consented. However, the referendum requested by the farmers (on account of their fears concerning an "extension of the farmers' workday") was accepted in the plebiscite and the government was thus prevented from introducing daylight-saving time. After all of the European states had in the fall of 1979 declared their intention to introduce daylight-saving time in 1980, the Federal Council made another attempt, in order to spare Switzerland the fate of becoming a European "time island." This time, the "time bill" did not get past the newly elected National Council. One of the reasons advanced by the opposing majority: Since another referendum was to be expected, it would not be possible anyhow to introduce daylight-saving time according to schedule; consequently, it would be advisable to defer the final decision, in order to be able to study the effects of the "time island of Switzerland" experiment. Thus the stability is obtained at a price--a price that sometimes gets on the nerves of citizens not trained in patience.

One of the most important factors which have negatively affected the voters' attitude toward the electoral process on the federal--and, to some extent, cantonal--level is connected with the development of the party system during the last 20 years: For 20 years, there has been in effect the "concordance," i.e. the cooperation among the four biggest parties in the parliament, which resulted in the so-called "magic formula" in the formation of the seven-member Federal Council, the national government. Since 1959, the two federal councils have been electing to this "cabinet" two representatives each of the Liberal-Democratic Party (FDP), the Christian-Democratic People's Party (CVP) and the Social-Democratic Party (SPS), and one representative of the Swiss People's Party (the former Farmers', Workers' and Citizens' Party).²

Seats Held by the Parties in the Two Parliamentary Chambers

<i>Mandate der Parteien in beiden Parlamentskammern</i>						
	1) Nationalrat		2) Ständerat		3) Zusammen	Zusammen
	1975	1979	1975	1979	1975	1979
4) Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei	47	51	15	11	62	62
5) Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei	46	44	17	18	63	62
6) Sozialdemokratische Partei	55	51	5	9	60	60
7) Schweizerische Volkspartei	21	23	5	5	26	28
8) Landesring der Unabhängigen	11	8	1	—	12	8
9) Liberale Partei	6	8	1	3	7	11
10) Übrige	14	15	—	—	14	15
TOTAL	200	200	44	46	244	246

Key:

- | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. National Council | 6. Social-Democratic Party |
| 2. Council of Cantons | 7. Swiss People's Party |
| 3. Total | 8. Independent Party |
| 4. Liberal-Democratic Party | 9. Liberal Party |
| 5. Christian-Democratic Party | 10. Others |

In the new National Council, these four parties hold 169 of 200 seats, and in the Council of Cantons, 43 of a total of 46 seats; their share of the vote amounts to approximately 80 percent, an--at first glance--overwhelming majority. I am saying "at first glance," since the impression that the remaining 7 of the total of 11 parties, which (aside from some individual deputies) are represented in the parliament, form the opposition would be incorrect. A "government coalition," which according to an international press agency is supposed to have "gained a seat," does not exist. Nor is the impression of an Austrian radio commentator correct, according to whom SP losses in the National Council had been "offset" by its "coalition partners" FDP and SVP. In fact, under the most unfavorable conditions, the "concordance" among the four parties does not go beyond a roughly proportionate distribution of the government seats. But even under the most favorable conditions, it has so far accomplished no more than rudimentary drafts of common objectives for a new legislative period.

Collegium and Concordance--But No "Coalition"

The government itself shows only few of the characteristics of a "coalition"; it functions as a collegium, the decisions of which must be made and supported by all of its members, if necessary against their own party. Thus it goes without saying that not nearly all of the decisions of the government collegium are backed by the parties represented, let alone by all of their deputies.

Thus the "concordance" is primarily the result of the fact that none of the participant parties would in any way be capable of forming a majority government on its own and that these parties--above all the "three big ones," the FDP, the SPS and the CVP--are themselves coalitions, the constituent elements of which are often prepared--in the parliament or in national referenda--to join the opposition. It is for this reason that it has so far not been possible to form within the existing "concordance" partial coalitions that in numerical terms would be capable of forming a government. In the last few years, the Social Democrats, whose left wing is quite willing to take this risk, have shown the greatest desire to break away and to drink from the "fountain of youth of the opposition." But since their chances of forming a majority government--even in league with the few representatives of the extreme left in the parliament--are presently minimal, the SP's moderate members, who are in the majority, are asking themselves, probably with reason, what chances and prospects vis-a-vis the people the "drink from the fountain of youth" would actually open up for them.

Two Cardinal Problems

Thus, against the background of the "concordance development" of the Swiss democracy since 1959, the uneasiness of the voters can be said to be focused on two basic problems:

Firstly, there is the fact that although an opposition does exist in this state, it hardly has any concrete form: Since it is made up--in the parliament as well as in national referenda--of constantly changing alliances, it is usually not identifiable on the ticket and thus not eligible for those who feel it is time for a change.

The second problem consists in the impression--likewise not easily substantiated--that during their cooperation the big parties have increasingly been losing political power to interest groups standing behind them and that they have in this process become less and less concerned with the people. That this impression is not unfounded is indicated by the so-called "consulting sessions," at which the government acquaints itself with the position taken by important associations and institutions on a particular bill prior to its introduction in the parliament, which procedure not only results in long delays, but sometimes even in the shelving of important political projects.

The question as to the reasons for the low voter turnout will keep the politicians occupied for some time. But even if they succeed in finding a satisfactory explanation, one should keep in mind that the road from diagnosis to therapy can be a long one. One of the solutions conceivable would be to change the electoral system--to abandon proportional representation and reintroduce, at least to some extent, the direct vote. However, certain reform attempts in this direction proved abortive after a "consulting session" a few years ago. Another promising approach is the total revision of the federal constitution, which was launched a short time ago. However, the start of this project was rather laborious and its implementation will necessitate the participation and support of active citizens who would be prepared to risk part of their obviously cherished stability in favor of a new development.

A short time ago, Switzerland demonstrated its powers of renewal by creating--130 years after the foundation of the federal state--a new, 23rd canton, the Jura Canton, with the support of the overwhelming majority of the electorate and admitting this canton to the confederation.

It is certainly conceivable that in consequence of the parliamentary elections of 1979 the citizens will be impelled to participate more actively in the election of their representatives. For the rating of "it will do" is not sufficient--even in its double meaning--for the continued existence of a really vital democracy.

FOOTNOTES

1. Hans Tschaeni in: "Mini-Profil der Schweiz" [Profile of Switzerland], Aarau, Verlag Sauerlaender [Sauerlaender Publishing House].
2. The positions taken by these--internally quite heterogeneous--parties can be described as follows:

- FDP: Affirms adherence to liberalism, but definitely exhibits conservative traits articulated above all by representatives of economic interests.
- CVP: This "catholic-conservative" as well as Christian-social party covers a broad spectrum of opinion ranging from a traditional Christian conservatism to a quite strong left wing influenced by Christian-progressive ideas and rooted in the trade union movement. The party as a whole, however, claims to pursue a "bourgeois" policy.
- SPS: Social-democratic party of the European type; as regards its goals (and, to some extent, its problems), it is comparable to the German SPD.
- SVP: Conservative, middle-class party of farmers and workers. So far, the move toward a real "people's party," which had been the motive underlying the change of name, has not produced any significant changes or developments.

8760

CSO: 3103

PRESS COMPARES TEHRAN, BOGOTA HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

NC140845 Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 12 Mar 80 p 3 NC

[Commentary by Sami Kohen: "The Drama of the Hostages"]

[Text] When it was announced last week that the American hostages in Teheran would be turned over to the Revolution Council by the militant students, this development was interpreted to mean that the government in Iran had at last prevailed over the occupiers.

But, unfortunately, pledges were once again left unfulfilled, hopes for the release of the hostages once again disappointed, and more important, it has become apparent that an "authority vacuum" persists in Iran. To put it more precisely, President Bani-Sadr, Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh as well as the Revolution Council and the administration have been unable to influence the students and finally they have had to give in to them.

Khomeyni, who has recently been trying to maintain a balance between the Revolution Council or, to put it more correctly, between Bani-Sadr and the militants in the street, has this time sided with the occupiers. The Ayatollah may have felt compelled to act in this way, but this will undoubtedly increase "the administration chaos" and the internal political crisis in the country.

Khomeyni's decision has also led to the return of the UN Commission empty-handed and this makes the future of the hostages even more uncertain. This means that the occupation of the embassy will continue and that the assembly to be elected in May will decide the fate of the hostages.

Thus, the ordeal of the 49 American diplomats, who have been held hostage for the past 129 days, will continue, just like the 30 diplomats of various nationalities held hostages for the last 13 days in Bogota, thousands of kilometers away. The diplomats held hostage in the two capitals by militants are subjected to this ordeal for two different reasons. The only aspect these militant acts have in common is daily fear and terror for diplomats because they do not know what is going to happen to them.

However, fundamentally, the two events differ. In Iran, the occupiers have resorted to their militant acts with the blessing of Khomeyni, leader No 1.

They continue to enjoy this blessing today. But the militants in Bogota belong to a terrorist organization known as M-19, which is totally opposed by the state.

The aim of the Iranian students is to force the United States to return the shah and to admit "complicity" with the shah. While the aim of the militants in Colombia is to rescue their 300 friends from prison and to grab \$50 million. The Iranians are trying to push the United States into a tight corner and win public support for their campaign. Finally, the aim of the Colombians is to overthrow the present regime and introduce a Marxist order.

The hostages in Colombia are treated as "trump cards for bargaining" whereas those in Iran have been abandoned to their own fate and to the mercy of the militant occupiers, particularly after Khomeyni's latest decision and after the departure from Iran of the UN Commission. So, the drama of the diplomats in both Teheran and Bogota is continuing.

CSO: 4907

PRESS EVALUATES 'POWER QUARREL' IN IRAN

NC140900 Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 11 Mar 80 p 3 NC

[Editorial by Oktay Eksi: "The Lunatic on the Roof..."]

[Excerpts] The whole incident sounds as if there was "a lunatic on the roof."

You must have heard it over the radio or read it in the newspapers, but let me put it in a nutshell: The Iranian students, who had promise to turn over the American hostages--held by them since 4 November--to the Iranian Revolution Council, have now gone back on their word.

Imam Khomeyni intervened by demanding that the UN Commission "should first publish its findings." So, encouraged by Khomeyni, the students refused to fulfill their pledge.

Foreign Minister Qotbzadeh could not help posing a question which comes to everybody's mind: "We had promised that the UN Commission would be allowed to see the hostages. This was a promise made by the government. Now it is understood that our promises are absolutely worthless. How many governments are there in this country?"

It is sad, but this is the true position in Iran. In fact, it is natural for an anomalous situation to prevail for some time as a result of the confusion and excitement caused by the revolution. It is understood that Iran is still at the beginning of such a period. Imam Khomeyni is still the greatest authority in Iran. It is natural that this should be so for as long as he lives. For, the masses behind him are not far-sighted leaders possessing statesmanlike characteristics. They are the kind who follow the ayatollahs and who are prepared to plunge into any form of adventure.

But also other facts affect Iran. Developments like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the poor state of Iran's economy disturb the intellectuals who are worried about the future of their country. This must be the reason for the gradually developing quarrel between such intellectuals as Bani-Sadr and Sadeq Qotbzadeh--who advocate a more realistic policy in all matters, particularly in international relations--and the fanatic ayatollahs. The case of the hostages has helped to expose the dimensions of this quarrel more clearly.

It is still too early to predict when the "power quarrel" in Iran will assume a more "specific" form, and who will win. But the parliamentary elections to be held in April will enable the true intellectuals to assert their influence in a more effective manner.

It is only then that the lunatic on the roof will have to come down.

CSO: 4907

BRIEFS

PRISON RIOT ENDS--The riot started by certain prisoners in the Edirne closed prison ended today with the intervention of the security forces. Of the five prisoners who were injured during the intervention, Davut Gumussu died in the Edirne State Hospital, where he was taken for treatment. The 12 persons taken hostage by the prisoners were saved. According to the TRT Edirne correspondent, Edirne Governor Naci Babacan informed the rioters that 49 inmates will be sent to other prisons and asked them to release the hostages. When the governor's appeal was ignored, the security forces intervened around 1430. Five prisoners were injured when the security forces tried to enter rioters' section by using tear gas. Of the five injured prisoners, Gumussu later died in the hospital. The other injured inmates were taken to the Edirne State Hospital for treatment. Two pistols and five knives were found during searches conducted at the prison. Some of the prisoners had taken hostage 12 visitors 4 days ago demanding that the conditions at the prison be changed. [Text] [TA131853 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1600 GMT 13 Mar 80 TA]

TOB-DER LEADER DETAINED--TOB-DER [Turkish Teachers' Unity and Solidarity Association] leader Gultekin Gazioglu was detained by the Ankara Military Law Command. It is reported that Gazioglu was detained on the grounds that he called on teachers to strike on 24 December 1979. An investigation was also opened of the TOB-DER administrators on the same grounds. According to information received by TRT correspondents from martial law security officials, in the official justification for Gazioglu's detention, it was also stated that Gazioglu directed the teachers' strike on 24 December through instructions issued from the prison where he was being detained. A TRT correspondent also learned that the Martial Law Command opened an investigation of the 621 teachers who participated in the strike in Ankara on 24 December 1979 and that 100 of them were arrested. [Text] [TA132041 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 2000 GMT 13 Mar 80 TA]

FRG SHIP VISITS--A FRG naval training ship arrived in Istanbul today. The ship, which is called "Deutschland," has 27 officers, 118 noncommissioned officers, 86 naval academy students, 6 civilian teachers and 165 seamen. The ship will stay in Istanbul for 4 days. [Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1000 GMT 7 Mar 80 TA]

TERRORISTS ROB BANK--Three armed terrorists robbed the branch office of a bank in the Uckiyilar quarter of Izmir today. The robbers fled with 310,000 Turkish lira. [Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1600 GMT 6 Mar 80 TA]

MINISTER TO SAUDI ARABIA--An Islamic countries religious affairs and Awqaf ministers meeting will be held in Mecca, Saudi Arabia on 8 March to discuss the religious, social and cultural problems of these countries. State Minister Muhammed Kelleci, who will represent Turkey at the meeting, left for Saudi Arabia today. Kelleci will hold certain official contacts as well. Religious Affairs Director Tayyar Altikulac also left for Saudi Arabia with Kelleci. [Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1000 GMT 6 Mar 80 TA]

AGRICULTURE MINISTER RETURNS--Food, Agriculture and Livestock Breeding Minister Cemal Kulahli, who attended the OECD agriculture ministers meeting in Paris, returned to Turkey today. Kulahli said that the agriculture and food policies of OECD members were discussed during the meeting. [Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 2000 GMT 7 Mar 80 TA]

ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK MEETING--The Fourth General Congress of the Islamic Development Bank, which started in Jidda, Saudi Arabia on Tuesday, ended today. Finance Minister Ismet Sezgin, who represented Turkey at the Islamic Development Bank General Congress, said that an agreement was reached during the congress to further expand the activities of the bank. In a statement to the TRT on this subject, Sezgin noted that the issues of increasing the capital of the bank to 2 billion Islamic dinars and of securing additional resources through deposits and similar ways from member countries were emphasized during the meeting. In reply to a question, Sezgin said that the loans to be extended by the bank to Turkey this year will be greater than in previous years. Pointing out that the Islamic Development Bank has become the symbol of economic cooperation and solidarity among Islamic countries, Sezgin added that he held bilateral talks with the finance ministers of other Islamic countries during his stay in Jidda. Sezgin will return to Turkey on 15 March. [Text] [TA131830 Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1600 GMT 13 Mar 80 TA]

PLO REPRESENTATIVE ON 'POLITIKA'--The campaign for solidarity with the POLITIKA newspaper, closed down by the Istanbul Martial Law Command, is continuing both at home and abroad. Recently, PLO representative in Turkey Abu Firaz visited the Ankara office of the POLITIKA newspaper to convey his regrets and expressed his solidarity with the newspaper which he said [his organization] considered its own. Abu Firaz noted that such obstructive measures would not discourage those engaged in their rightful struggle and added that, on the contrary, it would sharpen their (?aspirations) describing the closing down of the POLITIKA newspaper as a new stage in this struggle. Abu Firaz said that the Turkish and Palestinian peoples were brotherly and anti-imperialist peoples. [Text] [TA140656 Voice of Turkish Communist Party [clandestine] in Turkish to Europe and Turkey 0600 GMT 14 Mar 80 TA]

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